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POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Baturin on Information About Coup Attempt

944K0930A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 12, Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Yuriy Baturin, aide to the president for national security affairs, by Andrey Uglanov and Pavel Lukyanchenko, under the "Exclusively for the Readers of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY" rubric; in the Kremlin, date not given: "Yu. Baturin: 'The Anonymous Author Is Being Sought'"]

[Text] Following a storm of rumors and reports about a "conspiracy" against the president, we sought comments from Yuriy Baturin, the aide to the president for national security affairs.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, information about the "coup" began to reach the editorial office as early as 6 March. Later on, a confidential document appeared, which was subsequently, a week later, published in the newspapers. What are the reasons for the appearance of this paper? Are you taking any actions?

[Baturin] This is perhaps the most public of all secret conspiracies of which I am aware. This is precisely why the attitude toward it is not that of one toward a conspiracy, but just that toward a certain political performance aimed at poisoning the atmosphere and creating an environment of suspicion.

Two scenarios are possible in this instance. The first scenario: One of those who thirst for power felt that he had revealed himself more than necessary. In this case, more smoke should be blown, as many people as possible should be named, and when this list has become sufficiently absurd in terms of the number of names and their combinations, then any other name will also be obscured on it—this is the smokescreen scenario.

Here is the second scenario. This work is a product of an overactive investigative imagination. When there are some signs of feeble encroachments on power, a person assesses them and arranges them in certain patterns: What could this be? Later, all of them fit together for the person and grow in volume. Subsequently, this person himself compiles such a paper and circulates it as extensively as possible, for example, in order to bring this to the attention of the people who, for some reason, do not see these "obvious" conspiracy patterns.

The letter is passed from hand to hand in Moscow; radio, TV, and newspapers discuss it. Figuratively speaking, the author sets a house on fire in order to light up its dark nooks and perhaps banish goblins from it. Such techniques cannot be used in our situation, which is quite unstable to begin with. After all, the house would burn down at the same time.

Now about the things that are being done. Everything is being done that should be done: Special services and law enforcement organs are looking for the anonymous author. This is precisely what it is called. Once he is found, it will be possible to raise the issue of filing criminal charges, the elements of crime being slander associated with the charge of committing a grave crime against the state.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] However, this episode coincided with the Internal Troops being drawn up to Moscow.

[Baturin] When there are troops, the Army, any other coercive structures, they live and move. There is normal life, exercises, redeployment, regrouping. Or would you like all of them to freeze, so that nobody would think that they are up to something? However, all of this may be perceived with suspicion, that is, in keeping with the models of overactive consciousness.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Why does the attending physician of the president not make an official presentation somewhere?

[Baturin] The health condition of a patient (good or bad) constitutes a physician's secret. If the president does not want bulletins about his health, even if good, release on a monthly basis, he is entitled to this.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] This is done in other countries.

[Baturin] Other countries have a different political culture. I do not want to say that ours is worse; no, it is just different. Nor does it appear possible to change a political culture for the country, say, effective Monday.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Much has been said to the effect that this is not even about the president, but rather about somehow discrediting V. Chernomyrdin. One may hear about certain financial and industrial groups that are envious of Gazprom. The concern has become quite influential, perhaps, with some assistance from V. Chernomyrdin. It is tempting to occupy this niche and to collect the same dividend.

[Baturin] I do not want to comment on your hypothesis in any way. It does not quite touch on this letter. However, if you are putting together versions of this kind, we must say that in this case, absolutely improper means are being used. We should then acknowledge that at issue are people who are acting improperly. You are perhaps aware of what this is.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Could the letter have been initiated by people close to the president, as an electrical shock of sorts? Recently, he has withdrawn from current business, in a way....

[Baturin] This question fits within the second hypothesis which I have already outlined for you. However, I for one am not aware of such people in the entourage of the president. This is why I would like not to make such assumptions about the presidential entourage. As far as I know, such methods are not used here.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Is the September edict on the early election of the president on 12 June 1994 still in force?

[Baturin] In December, an edict of the president was issued which canceled quite a number of his own edicts and certain legislative acts before the new Constitution took effect. The edict that you have mentioned did not appear on the list of the canceled edicts. However, let us

not forget about the transitional provisions of the Constitution in effect in keeping with which the president exercises his powers until the end of the term to which he was elected.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] To tell you the truth, we wrote a commentary on the topic of the "conspiracy." Here is its text:

We can surmise the following. In early March (according to some data, on the evening of 6 March), the people "at the top" learned about a certain discrediting action which the opponents of the president intended to carry out on 9 March. A meeting of "a narrow circle" was immediately convened, at which it was decided not only to avert the planned action of the opposition, but also to strike their own preemptive blow. Special services were instructed to collect by way of operations compromising evidence available at the time against the most "blameworthy" politicians, that is, those who openly crave the office of the president. The compromising evidence included both "unguarded statements" of these persons, published in the press, which testified to their angling for the "position," and information obtained from informants who were present during the relevant confidential conversations. All of this information was "chewed over" by a group of analysts, assumed the form of a noncommittal "Version No. 1" which will be superseded by subsequent versions, and disseminated among the members of the State Duma, journalists, and party leaders by means of a fax machine (belonging, as they say, to the Dinamo society). Just so that there would be no telltale signs and so as to cover up and prevent suspicions as to its genuine source of origin, one or two individuals loyal to the president were thrown in and in the second part, the Ministry of Defense "tag" was "attached" to "authentic" information confirmed 100 percent by materials from the special services.

Upon what did the creators of this "Version No. 1" count? Apparently, on killing three birds with one stone. First, on letting potential "conspirators" know that the eye of the sovereign is alert and is aware of their apparent and concealed intentions (for the most part, individuals appear on the list who remain in the shadows and do not advertise their views very much). Second, on creating for the people a new image of the "enemy" who hampers the reform course with all his might and on learning about the public sentiment. Third, on shaking up the president by showing him that not everything is good in the "Danish kingdom" and that it is time to become active.

[Baturin] This is a very far-fetched version. I can say that I do not know anything about such a meeting; I did not participate in such a meeting or give assignments. Therefore, a choice should be made: Either the aide for national security affairs does not belong to the circle that decides such things, or this did not happen. Thousands of people work here. Even if three people did talk about something, you might call it a meeting, and I might call it just chatter. Nonetheless, I have not heard about anything of the kind.

The competent organs are establishing whether the removal of the president was being prepared. However, changes have occurred in the Kremlin. At the entrance, the guard

demanding that the operation of a dictaphone be demonstrated, inspected the tape, and asked whether we had weapons. Quite recently, it was simpler.

Yakovlev on Coup Rumors, Media Issues

944K0931A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 12, Mar 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with A. Yakovlev, head of the Federal Service of Russia for Television and Radio, and chairman of the Russian State Radio and Television Company Ostankino, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY editor in chief Starkov: "A. Yakovlev: 'The Time Has Come for Pragmatists....'"]

[Text] A conversation with the leader of the Federal Service of Russia for Television and Radio Broadcasting, and chairman of the RG TRK [Russian State Radio and Television Company] Ostankino, A. Yakovlev.

[Starkov] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, a scandal has broken out around the document concerning the conspiracy against the president that is supposed to be in the making. What do you have to say about this event?

[Yakovlev] There is a kind of logic here. There was one putsch—an unsuccessful one. There was the threat of the president's being overthrown in the second half of last year. But that led to the October events. None of these attempts produced any results. But the people who have failed to gain the power are getting itchy fingers. They need a new tactic. Because it is no accident that the provinces did not even stir in response to the Moscow events, either in 1991 or last year. There was nothing except perturbation. And the people who want to interrupt the course of the reforms understand that a military putsch is no longer feasible. Therefore, some are writing a new program, others are changing their stripes, and still others are getting rid of the image of far left, arch-leftist radicals, since this is no longer a convenient thing to be. I see in the paper that appeared a desire to get on the leaders' nerves once again. To cause them to suspect one another. And I do not think this will be the last time.

[Starkov] But it is surprising that this "version" of the conspiracy mentions even a person so close to the president as V. Chernomyrdin.

[Yakovlev] I think that there are now people who would like to start a quarrel between the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the president. This would be very bad for the country. And this is also one of the versions of the so-called putsch—"driving in a wedge." All these are political "toys" with which our society is not familiar but which, alas, we have to get used to. But actually I think we now have a possibility of stabilizing the situation, especially if we get down to work. The government and the president and the local administration. Incidentally, the power is now shifting to the localities, and this is good.

It is interesting that they are resolving for themselves many issues that we once resolved in the Politburo. And they are doing it correctly and wonderfully! And the regions, with all their power and strength, have no intention of breaking apart and scattering. So perhaps during these two years we should reach an agreement and simply work.

[Starkov] The communists are calling for the same thing.

[Yakovlev] The communists have no other way out. They have already organized two putsches, and society could call them to account.

[Starkov] From all this it follows that you are proposing a difficult but at the same time temptingly clear path of peace and harmony. And you look with optimism on the present development of the situation. And yet I recall that half a year ago you were the one predicting an imminent cataclysm: Men, hide your families—and through the snowdrifts. Do we have this "snowdrift situation" now?

[Yakovlev] Not now. I guessed it the last two times. But I was in Austria recently, and they are saying almost in a panic: You gave them amnesty, this means is the onset of communism....but I have the feeling that something has shifted in the society and the clock has turned in the proper direction.

Yes, we have Zyuganov, Baburin, and Umalatova, but something has changed. We must remain vigilant, we must not allow the kind of dim-wittedness that is so pervasive in the democratic forces. But nonetheless, after these two putsches the authority of the people behind them has dropped sharply. Not because we democrats have turned out to be so intelligent (on the contrary, we have done everything possible to help our opponents) but because of objective circumstances. And the people are simply tired of all this; they understand that anyone who cares about the people will not go on the attack.

[Starkov] But this "peaceful" development of events has its own danger hidden within it: In the localities through local elections they can remove democratic forces from power and gradually return the old nomenklatura to the ministerial posts in the center. And this is already happening....

[Yakovlev] Yes, indeed they are appointing and will appoint professionals as opposed to nonprofessionals. But here is the question: Should we be afraid of these professionals? Some of them—yes, but some we should not. I have had contacts with these people. They say: "Why do you think we are Red-and-browns? We have been politically neutral for a long time. We are ready for a market economy, for a new regime of power, we are ready to participate in elections. But we do not agree with what the government is doing or the way it is doing it. And that is all." Why should we not assume that these statements are sincere? If they are, that is wonderful. We will always part ways when it comes to methods; otherwise there will be no pluralism. The main thing is not to diverge when it comes to objectives. In general I think that the age of the pragmatist has now come. And where will we find them? For now the only place to find them is in the nomenklatura, whether we like it or not. And if we find there not ideologized politicians but people who are devoted to their profession, let them work.

I think the society now needs some kind of brief respite. Just a breather. And for the next stage of our development, we must see what kind of functions our president should have. Ultimately, I think we will reach the conclusion that our president should be like an arbitration figure: He should have dealings with the Army and foreign affairs—and that is all. Let everything else be done by professionals

in the parliament and in the Cabinet of Ministers. But they must also be responsible for their own affairs.

[Starkov] Can we really so easily turn our legacy of the past into something good? After all, there are some absolutely unacceptable things that we inherited from Bolshevism.

[Yakovlev] Yes, and one of the unpleasant features of Bolshevism was living not life but an imitation of life. This is a strange problem that has been inherited almost everywhere by the present bureaucracy as well. It is reflected primarily in the fact that we generate an endless number of appeals, competitions, and resolutions. Resolutions of the Politburo, resolutions of the Secretariat, resolutions of the government, the boards of the ministries, various other state organizations, resolutions of the bureaus of the obkoms [oblast committees], kraykoms [kray committees], and raykoms [rayon committees]. All of these resolutions are like a black cloud hovering over our life. Why did this happen? In general this is a fairly comprehensible phenomenon. When you cannot really resolve certain of life's problems, you must replace them with an imitation of life. And people lived in an unreal world of false hopes.

[Starkov] That works, incidentally.

[Yakovlev] And how! Otherwise, Bolshevism would not have lasted for 70 years. And it is still living to this day. Because even today among the resolutions of the most diverse levels again 10 percent come from real life and 90 percent are stillborn. The chief of the administration of one oblast showed me a file of resolutions he had accumulated and said: "I do not need this, I have a different life." He finds nothing for himself there. It is an ongoing imitation of life. The director of a hog farm near Moscow said that it was more advantageous for him now to slaughter all the hogs and sell them, and he would have 3 billion rubles, and if he were to put them in the bank then all the workers of this hog farm would receive twice as much in wages and not do anything. He asks: What kind of economy is this?

[Starkov] Let us speak about the capabilities of the administration. You are probably one of the most experienced politicians of the present day. And you have constantly been risking your career, your family's well-being, and even your life. Wherein, in your opinion, lies the art of leadership?

[Yakovlev] It is important always to have a sense of what needs to be done. But there are certain periods in history when it is even more important to know for certain what should not be done. For example, I never engaged in arguments with the Politburo regarding the dead, empty questions that were frequently raised there. The questions were very large ones and I should have participated in the discussion, but I remained silent because I sensed that they were dead. I can honestly say that this is a feeling. To separate the "dead" questions from the "living" ones takes some kind of internal mechanism that works in me.

Further. Gather the patience to listen to people. I have had many cases when a person will come to me and talk and talk.... I finally respond to him that I cannot do anything. And he says to me: "Yes, I know, but thank you for listening, anyway." For some reason in our society it has turned out that we are unable to listen to people as to

human beings. Second. I would advise an upcoming bureaucrat never to promise anything. This is deception in which we have been engaging up to this point, that is, we want to replace one deception with another one. If you can do something, do it, and the person will be grateful. If you do it without promising to, the gratitude will be much greater.

Now, when I read in others' memoirs the kinds of complicated political operations and intrigues that are sometimes attributed to us, I sometimes start to get a swelled head. But, alas, nothing of the kind happened. We should not be regarded as such intelligent people.

[Starkov] You were a member of the Politburo, a person who was not simply in with the authorities, but one who was at the helm of power. Do you not get the feeling that the people sitting in the Kremlin today, where the Politburo used to sit, are still wet behind the ears and what they are doing is nonsense.... And this pertains not to you personally, but to the entire country. The plants are on the verge of shutting down, the coal miners are striking. One gets the feeling that this never happened when you were in power.

[Yakovlev] No, I do not have that feeling in the slightest degree. I am a fatalist, and I think that things are the way they ought to be. Nobody actually drove us out of our positions. We had a dacha, and a car, and a guard. We started it all ourselves. Many people do not understand this now. A power that was enlightened but still totalitarian could have been different. Gorbachev was quite suited for this. And one must give him his due; he also in some ways moved toward the breakup. And he turned over a great page in history. Because it would have been possible to hold out a little longer, well, 10 years, but still it would have ended with a social upheaval. Inevitably. Even then we were moving toward collapse. The stabilization that was created out of petrodollars had ended. And thank God the energy for the disintegration came from within ourselves and was not imposed on us from outside. Then there would have been a complete collapse, all-out war....

[Starkov] Let us return to the present day. It seems to me that you have been fairly closemouthed in the press about your work in your new position as chairman of Ostankino. How did the appointment itself come about? You probably did not make any promises to Boris Nikolayevich.

[Yakovlev] When they were putting out feelers, I refused. And then I refused a second time. There was nothing in it for me. I would rather write another book....after all, I was getting into something that would be the shortest path to the loss of my reputation. But in a later conversation I told Boris Nikolayevich that, in the first place, nobody could interfere with my work, that it was to be a presidential structure. And if anybody wanted to give me orders I would leave. Second—I laid out for him the Ostankino ideology as I conceived it. The essence was this. We had gotten people upset. The horse had reared up, it was still standing on its hind legs, and was it not possible to get it back on all fours? To try through television to bring society out of this reared-back condition. It is necessary to see shortcomings and criticize them. Our television commentators are always asserting: We are on the edge of an abyss, there is just one step left. And I tell them: For three years

now, we have not taken this step. Why are we marking time? (Laughs.) I ask the question: How many enterprises do we have that are in a financial position where they owe nobody nothing and nobody owes them anything? It has turned out that 30 percent of them are like this. If only they had discussed just one of them!...

[Starkov] But in general and on the whole, you have still taken a completely new and unusual position: They say that you do not interfere with the preparation of programs or the work of the studios. This is the approach of a commander in chief who is developing a strategy, and not someone who wants to inspect to see whether a soldier has a clean collar or has tied his shoes correctly.

[Yakovlev] No, I do not want to interfere with the programs. This might seem to be a shortcoming, but I do not even look at the programs that play on one day or another. That is not my business. There are people who are responsible for this. I can not insist, say, on covering such subjects as the property owner, the bureaucrat, the farmer, the office worker, or small business. Which version, which form—that is not my business. I want the subjects to be heard about now, but let the professionals who are in charge of this find for themselves which programs and what to say on them.

[Starkov] How did you act in the extremely serious situation with the Ministry of Communications? After all, there was the threat that television was about to be shut down.

[Yakovlev] I said that if the government shut down television, another government would start it up again. I gave orders not to interfere. One cannot place oneself in the position of a supplicant. Let them try to shut us down. I follow the government's orders, it pays me. I did not go to the government meeting regarding this, and I let them know that I would not go there holding my hand out.

Now I am reproached for one thing—why was I so calm? They were threatening not to give us any money, to raise havoc throughout the press in the near future, to put out twice as much negative information about me. I knew why it would appear. I had issued orders concerning the prohibition of barter and centralization of advertising.

[Starkov] And what next?

[Yakovlev] Let the studios be privatized and compete, making their way onto the air. We will buy programs. And we will sell advertising if we buy the program. I think we will divide up the advertising like this: Of 100 percent, 40 percent will be centralized, 40 percent will go to the studio, and the remaining 20 percent will be distributed by the expert artistic council according to ratings.

[Starkov] Incidentally, many of the latest ratings do not put Ostankino in first place at all but, for example, NTV.

[Yakovlev] I think that is normal. Anything that is new will have higher ratings. Let us wait half a year.

[Starkov] Are you not sorry that such powers as Mitkova and Keselev have left? After all, they could be on your team.

[Yakovlev] I feel ambiguous. On the one hand, I am sorry. I would be glad if they were with us, but since they have gone there, where they are paid more and where they feel

better psychologically, I am glad for them. I have good relations with both Keselev and Mitkova. And you cannot demand real work from people when you pay them a pittance. That is degrading.

[Starkov] People are now saying that two state television companies are too many, that perhaps we should keep either one or the other. What will you do with GTV [state television]? After all, even a rich country cannot allow itself two state BBC's.

[Yakovlev] I agree, we really should have one state company, and for the other we should look for forms for attracting national capital. For example, the present Ostankino could become a part of a future joint-stock company. But it is not only a matter of finances. In the first place, Ostankino still means all of the former Soviet Union and the whole world. In the second place, I personally think that Ostankino should have its own image, and we should not exactly duplicate another television company.

[Starkov] You know, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, a person really can understand those who are surprised by your cold-bloodedness. Where did you get this unhurried reasonableness which has helped you to solve a multitude of problems and, I hope, will help with the problems of the television company as well? This philosophical calm?

[Yakovlev] What has helped me to have a healthier attitude toward things?... Well, I was not educated by Soviet power. I was educated by my father—even politically. I recall how they arrested him, how he hid, who warned him about this and how. I saw all this. I recall when, in 1941, there was an announcement from TASS about Germany, and my father, with four years of education, said: "That is it, son, there will be war" when everyone around was saying they would not attack. I remember when my father removed the portraits of Stalin and then Khrushchev. He was the first chairman of the kolkhoz—and then he left it, saying that people had started to work less. And that meant there would be trouble. A simple answer, right? If they started to work less there would be trouble. He alone, thinking in simple, common-sense categories, not suspecting that it was philosophy, instilled them in me.

[Starkov] Well, since we have touched upon the distant past, tell me how many years you spent in Canada?

[Yakovlev] Ten years.

[Starkov] Did you have an interpreter?

[Yakovlev] The first year, for insurance. So that there would be a person who could confirm that I did not say something. The remaining nine years I got by without an interpreter.

[Starkov] How many years did you study at Columbia University?

[Yakovlev] A year in graduate school.

[Starkov] Along with Kalugin?

[Yakovlev] Yes.

[Starkov] When you went there, did you understand that you would "tarnish" your biography, that that would be some kind of blemish on your resume?

[Yakovlev] Yes, I understood that, and Kryuchkov took advantage of this blemish. Although of my 17 acquaintances who went there with me, 14 were not from science or, rather, they were from a science of a different profile.

When the procuracy filed a criminal case against me, all the documents were brought up. But they found nothing except two denunciations. Oleg Kalugin granted an interview regarding my case, and he was officially interrogated. They also interrogated Gorbachev, Bakatin, and Chebrikov.

[Starkov] Who made the denunciations?

[Yakovlev] Resident agents. And these denunciations were simply because of my statements: I had criticized the work of the KGB.

[Starkov] And what were you doing at Columbia University?

[Yakovlev] I was writing a dissertation on historiography of American foreign policy.

[Starkov] What kind of incomes do you live on? You personally.

[Yakovlev] I finally received wages from Ostankino of about 300,000 rubles. And I have a pension of 112,000 as a disabled war veteran.

[Starkov] And as a member of the Politburo.

[Yakovlev] When I approached pension age I submitted all the documents to the rayon social security division; let them figure it out according to the law. At that time they assigned me 400 rubles. Two pensions—civilian and military. I have been receiving the military pension since I was 20. When Politburo members went on pension they received 500 rubles. Boldin was disturbed and reported to Gorbachev. How could it be—I went to social security!

[Starkov] Do your books bring you any income?

[Yakovlev] I have calculated (the publishing house gave me complete accounts of state revenues from the books) that if they had given me all that money, it would have been more than my wages—both in the Politburo and before then.

Yeltsin Flight Crews Refute Aspersions

944K0892A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 11, Mar 94 p 3

[Letter to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: "Soft Landing, Mr. President!"] This letter is in response to an article by Aleksandr Sargin under the rubric "Scandal": "A Soft Landing to You, Mr. President!" which was translated and published under the headline: "Problems in Presidential Flight Team Noted" in FBIS-USR-94-008, 2 February 1994, pp 2-3]

[Text] We are amazed and upset by your article "Soft Landing, Mr. President!" since the majority of us like your newspaper and value the objectivity, diversity, and topicality of the material, the boldness of its opinions, and the high professionalism of its presentation. This article, however, was in sharp contrast to all that we have read hitherto.

Who gave the author (who is known to none of the members of the outfit and who, naturally, cannot know its assignments and endeavors) the right to judge our company, its activity, and its leader—a professional pilot of the highest class, with “God-given talent,” as the people say. Can there be any justification for such improper behavior (aimed, in our view, at causing a sensation, most likely, some department functionary clinging to a wholly needless chair which is slipping away), traumatizing the outfit and taking up its time, which is so much needed in the business of renewal.

We do not intend to justify ourselves on the substance of this malevolence, and the article as a whole could not be called anything else! We demand a meeting with the author. Nor would it have done the newspaper any harm, before publication of this article, to meet with specialists of the company, with the leadership, and with the public. Nor is it too late even now! We maintain that the material set forth in the article is pure invention. Truly, some of the events did occur, but everything here has, as they say, been “stood on its head!” The characters, the dates, the place, and the time of the events and so forth were changed. Serious allegations were leveled at the company on the basis of absolutely incompetent arguments. The information adduced on the landing of the Il-62 in a “Vnukovo field” evokes mirth, and not only in the professional. There was not even the remotest approximation of anything of the kind, what is more. This was manifest slander of the company and management! Why also in your article is there such a lack of respect for the president? For a state organization and the state as a whole? The trashy material and cynicism, which are atypical of your publication, are jarring!

Whence this fury leveled at, it is our firm belief, a useful undertaking? We assure you that the entire work of the Rossiya State Transport Company is built on an understanding of the country's present economic condition and is geared to the speediest complete renunciation of state budget appropriations.

When, though, permit us to ask, has an outfit been blamed for the assimilation of new equipment? Is this not geared to the development of state potential as a whole and a growth of well-being, skills, and image of the outfit?

Of course, our outfit, like any other, is not insured against mistakes, but you cannot destroy an idea without an understanding of its essence.

Can we all be considered absolute bunglers rejecting Air Transport Department control and safety documentation and also ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] documents written in the blood of all air catastrophes? Who rejected professional cooperation with the department? A. Larin? Someone else from the company? Absurd! It was he, after all, who created the department! Where's the logic?

We are for professional contact, but without bureaucratic red tape!

We request and demand an immediate investigation in point of substance, a retraction in the paper, restitution to the company for moral damage, and our protection henceforward from such nonsense!

[Signed] Staff of the Rossiya State Transport Company

FROM THE EDITORS: *A series of air catastrophes has as of late cost the lives of hundreds of people. This is, probably, one of the most dreadful ways to die. Shots of pieces of charred human flesh amid the piles of wreckage of an aircraft are horrifying. “Filled” daily almost with such information, could we have remained silent, having received alarming warnings about the president's flights?*

Of course, cold calculation suggests that all documents should be collected as a preliminary. But experience tells us that this is practically impossible—for very many reasons. Following, therefore, a taped conversation with four deputy leaders of the aviation detachment (three no longer work there), we decided to publish the material. They all subsequently failed to show the editors the necessary documents, it is true.

It would now seem perfectly probable that the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent was an unwitting instrument of internal intrigues in the aviation detachment— attempts were being made to settle scores through him. But even if this version is correct, it is only partially so. Following the publication, certain aviation specialists met with the author of the article and provided additional information, as they say. But the problem is that they also were unwilling to make documents available or at least put their name to what they had to say.

It remains for us to confess that the paper was in a rush to publish the article, which cast aspersions on the outfit of the aviation detachment. We apologize to it and very much hope that we will not in the near future find ourselves proved right, for all that, albeit at a very high price.

Duma Deputies Supporting Amnesty Listed

944K0894A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 11, Mar 94 p 3

[Article by group of experts of the Strategy Center, A. Sobyenin, E. Gelman, and O. Kayunov, under the rubric “At the Readers' Request”: “Who Voted for Amnesty”]

[Text] *As we can see, the greatest contribution to the “establishment of civil peace” was made in the State Duma of the Russian Federation with the votes of the Zhirinovskiy supporters, members of the New Regional Policy faction, agrarians, communists, representatives of Women of Russia, democrats from Shakhrai and Travkin's parties, and patriots from the unregistered group Russia's Path.*

The group Union of 12 December (23 deputies)

None who voted for amnesty.

The Russia's Choice faction (75 deputies)

I.V. Starikov Novosibirsk Oblast

Yabloko faction (27 deputies)

*T.V. Zlotnikova Orenburg Oblast

*N.Ya. Petrakov Moscow

*V.N. Shostakovskiy Moscow

*I.A. Yakovenko Moscow

*V.V. Igrunov Moscow

*O.G. Dmitriyeva St. Petersburg

PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] (30 deputies)

A.N. Arinin Republic of Bashkortostan

A.G. Popov Republic of Mari El

S.A. Zenkin Ivanovo Oblast

Yu.M. Ten Irkutsk Oblast

S.A. Shapovalov Rostov Oblast

V.S. Grigoriadi Chelyabinsk Oblast

V.P. Utkin Chelyabinsk Oblast

K.F. Zatulin Moscow

K.E. Zuyev Moscow

V.N. Kozhemyakin Moscow

V.A. Nikonov Moscow

A.Ya. Sliva Moscow

S.B. Stankevich Moscow

A.V. Turbanov Moscow

S.M. Shakhrai Moscow

I.A. Shichanin Moscow

M.L. Goryachev St. Petersburg

S.S. Boskholov Ust Orda

New Regional Policy Faction (66 deputies)

*V.N. Maksimov Republic of Komi

Yu.V. Utkin Republic of Bashkortostan

M.Z. Gnezdilov Republic of Altay

G.M. Gamidov Republic of Dagestan

Kh.M. Karmokov Kabardin-Balkar Republic

A.A. Akbayev Karachayev-Cherkess Republic

Ye.P. Zhirkov Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

A.S. Dzasokhov Republic of North Ossetia

K.D. Arakchaa Republic of Tyva

M.A. Vasilyev Udmurt Republic

V.G. Bessarabov Altay Kray

V.A. Kolmakov Krasnoyarsk Kray

A.A. Piskunov Arkhangelsk Oblast

V.A. Nikitin Volgograd Oblast

P.I. Matyashov Voronezh Oblast

(Continued)

New Regional Policy Faction (66 deputies) (continued)

N.V. Parinov	Voronezh Oblast
V.B. Shuba	Irkutsk Oblast
Yu.Ye. Voyevoda	Kaliningrad Oblast
N.V. Volkova	Kemerovo Oblast
Ye.A. Agafonov	Kirny Oblast
A.G. Puzanovskiy	Kostroma Oblast
G.S. Kalistratov	Kurgan Oblast
Ye.M. Kokorev	Magadan Oblast
A.D. Ayzderdzis	Moscow Oblast
O.F. Ochir	Novgorod Oblast
A.I. Voropayev	Orel Oblast
V.I. Kravtsov	Perm Oblast
Yu.N. Rodionov	Rostov Oblast
Ye.A. Gusarov	Samara Oblast
G.I. Gusarova	Samara Oblast
L.P. Rozhkova	Samara Oblast
V.M. Smirnov	Samara Oblast
N.A. Chukanov	Samara Oblast
B.N. Tretyak	Sakhalin Oblast
A.P. Veyer	Sverdlovsk Oblast
S.V. Mikiyev	Sverdlovsk Oblast
V.A. Vasilev	Tula Oblast
S.I. Shkuro	Tyumen Oblast
A.M. Tarasov	Moscow
A.K. Yegorov	St. Petersburg
B.B. Zhamsuyev	Aga
A.P. Vlasova	Permyakia
A.N. Chilingarov	Nenetsia
A.G. Vasilye	Taymyria
V.S. Medvedev	Khanti-Mansia
T.G. Nesterenko	Chukotka
V.V. Goman	Yamalia
M.O. Tolboyev	Republic of Dagestan
V.I. Kosykh	Volgograd Oblast
S.V. Burkov	Kemerovo Oblast

Women of Russia faction (23 deputies)

Ye.M. Popova	Republic of Komi
G.I. Klimantova	Udmurt Republic
S.Yu. Orlova	Maritime Kray
V.V. Kozhurkhova	Stavropol Kray
G.P. Chubkova	Astrakhan Oblast
I.Ye. Novitskaya	Vladimir Oblast
A.A. Zhilina	Volgograd Oblast
R.I. Skripitsyna	Kaluga Oblast

(Continued)

Women of Russia faction (23 deputies) (continued)

G.V. Parshentseva	Kemerovo Oblast
I.Ye. Vybornova	Moscow Oblast
A.V. Guskov	Moscow Oblast
V.G. Martynova	Moscow Oblast
M.I. Gaydash	Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast
Zh.M. Lozinskaya	Tula Oblast
F.Sh. Arslanova	Tyumen Oblast
N.G. Gundareva	Moscow
M.K. Dobrovolskaya	Moscow
L.N. Zavadskaya	Moscow
Ye.F. Lakhova	Moscow
N.D. Malakhatkina	Moscow
A.V. Fedulova	Moscow
Ye.Ye. Chepurnykh	Moscow

Democratic Party of Russia Faction (15 deputies)

F.S. Pashennykh	Krasnoyarsk Kray
V.I. Nesternenko	Maritime Kray
Yu.N. Yakovlev	Maritime Kray
V.A. Kotlyar	Voronezh Oblast
I.B. Zubkevich	Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast
A.I. Leushkin	Samara Oblast
G.Yu. Karelin	Sverdlovsk Oblast
N.M. Tropin	Tyumen Oblast
O.T. Bogomolov	Moscow
S.Yu. Glazyev	Moscow
S.S. Govorukhin	Moscow
Ye.B. Malkin	Moscow
N.I. Travkin	Moscow
V.L. Talanov	St. Petersburg

Agrarian Party of Russia Faction (55 deputies)

*T.P. Tokareva	Sverdlovsk Oblast
R.B. Asayev	Republic of Bashkortostan
A.M. Galiyev	Republic of Bashkortostan
R.N. Mirsayev	Republic of Bashkortostan
Z.I. Sayetgaliyev	Republic of Bashkortostan
N.Ya. Kondakov	Republic of Buryatia
V.A. Agafonov	Chuvash Republic
P.V. Yefremov	Altay Kray
A.G. Nazarchuk	Altay Kray
S.P. Openyshev	Altay Kray
A.A. Dolgoplov	Krasnodar Kray
P.Ya. Kiri	Krasnodar Kray
N.S. Kotov	Krasnodar Kray
A.T. Kochegura	Krasnodar Kray
A.I. Yaroshenko	Krasnoyarsk Kray

(Continued)

Agrarian Party of Russia Faction (55 deputies) (continued)

V.I. Berestovoy	Belgorod Oblast
A.Ye. Vorontsov	Bryansk Oblast
N.V. Ivanov	Bryansk Oblast
Ye.V. Buchenkov	Vladimir Oblast
G.I. Churkin	Vladimir Oblast
G.A. Medentsov	Volgograd Oblast
V.N. Plotnikov	Volgograd Oblast
A.A. Popov	Volgograd Oblast
T.I. Leta	Volgograd Oblast
A.A. Turusin	Irkutsk Oblast
P.T. Burdukov	Kaluga Oblast
G.T. Dyudyayev	Kemerovo Oblast
V.V. Gukov	Kursk Oblast
Yu.V. Sokolov	Leningrad Oblast
N.M. Kharitonov	Novosibirsk Oblast
A.A. Chernyshev	Orenburg Oblast
M.A. Putilov	Perm Oblast
B.I. Danchenko	Rostov Oblast
S.A. Ponomarev	Rostov Oblast
S.A. Yenkov	Ryazan Oblast
V.Ye. Balalyev	Smolensk Oblast
A.A. Ponomarev	Tambov Oblast
Ye.M. Bogdanova	Tula Oblast
V.F. Vershinin	Moscow
A.S. Davydov	Moscow
V.B. Isakov	Moscow
I.Ye. Klochkov	Moscow
G.V. Kulik	Moscow
V.V. Mikulin	Moscow
V.I. Naumov	Moscow
I.P. Rybkin	Moscow
N.A. Sukhoy	Moscow
A.M. Biryukov	Birobjan

Communist Party of the Russian Federation Faction (45 deputies)

*T.M. Gudima	Arkhangelsk Oblast
*A.V. Aparina	Volgograd Oblast
*A.N. Mikhaylov	Kursk oblast
*V.M. Zelenin	Perm Oblast
*T.A. Astrakhankina	Tver Oblast
*G.N. Seleznev	Moscow
*O.A. Shenkarev	Bryansk Oblast
*T.V. Pletneva	Tambov Oblast
*V.D. Filimonov	Tomsk Oblast
*V.I. Zorkaltsev	Tomsk Oblast

(Continued)

Communist Party of the Russian Federation Faction (45 deputies) (continued)

K.A. Tsiky	Republic of Adygea
V.I. Nikitin	Republic of Bashkortostan
O.O. Begov	Republic of Dagestan
V.P. Kartashov	Republic of Mordovia
Ye.A. Kosterin	Republic of Mordovia
R.G. Gostev	Voronezh Oblast
L.V. Oleynik	Kurgan Oblast
N.N. Goncharov	Kursk Oblast
A.F. Potapenko	Kursk Oblast
N.G. Bindyukov	Novgorod Oblast
V.A. Bokov	Novosibirsk Oblast
V.N. Volkov	Orenburg Oblast
V.I. Ilyukhin	Penza Oblast
I.M. Bespalov	Rostov Oblast
I.M. Bratishchev	Rostov Oblast
A.V. Ionov	Ryazan Oblast
A.N. Gordeyev	Saratov Oblast
O.O. Mironov	Saratov Oblast
L.N. Petrovskiy	Smolensk Oblast
V.A. Bayunov	Tver Oblast
A.N. Zaytsev	Moscow
G.A. Zyuganov	Moscow
Yu.P. Ivanov	Moscow
V.A. Kovalev	Moscow
Yu.Yu. Leonov	Moscow
V.S. Martemyanov	Moscow
N.M. Pyatchits	Moscow
V.I. Sevastyanov	Moscow
V.V. Semago	Moscow
A.K. Frolov	Moscow
V.S. Sheveluka	Moscow
Ye.S. Krasnitskiy	St. Petersburg
Yu.K. Sevenard	St. Petersburg

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Faction (64 deputies)

V.I. Novikov	Udmurt Republic
V.V. Zhurko	Krasnoyarsk Kray
V.P. Ivanov	Krasnoyarsk Kray
Ye.A. Bolshakov	Maritime Kray
S.A. Churkin	Volgograd Oblast
M.Yu. Vakulenko	Kirov Oblast
Yu.M. Ruda	Kursk Oblast
N.P. Astafyev	Moscow Oblast
V.V. Zhirinovskiy	Moscow Oblast
S.K. Zarichanskiy	Moscow Oblast

(Continued)

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Faction (64 deputies) (continued)

S.V. Kalashnikov	Moscow Oblast
V.V. Kiselev	Moscow Oblast
V.M. Borzyuk	Orel Oblast
S.A. Korobov	Penza Oblast
Ye.E. Mikhaylov	Pskov Oblast
M.P. Burlakov	Samara Oblast
A.M. Dorovskikh	Saratov Oblast
Ye.P. Ishchenko	Sverdlovsk Oblast
A.V. Vasilishin	Tyumen Oblast
S.N. Abeltsev	Moscow
V.I. Bolshakov	Moscow
Yu.Ye. Buzov	Moscow
T.I. Bulgakova	Moscow
A.D. Vengerovskiy	Moscow
V.G. Vishnyakov	Moscow
L.D. Gagut	Moscow
V.Z. Gvozdarev	Moscow
V.K. Gusev	Moscow
S.M. Zhebrovskiy	Moscow
E.G. Zhuk	Moscow
V.Ye. Zhuravlev	Moscow
A.A. Zvyagin	Moscow
V.P. Ivanov	Moscow
A.V. Kapustin	Moscow
V.V. Kobelev	Moscow
A.I. Kozyrev	Moscow
V.U. Korniyenko	Moscow
V.M. Kostyutkin	Moscow
N.V. Krevelskaya	Moscow
M.Ya. Lemeshev	Moscow
V.A. Lisichkin	Moscow
Ye.Yu. Loginov	Moscow
L.S. Maksakova	Moscow
E.V. Mitrofanova	Moscow
B.V. Moyseyev	Moscow
K.N. Panferov	Moscow
A.V. Pronin	Moscow
A.S. Sidorov	Moscow
M.N. Sidorov	Moscow
D.A. Skum	Moscow
S.V. Sychev	Moscow
V.I. Ustinov	Moscow
O.A. Finko	Moscow
Yu.P. Kuznetsov	St. Petersburg

(Continued)

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Faction (64 deputies) (continued)

V.A. Marychev	St. Petersburg
Ye.V. Tuinov	St. Petersburg
G.G. Lukava	Moscow

Russia's Path Group (13 deputies)

*N.A. Verveiko	Krasnodar Kray
S.A. Glotov	Krasnodar Kray
N.A. Zatsepina	Krasnodar Kray
V.A. Tikhonov	Krasnoyarsk Kray
N.M. Bezborodov	Kurgan Oblast
I.S. Anichkin	Novosibirsk Oblast
S.N. Baburin	Omsk Oblast
A.I. Lukyanov	Smolensk Oblast
A.N. Greshnevnikov	Yaroslav Oblast
Yu.P. Vlasov	Moscow
A.G. Nevzorov	St. Petersburg

Deputies not belonging to factions (eight deputies)

V.I. Borodin	Stavropol Kray
V.S. Katrenko	Stavropol Kray
A.A. Zakharov	Amur Oblast
V.S. Lipitskiy	Novosibirsk Oblast
A.R. Volkov	Moscow

*Asterisks indicate deputies of the State Duma who voted on 23 February only for the "small" package—for amnesty without abolishing the deputy commission for investigating the events of September-October 1993.

Gaydar on Amnesty, Related Issues

944K0919A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 11, 16 Mar 94 p 11

[Interview with Yegor Gaydar by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA observer Aleksandr Borin; place and date not given: "The Terrible Temptation of Centrism"]

[Text] [Borin] Yegor Timurovich, the press today is actively discussing the unexpected actions of Sergey Shakh-ray, who voted in the Duma for political amnesty. The most diverse theories are being advanced. Some people are even assuming that there is some kind of secret conspiracy with the president, who would prefer that the investigation not dot all the i's. Others, conversely, see a behind-the-scenes agreement with the Duma leaders. It is no accident, they say, that one of Shakh-ray's men, Andrey Voykov, was placed at the head of its administration. What are your ideas?

[Gaydar] Of course there is always the temptation to see the authorities as crafty, perfidious, and far-sighted, but most frequently this is not the way things really are. I do not believe in complicated political schemes in general and I certainly do not expect them from the present executive authority. Politics, as a rule, is arranged more simply and rigidly. Refined schemes involving multiple moves are usually undermined by the rough current of life right in the first stages. Therefore I absolutely do not believe in schemes involving intricate intrigues on the part of the

president. Shakh-ray's position was a bit of a surprise to me too; to be honest, I did not anticipate such a turn. All I can say is that I completely reject the story that there was a misunderstanding—"ah, we were not aware, ah, we did not know." These people are intelligent enough to know and to be aware. What is wrong? The hypothesis I came up with is this: The terrible temptation of centrism gained a hold. Centrism as a means of access to power. In politics, in my view, there exist two completely different strategies. The first: You have your own convictions and ideas about what the country needs. You defend them, you fight for them. If you cannot defend them while in power, you work with the opposition. That can take years, perhaps decades. This political strategy proceeds from the idea to the world view. The second strategy: Politics as the art of staying in power. It presupposes the ability to react very flexibly to the changing political waves, to skip from one to another, to significantly change your outlook and points of reference. Here it is absolutely necessary to prove that you are the greatest centrist, that you are prepared to cooperate with everyone. And if you have come from one particular side, in order to prove that you are a centrist, naturally, you have to make friends with representatives of the opposing side. You have to hold out your hand to them, demonstrate your loyalty. Speaking in extremely simple terms, I think it is here that we find the basis of the political drift of Sergey Shakh-ray and many other former democrats.

[Borin] But someone will say to you: "I have not betrayed anybody, I simply changed my basic principles, my attitude toward the matter."

[Gaydar] Oh, it is difficult to pretend here. It is immediately apparent for whom the cause is the most important thing and for whom it is terrible painful to lose all the trappings of power. Because power is terribly attractive. It makes a person unusually vulnerable. The prospect of suddenly becoming simply an ordinary private individual again is terribly frightening. I have seen this in people who, it seemed to me, were absolutely not susceptible to it.

[Borin] When you retired, did you experience something like this?

[Gaydar] No, I did not experience anything of the kind, not at all. Although I understand that feeling quite well. That is, I can see the tiny fragments from which such a feeling is formed. People's attitude toward you changes. Endless problems arise. You see boorishness. And many, many things like that. Previously a person was great and everyone loved him, everyone told him how intelligent he was, how valuable his opinion was, how everyone wanted to make friends with him... And suddenly it turns out that none of that was true, that now he is some kind of weird half-wit. And in general what has he done? Moved from one mistake to another? And why is he still in this position? You must also figure out...

[Borin] People are rude to him, they remind him of the laboratory chiefs who, they say, shook the entire country.

[Gaydar] I regret very much that Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin did not share his ideas about the laboratory chiefs and prime ministers while he was working under me. As I recall, he was very polite, unusually polite, I would say, to the point of being sickening. Perhaps he simply did not know that one of the principles adopted in cultured society is that the level of politeness does not depend on whether a person is your superior or not... So many of those who are in power today understand what awaits them when they leave power. And some people are terribly frightened by this. And then they are prepared to chain themselves to their little chairs, thinking up all kinds of reasons why they cannot leave. Policy has changed, everything has changed, but they still have to be there.

[Borin] Are you talking about the upper echelons of power?

[Gaydar] Not necessarily at all. It is by no means only the pompous forms of power that are attractive. The very connection to power is already an immense temptation. Many of the most diverse people ask to be included on one commission or another. The very admission to the corridors of power, the possibility of coming and participating in the process of decisionmaking, which might very well turn out to be quite different from what you would like—this is still a temptation. You were there, perhaps you even said something that did not exactly fit in with what the boss was saying, and the boss nodded, gave it some thought, and did it his own way—but still there is the temptation. You are fully aware that you are playing the role of a democratic shield for the nomenklatura, but you are incapable of refusing. I know excellent people who have not been able to refrain from this. And if the boss wants to surround himself with such a clique of former democrats, he will have absolutely no difficulty finding the people he needs. Perhaps not the top ones, not the most courageous, not the most intelligent, but simply with some democratic past.

[Borin] While the democrats are squabbling amongst themselves and betraying one another, the real power remains in the hands of the apparatchiks, the bureaucrats.

[Gaydar] Of course! There are such incredible masters here! I will give you one example. In September I accepted an invitation to work in the government again. Literally a couple of days later—current questions were being discussed at a meeting—suddenly, quite unexpectedly, out of the blue, a note from Finance Minister Fedorov concerning reorganization of the government was brought up. The note was old, from July or August, before I was working there. The essence of the note was that the Ministry of Economics had to be abolished and all these functions, for which I was responsible, would be concentrated in the Ministry of Finance. After that it was assumed that I would immediately jump down Fedorov's throat and start a terrible fight with him and he would then beat me off and run to complain to the higher authorities. I got together with Boris and we had a few laughs. But situations like this are coming up constantly, they are created brilliantly. And what sweet temptations the apparatus throws out to you! Let us do all of this. And why do you not do this little bit, which would be very good for the family. How nice and splendid it will be, and everyone will be so satisfied! To be honest, my colleagues laughed at me when I made them write down in the gift book the presentation of some kind of badge, etc. But it is my deep conviction that such purism is actually useful. It simply teaches the apparatus that such little things do not go so cheaply.

[Borin] Have there been attempts to approach you like that?

[Gaydar] Yes, of course there have. It is inevitable.

[Borin] So, are these kinds of intrigues inevitable? Are there no methods of fighting against them?

[Gaydar] Well, what can I say. This is a subject that is very difficult to discuss, to describe. If you start to bring an intriguer out into the open, to prove how he is twisting things and lying—then the intrigue has already achieved its purpose. You are damned if you do and damned if you don't... These, unfortunately, are methods it is very difficult to combat in direct and open polemic.

[Borin] You know, in our circle we always used to be afraid of what they called losing face. We were sentimental in the good sense of the word, if you will. The well-known words "Let us hold hands, friends, so we do not fall alone" expressed our main feelings, our aspirations. But now, it seems to me, the author himself would no longer write them, sensing that they, alas, are as if from another time.

[Gaydar] Yes, we have lost our sentimentality. I think this is very bad. How did it happen? A very complicated question. I would say this. There used to be a fairly simple arrangement: us and them. They were the authorities. They were cruel and evil. We were not the authorities. We could be destroyed and oppressed by them, we were dependent on them. But we were intelligent, honest, and good. We had our morality, we had our norms of behavior. We could hold each other's hands. This is not out of 1937. It is the way things were at the end of the fifties and beginning of the sixties. This is not

the way it was with mass terror, this is the way it was with a gentle authoritarian regime which, by and large, did not bother anyone who did not deliberately pick a fight with it. It allowed people to speak their minds in their own homes, it allowed them to be themselves, to be intelligent and worthy, as long as they did not sneak up to it with leaflets and dynamite. It seems to me that this is the basis of the intelligentsia culture from which Okudzhava and many other excellent writers sprang. Incidentally, in a certain sense these are the revived traditions of the Russian intelligentsia, Russian society. That is the way it was in the 19th century as well. Then too there was a gentle authoritarian regime, there were also "us" and "them," and we also had our own morality. In general it seems to me that gentle authoritarianism which precludes direct contact with the authorities is a fairly healthy environment for this kind of intelligentsia culture and morality.

[Borin] And now? Is this the result of rubbing elbows with the authorities?

[Gaydar] Things are much more complicated now. It is no longer "us" and "them." Now the authorities are divided and society is divided. There are many very different kinds of "us" and many very different kinds of "them." I would never have thought that people whom I knew well would suddenly end up in the enemy camp, as our political opponents. Evil opponents. But that is the way it has turned out. I went to the president and vouched for some of my friends. He said to me: "This one did this and that." I answered: "I do not believe it, that cannot be."

[Borin] And how did it turn out?

[Gaydar] In various ways. Sometimes it was discovered that it was slander, an attempt to discredit somebody. But sometimes—yes, alas, it was true.

[Borin] In the press today there are a lot of arguments about the position of the former procurator general Aleksey Kazannik. They say that since he thought that political amnesty was disgraceful he could refuse to implement this decree and then retire. One thing is clear: A noble person ended up as a plaything in the hands of the others in the procuracy. I am not saying anything about the helplessness and inconsistency of the presidential administration.

[Gaydar] I am not Aleksey Ivanovich's judge. By and large I agree with him. The fight against the extremely dangerous Duma decree could have and should have been waged long before it was adopted. Well, what about Aleksey Ivanovich? In a certain sense he is that kind of person. In my view, he is a man of high moral qualities. To be honest, I expected nothing less of him.

[Borin] The period when you were in the government today is called the "romantic," "heroic" period of our reforms. How is this to be understood? When conducting the reforms, did you try to stay within the confines of some moral rules? Not to lie, not to promise what you could not deliver?

[Gaydar] I think you are right. Moreover, lying is an economic category of the highest degree. Ruslan Imranovich tried to prove to me that panic was not an economic category. He was wrong, panic is absolutely an

economic category. It exerts an immense influence on the development of the entire complex of financial processes. Stock exchange panic, foreign currency panic, etc. So lying is also a completely economic category. Something is always being demanded of the state, of the politician. First: Either do not promise anything, or promise something and try to do it. This, of course, is very dangerous if certain dangerous and difficult things are promised. The other extremely widespread policy is when you promise things but you do not do them. In economics this is called discrepancy between the budget based on commitments that have been made and the budget based on financial flows. That is, you have promised everything to everyone. And then: "Well, you see, there is none. I will give you none, and you none, and I will not give you any either." This is the underlying foundation for the extremely severe financial crisis we are experiencing right now. It is related to the attempt to implement precisely that policy since the spring of 1993. Then, in the autumn, we tried to fight, to do something. But not to the end. We did not manage to, we were unable to. Such a policy is very risky. Because it discredits the state. Extreme financial problems are created for all who believed in the state. Millions of people suffer, ties are disturbed among enterprises, suppliers of raw material, suppliers of semimanufactured products, and suppliers of electric energy. The immense economic chain is broken. And it is all because it was convenient for me to say: "I will do this, I will give it to you." And then go into another room and say: "Of course, I will not give them a thing." That is a very vulnerable economic policy. And if it is an economic policy of realism, I assure you it has never led anyone to anything good and it never will.

[Borin] For decades we have lived under the power of favorites whose principle has been: After us, the flood. Does this mean that they are raising their heads again.

[Gaydar] Well, generally speaking, of course.

Achalov on October Events, Current Situation

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in Russian 12 Mar 94 p 4

[Interview with Colonel General Vladislav Alekseyevich Achalov by Sergey Turchenko; place and date not given: "Two Hours Before the Assault"]

[Text] SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA published a short interview with Lieutenant General Vladislav Alekseyevich Achalov immediately after he left Lefortovo. Today, we offer the reader a more detailed interview with the minister of defense of a House of Soviets that was riddled with gunfire.

[Turchenko] Vladislav Alekseyevich, let us begin from the moment that you were appointed minister of defense. Many of our readers ask in their letters: Why did you not take any kind of steps for real execution of the duties that were entrusted to you by the Congress of People's Deputies?

[Achalov] When the Congress of People's Deputies appointed me, Barannikov, and Dunayev force ministers, individual people, even from among the people's deputies demanded: Go to the ministries, take up your positions, and start to manage. But the real situation and common sense suggested another path for resolving the question. Since the three force ministries were appointed, this meant

that a government should be formed as well. Without this, for us to go to the ministries and there establish parallel managerial structures would mean the direct involvement of the Army, the MB [Ministry of Security], and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] in opposition inside these very structures themselves, which would lead to a full-scale civil war. I told Loth Khasbulatov and Rutskoy: If a new government is to be formed, and this is their prerogative, then questions of the Ministry of Defense can be resolved within its framework. But this, as is well-known, was not done.

[Turchenko] Some analysts think that it was a tactical error to appoint new force ministers outside the framework of a government, for this would seem to doom Grachev, Yerin, and Golushko to opposition with respect to the congress.

[Achalov] Grachev, Yerin, and Golushko were invited to a meeting of the congress as full-fledged ministers, but they did not appear. And this was their deliberate choice: To take the side of the president immediately. They undeviatingly took the path of unconstitutionality. When this became obvious, the congress appointed new force ministers. For me personally this was a surprise, but nothing remained to be done except to fulfill the will of congress.

[Turchenko] What does to fulfill mean? What could the minister of defense do sitting inside the blockaded House of Soviets?

[Achalov] We knew, and now it is obvious to many, that in September the MVD planned and prepared an operation to eliminate the Congress of People's Deputies. Besides the forces and resources of Moscow Oblast, OMON [Special Missions Militia Detachments] Personnel and Internal Affairs subunits from many regions were drawn up at the House of Soviets. In addition, in September, all of the army units closest to Moscow were dispatched to harvest potatoes, and all of the militia subunits were pulled out of the potato fields. The fact is that people from Yeltsin's circle knew what kind of an attitude the army showed to the regime in the referendum, and they did not count on it. They put into operation specifically cultivated OMON and Spetsnaz [Special Purpose Forces] forces. In this connection, I had the task of organizing antipro provocation measures and the security of the House of Soviets. That is, all of my work was directed at ensuring the safety of the deputies and more or less the peaceful work of the congress. Such tasks as going to the troops, inspiring them, and leading them in a breakthrough were not assigned.

The biggest misfortune was that neither Yeltsin, nor his circle, wanted to accept a compromise and to resolve the dispute at the top. They brought the situation to a point where the people themselves undertook the task. And when they saw that on 3 October the people came to the defense of the House of Soviets and the legal authority, they incited bloodshed.

[Turchenko] Let us look at 4 October through the eyes of a military professional. What was the sense of the tank shelling of the House of Soviets?

[Achalov] On the evening of 3 October, authority was paralyzed. The most resolute figures from Yeltsin's circle understood that only a harsh bloody battle would be capable of bringing their supporters out of shock. These

tank firings were necessary to them at any price and for any money. The Army, MVD, and the MB ended up drawn into a monstrous bloody game. No matter how much the finger is pointed at us now, declaring us to be the culprits of this tragedy, it is apparent to any sensible person: Being completely isolated, behind barbed wire, without communications means, theoretically we could not even create any kind of a dangerous situation. There was no military necessity to fire into the parliament building. This was a purely political act with the unjustified employment of heavy weapons.

[Turchenko] What do you remember particularly from this nightmare?

[Achalov] For two hours before the assault, our people in the MO [Ministry of Defense], MVD, and MB reported that an irreversible decision for its execution was already made. Military people came to me and tried to persuade me for a long time so that I would leave with them. I answered firmly that I would remain with the deputies to the end. I recall, as a minimum, two moments when Khasbulatov tried to get to Yeltsin in order to avoid bloodshed, but the president's circle did not permit such negotiations. And a savage reprisal started. I had occasion to participate in different conflicts in the border areas of our country. But there was nothing comparable to this barbarous brutality. After all, it was not without reason that workers of the Procuracy afterwards were not permitted in the House of Soviets for three days. All this time, the MVD and the OMON were clearing the building of blood and corpses.

When the shelling reached the fiercest stage, Khasbulatov and Rutskoy telephoned Zorkin, and they tried to reach Chernomyrdin so that they could promote a ceasefire. In the end—it was already the evening of 4 October—some Alpha officer arrived and said that he was authorized to take me, Barannikov, and Dunayev to negotiations with representatives of Chernomyrdin. We came out of the 20th entry way and got into an armored personnel carrier that took us to Krasnaya Presnya. Buses were parked there. Near one of them I spotted Barsukov, whose eyes were restless. I understood immediately that we had been tricked. When the bus started to move and I saw what route it was taking, no doubts were left: We were being taken to Lefortovo, and not to negotiations.

The first interrogation was held at 2300 hours on 4 October. I declared immediately that I was detained through deceit and, in addition, that my diplomatic immunity was violated. But no one paid any attention to this, as happens in our country. At first an attempt was made to steer me into the Terekhov affair. It did not work. Then they brought the standard accusation of massive disorders. But nothing here also could be linked to the law. If it were not for the amnesty, I do not know how the Procuracy would have extricated itself from the situation into which it had cornered itself.

[Turchenko] A judicial process could have shed light on the truth about September-October 1993. Perhaps you should have refused amnesty and attempted to go to court?

[Achalov] I do not believe in an objective court trial in the present state where the highest law—the constitution—is crushed with tank tracks.

[Turchenko] Do you consider yourself vanquished?

[Achalov] No. But I also do not see any victors. The present authority conducted a provocation against itself as well. As a matter of fact, it signed its own sentence. The elections showed that the people turned away from it and that it will not accept such authority.

[Turchenko] Now everything is being done in a clumsy way by the president's team, and an economic catastrophe is imminent in the country. Did you not give some thought to the fact that perhaps you were released from the dungeons in order that there would be live material for drawing a picture of an internal enemy?

[Achalov] Really, parliament cannot be shot up a second time. But the authorities are in urgent need of an internal enemy in order to divert the attention of the people from hunger and cold and from the true culprits of the impending catastrophe. And so the "democratic" mass media has pounced on us. They are a priori shouting about some kind of extremist plans. I do not doubt that there will be attempts to involve some of the released prisoners in a new escapade. Objectively, a period of spontaneous protest demonstrations are drawing near. Undoubtedly, they will always be linked to us, even if we do not begin to participate in them. After all, this is so easy: Put signs with our portraits in the hands of "plants" and then have them shout: They will say, the October prisoners are stirring up the people, and they are trying to take power. Is this not a pretext for the introduction of a dictatorship, without which the present authorities are not capable of lasting?

[Turchenko] Does this mean that you are distancing yourself from any kind of a spontaneous or organized struggle whatsoever of the people against the current tyranny?

[Achalov] I am against forceful variants of this struggle, because this will be a catastrophe. A civil war is already going on in outlying areas. Different groups are fighting for spheres of influence and sales markets. It will already be impossible to extinguish the next skirmish in the center. And in no case is it possible to allow it to happen.

[Turchenko] The present authority is moving toward an economic catastrophe. An attempt to replace it is fraught with military catastrophe. How is it possible to avoid these two catastrophes?

[Achalov] The solution is the common sense of the people. I read a lot in Lefortovo and I became convinced: The Russian people always found the medicine against leaders who were unacceptable to it. Undoubtedly, it will find it now as well. Time will put everything in its place.

[Turchenko] What are your near-term forecasts?

[Achalov] Far from optimistic. If assistance is not provided immediately to agriculture, an inevitable famine awaits us. No one will start to feed us for nothing. We have already eaten up all of NATO's spoiled products. We have to give our peasant an opportunity to sow...

[Turchenko] And what are your personal near-term plans?

[Achalov] After coming out of Lefortovo, it is necessary to look into my own situation to the end; after all, my status is still unknown, and then I have to find my place in contemporary life. There already are proposals for work.

Not only in our country, but abroad as well. But I do not plan to depart for anywhere. I have one thought—to be of use to the people. I have not decided yet in what capacity.

Shakhray Details Russia's Federal Future

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[Article by Sergey Shakhray, minister for nationalities and regional policy: "Three Big Shots for the New Russia: They Are Federalism, a Socially Oriented Market Economy, and Local Government"]

[Text] The considerations and propositions adduced below represent not only my personal viewpoint as a scholar who has been studying problems of federalism for more than 16 years now. They reflect to a certain extent the plans and intentions of the ministry that I head.

First and most important: The federalization of Russia does not mean a weakening of the state but the sole possible way of preserving its unity and integrity. But lest the objective processes of decentralization bring about the disintegration of the state, they must be cast in civilized forms of federalism. Federalism for Russia also means an opportunity to unite the rich potential of all Russia's regions and the sole possible form of the democratic organization of society.

Underlying the most essential contradiction of the state arrangement of Russia is the approach whereby federalism was for more than 70 years seen solely as a method of solution of the nationality question. This was both the ideology and the practice of constitutional development. Of course, it was not realized in all things but it was this approach that guided our former constitutional developers, and it was to these criteria that the internal arrangement of the USSR and the RSFSR corresponded.

Another form of state arrangement of the Russian Federation, in which the economic and territorial aspects have emerged in the "federalism" category, has arisen and has been developing in the past four years. Federalism has "suddenly" become the mode of distribution of economic and power authority within the Russian Federation and also a factor actively influencing the pace and forms of economic and political reform. Thus the national model of arrangement of the state and the territorial model of the arrangement of the state have found themselves in contradiction.

There is just one way out of this contradiction: We are condemned to a long transitional period, in the course of which we will have to find the optimum forms of the interaction of national aspects of state arrangement and the purely economic and territorial forms.

It is the ostensibly incomprehensible argument between the republics and oblasts about the equality of the components of the Russian Federation that is behind this contradiction of the two forms of state arrangement of Russia—national and territorial—which exist simultaneously. The need for recognition of a transitional period means that the republics, as national states, will be preserved within the Russian Federation. The krais and oblasts of the Russian Federation will enjoy development also (the constitution has equalized in a legal respect all components of the

Russian Federation). We must pay particular attention, however, to the formulation and support of new fledgling forms of integration of the components within the Federation itself.

The first experience in this respect is to hand—it is the activity of the interregional economic associations. There are eight of them today, and they encompass, as a whole, the entire territory of the Russian Federation. Within the framework of such associations different components of the Russian Federation interact with one another and tackle specific economic, transport, and other economic problems, regardless of their status.

I proceed from the fact that equality does not mean identity, and no one, therefore, will succeed in "accommodating" the entire diversity of the components of the Russian Federation to some one format. If only because some regions are subsidized and exist thanks to subventions of the federal budget. And this is not their fault but a consequence of the location of the productive forces and the development of the economy throughout previous years. Other regions are profitable, and not only the federal budget but also the subsidized regions live thanks to them. This means that there may be and will be different approaches in economic strategy and tactics in respect to different components of the Russian Federation. The new Constitution of Russia has laid down important principles of the self-regulation and "self-adjustment" of the Federation. While having preserved and strengthened the constitutional nature of Russia, the constitution has at the same time recorded the possibility of the regulation of processes of the delineation of authority by the Federal and other treaties.

Part 3 of Article 11 of the constitution, which is devoted to these matters, is enshrined in the chapter "Fundamentals of the Constitutional System" and thus takes precedence over other provisions of the constitution. Article 78 enshrines the possibility of the delegation of authority by the federal structures of power to the level of the components and vice versa. Articles 73 and 76 enshrine the fullness of power of components of the Federation in respect to all matters other than those pertaining to the competence of the Federation and also the right to independently regulate matters referred to the competence of the components. In aggregate, the said provisions represent a basis for use of the mechanisms of "self-adjustment" within the Russian Federation. It is on these articles that the treaty that has just been signed with Tatarstan is based.

Debate of the status of the Republic of Tatarstan is not a subject of the treaty. This is simply not in the treaty. Article 1 of the treaty talks about the format of the delineation of terms of reference and authority, and then come articles on the authority of the organs of state power. The treaty is called "Delineation of the Terms of Reference and Mutual Delegation of Authority Between Organs of State Power of the Russian Federation and Organs of State Power of the Republic of Tatarstan." This treaty was born over the course of three years, and it contains certain conceptually new provisions which could and, in my view, should be the subject of scientific analysis.

First, this treaty was born not of a political debate between the parties to the treaty but by way of the successive

conclusion of specific agreements. Eleven such agreements were signed. They regulate individual economic matters, problems of the delineation of state property, budget and tax relations, and so forth. Thus the formulas of the main treaty were born of specific agreements. And following the signing of such a treaty, the Federation obtains a ready mechanism of its realization in the form of these agreements. This is undoubtedly a new approach, which could be applied in many other instances also.

And the second, fundamentally important, fact. The Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, like the constitutions of many other republics also, is today in formal contradiction with the text of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. According to the Constitution of Russia, no federal body can abolish, fully or some part thereof, the constitution of any republic. It might be expected that the republic authorities would revise their constitution independently, but this could prove to be an interminable process. The treaty on the delineation of terms of reference and authority now represents the sole possibility, therefore, of the removal of the formal contradictions between the constitutions of the republics and the federal constitution. Inasmuch as a provision of the treaty in this case takes precedence over the rules of law, the format of the delineation of terms of reference and authority corresponding to the Constitution of the Russian Federation will take effect.

I have dwelt on this in such detail for the added reason that this treaty has "closed" a long three-year period, when neither the federal constitution nor federal laws in fact operated on the territory of Tatarstan. None of the efforts of both the former parliament or the positive efforts of the Constitutional Court had any real effect in resolving these collisions.

A few words about the political aspects of federalism. They lie in the plane of an improvement in state power in the Russian Federation on the basis of the principles of federalism. It is a question of realization of Article 77 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the draft federal law on the common principles of organization of representative and executive power in the components of the Russian Federation. Guarantees of the fundamentals of the constitutional system and the equality of the citizens and, primarily, guarantees of their suffrage, the model of delineation of powers between the executive and representative authorities, the principle of the electivity of the heads of administration and the local government authorities, and certain principles of the delineation of terms of reference and authority could and should be the subject of such a law. This would be a considerable step forward in the development of the political aspects of federalism in Russia.

The economic aspects of federalism are the next important issue. We can talk for as long as you like about the fact that Russia must be a full-fledged federation, but as long as the tax and budget systems remain exclusively unitary, Russia will never be a federation. The main thing, therefore, is to bring the budget and tax systems into line with the federative nature of the state. Each component of the Federation must have its own sources of revenue in the form of tax receipts into its own coffers. In addition, the

federal fund for support of the regions must finally begin to function. And the logic of tax collection must necessarily be revised.

I do not believe that income tax should remain mainly in the hands of a component of the Russian Federation or a local government authority but should be a federal tax. Each citizen should personally and directly do his bit for the cause of the Federation. Taxes of the VAT type, profits tax, and others, on the other hand, should be a subject of distribution. A specific format is being worked up by our ministry. We calculate that it will be possible to switch to an essentially federal tax and budget format as of 1995.

Unfortunately, a mass of violations is being perpetrated at this time on the part of the organs of state power of the components of the Federation in the economic sphere: nonpayment of federal taxes, the imposition of internal customs, restrictions on the free movement of goods and services, and other obstacles. This is prohibited by the constitution, and the federal authorities should not only respond appropriately to such violations but also formulate a new format ensuring the unity of the economic space of Russia, the unrestricted movement of goods, services, and people, and the equal legal protection of citizens of the Russian Federation, wherever they may be on the territory of Russia. The basis for the economic unity of the Russian Federation should be such elements of a common infrastructure as power engineering, transport, communications, and information science. For the equalization of the regions, which differ considerably in terms of level of economic development, it will evidently be necessary to introduce territorial rent also. There are no other effective sources of the redistribution of budget and financial resources.

And, finally, national aspects of federalism in Russia. Two circumstances are distinguished here.

Our paramount task is the prevention of conflicts in the Russian Federation, which are national in form, and a settlement of those that already exist. Without attempting a more detailed analysis here, I shall cite the three main causes of such conflicts: a recarving of power (the competition or struggle of old and new political elites in the regions), a recarving of ownership, and the activity of organized crime.

The national form of a conflict is chosen by their organizers as the most "suitable," the one that most disguises the true aims of the political forces behind these conflicts. Unfortunately, a new aspect of national conflicts could soon appear. Conflicts could develop on not just a bilateral basis (Ossetian-Ingush, Ossetian-Georgian, Georgian-Abkhaz, and so forth). The Russian population could be involved in them, with weapon in hand, what is more.

This circumstance would switch the conflicts to an entirely different phase. In interaction with the authorities of the regions in the Russian Federation the federal authorities must avert this danger, therefore.

Further, on the right of nations to self-determination. The right to self-determination can and should be guaranteed in the Russian Federation, except merely for one form of such self-determination, namely, detachment from the Russian Federation. Formulation of the question of the

rights of nations to self-determination, up to and including the formation of an independent state and its separation from Russia, would under the conditions of the Russian state necessarily raise the question of the form in which the Russian nation might constitute itself.

If we take the path of a "Russian republic" (and there are forces interested in this), it needs to be borne in mind that whereas for Zhirinovskiy a Russian republic means the USSR in its former dimensions, for other leaders a Russian republic means the sum total of krays and oblasts of the Russian Federation less the other autonomous formations.

An attempt to draw the borders of a new Russian republic would end in these borders running not only across regions but also across human souls, across our families. This would be an absolutely hopeless and bloody path. It needs to be recognized officially that the Russian Federation is the common form of state self-determination of all peoples and national groups of the country. In addition, the Russian Federation is the form of the self-determination of all its citizens, regardless of the nationality to which they belong. It is the common home within which there is sufficient room for all forms of self-organization.

Fundamental importance in the national aspects of federalism is attached to a revival of the concept of national-cultural autonomy. And not only and not so much even in the forms in which they were developed by Bauer and other ideologists. In my view, there is a possibility of the harmonious unification of the concept of national-cultural autonomy and a well-developed concept of local government. This would make it possible to devise specific organizational forms and realize at local government level the majority of the current national, economic, and political rights of all peoples and nationalities of the Russian Federation.

Concerning Chechnya. A situation where for a very long period of time 1.2 million Russian citizens have lived outside of the protection of the Russian Constitution and legality and where crime rages and thousands of families have been forced to leave their homes cannot be tolerated. The federal authorities must regard a settlement of relations with Chechnya as a priority problem for preservation of the federative principles of the Russian state and the development of the Russian Federation itself.

The position should be, in my view, as follows.

The federal authorities can and should agree to a treaty delineating terms of reference and authority with the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic. It is necessary to proceed here from the fact that the free, voluntary delegation and distribution of authority is essentially the highest form of manifestation of sovereignty and independence. But the condition of the signing of such a treaty must be free elections to the organs of power of Chechnya with the participation of the opposition and the participation of the inhabitants of this republic in elections to the federal parliament.

There is one further dimension to the problem of federalism—"federalism and the multiparty system." I am profoundly convinced that Russia can endure and strengthen as a free state only if two or three major and truly nationwide political parties, which would be the political

pivot of the federal state, arise in it. It will be very difficult to create and retain a federative state in Russia by legal and economic mechanisms alone. "Federalism and the multi-party system"—this proposition echoes the proposition that the Federation is for Russia the territorial form of democracy.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize once more that the rescuing strategy for Russia should be one based on three propositions—federalism, a socially oriented market economy, and local government.

Nizhny Novgorod Mayor on Election Program

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 No 10, Mar 94 [Signed to press 5 Mar 94] p 6

[Interview with Dmitriy Bednyakov, mayor of Nizhny Novgorod, conducted by NOVOYE VREMYA correspondent: "Revenge Will Not Pass in Nizhny Novgorod, City's Mayor Affirms on the Eve of the Elections"]

[Text] The elections of the oblast and city administrations are drawing near. One of the co-authors of the law on privatization, and most importantly—the author of many practical matters, Dmitriy Bednyakov, is running for the office of mayor of Nizhny Novgorod, the third largest city in Russia. In the elections of 1991, the 39-year old Bednyakov did not get the majority of votes and was appointed acting mayor by edict of the president.

The head of administration of Nizhegorod Oblast, Boris Nemtsov, despite his youth, is one of the most well-known Russian politicians. However, few pay attention to the fact that he would hardly have been able to achieve success in transforming the oblast had he not worked with like-minded people, among whom we should list primarily the city's mayor, Dmitriy Bednyakov, and the chairman of the oblast soviet, Aleksandr Krestyaninov...

And today, Dmitriy Bednyakov answers the questions posed by NOVOYE VREMYA.

[Correspondent] What are you taking to the elections?

[Bednyakov] I am not a proponent of program statements, but I am in my third year of work now and clearly understand that only he who will be able to manage in the channel of interests of the common man can expect victory in the elections, regardless of the level at which these elections are held.

[Correspondent] As far as I know, reforms in Nizhegorod Oblast have been implemented according to the conception: "First develop optimal economic mechanisms in the local areas, and then delegate rights to the center, based on the interests of the region."

[Bednyakov] We have done many things independently and more quickly than others. This concerns both privatization and the support of enterprise. This also concerns the mutual relations with large industrialists, as well as the policy of social protection of the population. However, I would like to say that reforms generally depend on one very important thing—on the presence of political will.

We may understand the goals of reform differently, perceive the tactics differently, and act differently. However, in order to have any kind of results, we must first have the desire for them. All our actions are subordinate to a dual

task. On one hand, we are striving to reform the economy, and on the other hand we have combined reforms (and they, as is the case everywhere, are accompanied both by liberalization of prices and by demonopolization) with measures on social protection.

For example, on 7 January 1992, seven days after liberalization of prices, we lifted price controls on milk. But at the same time we allocated budget funds to support certain categories of people. Every month these people got 70 rubles (R) each. Today this is a laughable sum of money. But in January 1992 it would buy one liter of milk a day for an entire month. And on the whole this measure allowed us to save considerable budget funds.

On 24 March 1992, we lifted price controls on bread and gave a subsidy of R260 a month to some categories of people (only some!)—invalids, families with many children and pensioners. In May of 1992 we increased the subsidy, and then changed over to individual subsidies using the so-called application order. As of 1 October of last year, we introduced a poverty subsidy, which is paid to those whose level of income is below the minimum subsistence level.

As of 1 January 1993, we have not had coupons for food products. The last ones I repealed were coupons for sugar. One may promise from the "soapbox": "I will never repeal coupons. I will retain prices at their former level. I guarantee each person 200 grams of carmel candy, and everything else." Yet all the while prices will still be increasing, and products will be disappearing from the shelves. Yet we have said firmly: "Yes, prices in different stores will be different, and perhaps will change in the course of the day." At first people could not get used to this. Yet now even pensioners, even war veterans who have become accustomed to buying their goods in specialized stores at fixed prices, ask only that the goods be closer to home.

Here are some economic indicators. The number of state enterprises for 1993 is 4.5 percent of their overall number. The relative share of non-state enterprises in budget revenues for 1992 was 12 percent, while in 1993 it was already 73 percent. There are no social conflicts.

In 1992 the decline in production in Russia comprised 19.9 percent. In Nizhegorod Oblast, which suffered all the ills of the Russian regions, it was 7.6 percent, while in Nizhny Novgorod it was 2.4 percent.

In 1993 the decline throughout Russia was once again 20 percent, while in Nizhegorod Oblast it was a little over 7 percent and in Nizhny Novgorod it was around 4 percent.

[Correspondent] Do you have any real competitors in the elections?

[Bednyakov] There are several competitors with whom there are no principle ideological divergences. Those who speak out for slowing of reforms, I believe, are doomed. The LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia], for example, is submitting a candidate named Buslayev. A man by that name has already put all of Russia on its ear once. The communists are presenting their own man. But, it seems, they will not even be able to gather enough signatures. I have not yet seen or heard any distinct programs.

[Correspondent] Will you be able to win the region in the case of some cardinal changes in the political course of the country?

[Bednyakov] I am sure of that. There were R70 billion which settled in the Savings Bank for last year alone. The level of consumption has remained practically unchanged in two years. New stores have opened—around 700 of them. No efforts to resurrect state regulation will pass here.

Romanov Seen as 'Rising Star'

944F0462A Vladimir ZAVTRA in Russian No 9, Mar 94
pp 1, 2

[Dialogue between Petr Romanov and Aleksandr Prokhanov; place and date not given: "A Russian Engineer, I Was Forced To Become a Politician..."]

[Text] [Prokhanov] In the definition of a political friend of mine, you, Petr Vasilyevich, are a rapidly rising political star. I heard about you long ago, but we met only this winter, bitter and formidable, when I came to Siberia, to your native Krasnoyarsk. The center of Siberian industry was dying, like a beached whale. And only your plant—it is hard to call it a plant, it is a small civilization, a city within a city—was continuing to live, struggle, breathe, and fight. We exchanged our values, our ideology, for the first time then.

You are a technocrat. This is a rarity, a find, for the patriotic movement. Members of the opposition are liberal arts figures, philologists, legal scholars, and historians, as a rule. You, though, are the bearer of immense production engineering knowledge and organizational experience. You are linked with modernity, with industry, with the idea of technotronic development. Your activity in the Russian National Assembly and proximity to the top opposition leaders have created for you a firm reputation as a state absolutist and Russian patriot.

You became a politician. You became a member of this hastily formed institution of power—the Federation Council. You essentially won the fight with Shumeyko for in order to forestall you he had to accumulate all the influence of the president and the prime minister backing him.

What do you, a Siberian, a plant director, an industrialist, feel, having found yourself in this cauldron of new Moscow politics? Your feelings from interaction with this environment?

[Romanov] I never previously felt myself to be a politician. This is now the most dangerous period of my life. Military pilots say: "Watch out for them winging you during takeoff." They did not. Figuratively speaking, I am as yet gaining cruising speed. Then it will be time for the plans which I brought with me here and which I would like to embody via the Federation Council. Decent people have been elected. I will contribute to their philosophy the spirit of the military-industrial complex.

When, prior to the vote on the candidates for the position of chairman of the Federation Council, I was asked whether I had any experience of parliamentary business, I replied honestly that I did not. I have now built up some such experience. It is negative: The political forces with which I have come into contact and the institutions I have

entered are not all that disposed to work for national unification. I mean by this the mutual understanding and interaction of all who wish to survive in Russia and make it great. Political persons and the conflicts connected with them are ultimately transient. How many there have been.... And if the country stands, has not crumbled, state instincts are still, consequently, alive. It is simply that they just cannot become policy and ideology.

Unification is occurring as yet merely within institutions and parties and groups of politicians. Even recently the patriots were sharply criticizing the State Duma for amorphousness and conciliation. But the Duma, without even touching on the subject of the amnesty, has shown that the most diverse politicians are disposed to act together in strategic areas. Were this unification to go beyond the framework of parties and institutions, I would feel better in Moscow politics.

As far as my technocratic experience, as you put it, is concerned, I met with many plant outfits in Krasnoyarsk and heard one and the same thing everywhere: "We have to work." The plants are buckling under the arrears, and wages have not been paid for months—and people are working, they want to work. This cannot be said of Moscow politicians.

A Russian engineer, I was forced to become a politician.

[Prokhanov] You speak about unification, the composition of the efforts of the parties, the composition of the tendencies of politicians, each of whom has his own vector, his own political pace, his own experience of catastrophe or victory. I, and not only myself, am tormented by one question. For three or four years we patriots have been attempting to compose a party of national interests, a patriotic party based on the national idea.

It cannot be said that these attempts appear absolutely barren. Small political formations: the Russian Revival Party, the Russian Party of Mikhail Korchagin, have been formed. The Slav Assembly has been created. Among the most dynamic is Russian National Unity. There was the attempt to create the Russian National Assembly, in which you actively participated. The National Salvation Front was squashed. All other attempts are coming to naught. Everything is confined to a conference, a congress, at which declarations are made, then organizational apathy sets in, all movements come to a halt....

Why are we unsuccessful here? Is it not because unduly blurred, unduly archaic political formulas such as "Orthodoxy-autocracy-national character" or "Russian solidarity" are made the basis of them, these parties and their ideology? Today's Russia is a multidimensional pulsating structure, in which each region has its own version of the Russian idea.

In addition, the present Russia does not have a traditional look. It is oriented toward the future. Perhaps none of these pariahs has a future image, all their values are too tied to the past, and they are unable to adapt tradition to history and actual policy?

[Romanov] But in just the same way it has not been possible to create a "presidential" party either. Communitarianism is a feature of Russian politics. The communists are fragmented, like the democrats also. What significance

have all these Moscow parties for the ordinary man? Go to the periphery, as they say in Moscow, call in at a shop or a cowshed, and ask if only: "What is the Constitutional Court, who is on it?" It is not known. Even less is anything known about patriotic politicians.

I see as the solution for the patriots the creation of a supra-party bloc based on the center parties with a negligible tilt to the left, but under no circumstances to the right. The leaders of parties and movements should step beyond party ambitions, sit down at the table, and come to some agreement. This supra-party bloc of politicians should go to the people with an intelligible program of national salvation. I do not believe that its success would depend on how far it operated with outmoded ideologies and how it modernized the "Orthodoxy-autocracy-national character" principle. It would depend on whom it persuaded: the Moscow "mass meeting" or those who have their hands on the levers of the economy and power.

Such a program is a latent need of both the opposition and the authorities. I heard and read the president's speech in the Federal Assembly. Even he, having become, according to the new constitution, the head of state, is now uttering words inconceivable from his mouth three or four months ago. He has willy-nilly been forced to size up the situation in the country and to construct his—albeit deficient, hypocritical—program in conformity with it.

The president spoke in sufficient detail about what needs to be done. But everyone knows this, as it is, I believe. Were an opposition supra-party bloc to explain how it should be done, it would have a chance to win.

The politicians who are a part of the bloc must necessarily identify stages and arrange landmarks en route to the goal—promise-landmarks. After all, Khrushchev's "the present generation of Soviet people will live under communism" was not fortuitous. It showed that these authorities understood the importance of the possession, in your definition, Aleksandr Andreyevich, of a future image, albeit "incorrect." They, the politicians, must not be afraid to take on themselves—to the extent of their influence—economic assignments also. Set them six months ahead, say, providing them with resources....

[Prokhanov] I listened to the president's speech with a double feeling, catching in his vocabulary all the words and ideas that we patriots have over three years formulated and offered society and for which we have acquired the title of "conservatives" and "red-browns." He outlined distinctly, in party and oblast party committee fashion, the contours of the catastrophe that has struck Russia. He omitted just one thing: who created the catastrophe. Or was it these "red-browns" who brought the country to disintegration, the stoppage of the plants, the exorbitant prices?

Each day on my way to work I pass the Frunzenskaya Embankment, I see daily the enormous Buran—the Russian spacecraft—reminiscent of a once beautiful, but now dead, creature. I was at Baykonur when Buran, having accomplished an unmanned space circuit, landed on the scorching pad. I remember the exultant face of Oleg Baklanov, I remember my own exultation: my state ruled in near-Earth space....

And now Buran has been trotted out posthumously as a laughing-stock. What will be made from it: a bordello, a restaurant, a public restroom? It is like spoils taken on the field of battle from the vanquished USSR.

So let us be told who the author of this catastrophe is. Let us be told that it was wrought by Gaydar and Yeltsin, Fedorov and Shumeyko.

Two symptomatic blabbings have been agitating minds as of late. On the eve of Clinton's visit the following political formula appeared in the American press and was relayed to Russia by CNN: "America will have to choose between the shock therapy of Gaydar, which, of course, would weaken Russia to the United States' advantage, and a new, more moderate policy, which would preserve Russian potential to some extent, but would protect Russia against a social explosion which could sweep away the supporters of reforms."

And recently Gavril Popov, the superdemocrat, published a program perceived as an attempt to crawl from beneath the rubble of the present political period. He acknowledges in this program that Gaydar's shock therapy was thought up by the Americans to destroy Russia's military-industrial complex.

This was said when our submarines stand fast at the piers, when the missile and tank plants are at a standstill, and when the test ranges are dying, military supertechnology is disintegrating, and young intellectuals are going into commerce and pimping. This was said by Popov, whose contribution to the collapse was immense.

So why do you members of parliament not name publicly the culprits of the catastrophe before embarking on the restoration of Russia?

[Romanov] Why are we not delivering angry philippics against the "regime"? Well, we ourselves, the corps of directors, are to blame for what has happened. And now we face the prospect of a shutdown of production—not random, not partial, but total. This would signify the collapse of the economy and statehood and national catastrophe.

Yes, Gaydar and Fedorov have gone. Were we to shout curses after them, we would have to back them up with action also. Stop the plants? Trigger a directors' strike? What's the use....

Our real fault is that we are today, now, not saying, not venturing to tell Chernomyrdin, Soskovets, and Gerashchenko: "Stop. Let's take a look. We acknowledge that on account of a number of Russia's geographical and geopolitical circumstances a market economy may be created even theoretically only in European Russia, along the Trans-Siberian Railroad, at that. We acknowledge that we need a transitional period, that we will not crawl out of the present pit without emergency economic measures. And for this reason the present inflationary drift, when only the idle are not managing to shake money loose from the cabinet, is intolerable. A realistic program of salvation and reconstruction of the dying economy is needed."

[Prokhanov] I know that you, Petr Vasilyevich, are working on a multitude of program documents. Could you not briefly give us the essence of this transitional period

and these emergency measures and the methodology with which it is possible to halt the catastrophe and undertake the plastic transformation of our tormented economy into a new quality connected with development.

[Romanov] Russia has two paths, in my view.

The first is to "pupate," to go into isolation, and to tackle all problems, technological and structural modernization included, thanks only to our own internal resources, becoming a strong national state. Russia should imbibe, figuratively speaking, the umbilical cords, protruding from its body, of the defunct empire, lines of communication, and infrastructure that linked it only recently with the former Soviet republics. But this would take, considering the scale of the present collapse, 60-70 years.

The second is to accept the role of "raw material" state being imposed by the "world community," making in this sense a temporary concession. Russia would export raw material and import technology and would one day once again become a strong, but not isolated, national state, slowly once again assembling the empire.

Unless a benign political miracle occurs, the actual development of Russia will choose a path between these two not all that optimistic options.

What emergency measures are possible in these contours? Regardless of the forms of property, it is necessary to administer in centralized fashion in conjunction with the territories all the extractive sectors, power engineering, transport, and foreign economic activity.

It is essential to introduce strict price control of the economy via a lowering of outlays in the production sectors and differentiated tax rates for brokerage, commercial, financial, and banking services. A consolidated government contract by sector is needed simultaneously. We would in this way immediately be giving the Russian manufacturer priority. He would henceforward know precisely what profit he would make in production, and what, in commerce, and how much he would lose in taxes.

All investment funds, banks, and other similar financial institutions should be adroitly oriented toward investment in efficient works with a necessary government guarantee in the event of a failure to achieve the contemplated efficiency.

It does not need to be said that the activity of the State Property Committee and the Antitrust Committee of the Russian Federation would be suspended for the period of the emergency measures.

It is essential to sharply limit, to "suppress," imports of consumer goods, primarily durables, if, of course, these prohibitions do not entail the danger of starvation. Each bottle of Italian mineral water on the Krasnoyarsk shelves means a dollar not invested in the Russian economy. And investments have declined in Russia by a factor of six or seven since 1991 as it is. This, incidentally, is a special problem barely soluble within the framework of emergency measures alone.

It is necessary also to establish sectoral wage differentiation, movement beyond the framework of which should entail severe penalties.

Finally, for the Russians coming to us from the near abroad we need to create jobs in the agro-industrial zones which are promising from the viewpoint of the market economy. The move should, of course, be undertaken in planned fashion, with the simultaneous closure of works that have no future.

[Prokhanov] This is akin to a plan for the restoration of the national economy after a war. It creates an ideological field, toward which the people are predisposed. The people must understand that they have been bombed to destruction. And that we will have to restore the devastated cities and lines of communication and also human relations by way of the injection in the restoration of the surplus quantity of our own calories.

[Romanov] Yes, belt-tightening once again, for the umpteenth time.... Agrarian problems were discussed recently in a committee of the upper house of parliament. I said that no government financial injections would in themselves save the situation. We need a program of salvation of the agrarian complex—as specific as possible, for a year or 18 months to two years. And for the sake of it, this program, we would tighten our belts. And the people would understand were there at least some changes for the better in two years.

[Prokhanov] You have spoken about the creation of a national political alliance, a congress of politicians, and have drawn its boundaries, in which tremendous political potential is condensed. It means, most likely, not only politicians and their parties and allies but also vast social groups and classes. The working class, peasantry, technical and liberal arts intelligentsia, and even the new bourgeoisie to some extent. On what kind of base do you conceive of the creation of this alliance? On the basis of the State Duma or in the garb of a new political super-organization?

[Romanov] We need to think sooner about ideology than about organization and to find comprehensible, plastic slogans explaining reality and outlining—once again I avail myself of your term, Aleksandr Andreyevich—a future image, an image of the near future.

After all, whatever one's attitude toward the Bolsheviks, it has to be admitted that ideologically they operated very dexterously in 1917. They did not say that they had appointed Russia "to set alight the fire of world revolution." They said: "Peace to the peoples, the land to the peasants, the plants and factories to the workers!"

We should be understood by all: from the nationally oriented "bourgeois" to the retirees who are living by begging. The "bourgeois" need to be told that if they begin to build national industry, they will be exempted from taxes. And they do not need to be told what this means. If, however, they start simply to "turn over money," the financial inspector will have them in his clutches. And only this way, not the other way about. We will offer retirees selective social programs. And so forth.

So if such a program is taken up, I am prepared on my responsibility to formulate and put into practice what my city and my sector need. Not debate, it is necessary, I repeat, to do something and to know how to do it.

[Prokhanov] You are a general director. You should lead a technocratic train into this political bloc. You have the

authority of a man and the subtle internal laws and tendencies of the corps of directors. I have, I confess, long ceased to understand what is happening in it....

[Romanov] The same as in the country.

[Prokhanov] In the good old days I knew this very stratum of directors. I saw their tragedy, the smashing of the corps of directors in Gorbachev's times. At first they came to elect them, the directors, gave them over to be torn to pieces by the mob....

[Romanov] Remember how Gorbachev on many occasions said in public: Let's fall on the bureaucracy together, we, from above, you, the people, from below?

[Prokhanov] Yes, this was the first blow at the base stratum of the Soviet state. The directors then came to be persecuted, and they were declared the "principal conservatives" and the exponents of the "communist conspiracy." They were defamed as, virtually, the "second structure after the KGB impeding perestroika." While having sustained heavy losses, the corps of directors withstood these two blows, nonetheless.

Subsequently, against their wishes, the directors awoke one day as multi-millionaires, virtually. The oblast property committees appointed for them super-high salaries, and they were permitted via easily obtainable licenses to engage in the commercial exportation of products overseas.

[Romanov] But, despite this, the directors held the work force together and prevented it disintegrating. Nor do they all have such super-high salaries—in my circle, at least.

[Prokhanov] But as of late many of the directors whom I know have had the constant feeling that this "small social world" at the enterprises is on the verge of disintegration. The directors are cringing beneath the sullen looks of the workers....

[Romanov] They are right to have this feeling, possibly. After all, for the past eight years the authorities have done everything to keep the directors out of politics and to ensure that they not perceive their responsibility for the enterprise on the scale of the association, the main administration, the sector, or the economy as a whole and that they get used to feeling that they are "on their own."

I remember Kremlin meetings under Gorbachev and Silayev. Even then we directors were speaking at the top of our voices about the crisis, about how to get out of it. There was a great deal of talk, but nothing was done. Subsequently various forces on a multitude of occasions attempted to place the directors beneath the most diverse political banners. Ultimately they threw up their hands and concentrated on the problems of their own enterprises. And it was at this moment that they ceased to be for the workers representatives of the state at their enterprise, and they have not yet become regular capitalist bosses.

Nonetheless, you are right: The corps of directors is still a real force incorporating also an organized structure, possession of the keys to technology, and a social infrastructure. And for this reason the struggle for it will continue.

[Prokhanov] Volskiy's attempt to capture the affections of the corps of directors, accumulate it in the Party of

Industrialists, and create a political battering-ram from the directors is the best known. Against the background of Tizyakov's aborted attempt, it appeared successful for some time. Tizyakov was dislodged from politics after August 1991. Volskiy evaporated in October 1993.

Quite recently Skokov held in your parts, Krasnoyarsk, a congress of the Federation of Commodity Producers of Russia. I saw him after this. He is a strong politician and a connoisseur of the corps of directors, but he is by no means certain of the success of his mission—the national consolidation of the technocrats.

Is it possible, in your view, to consolidate the directors politically and teach them to uphold the political interests of their corporation, not only of the economic lobbies? And who could do this? The directors have been rejecting one leader after another ...

[Romanov] Permit me to disagree: First of all, it is not a question of leaders but of ideology. Only ideology drives the army, only thanks to ideology do the lines of communication run, only it consolidates the classes. But the directors cannot have their own, "directors'" ideology. But there is formally no official ideology either. It is not known whether statehood itself exists or not.

It seems to me that we need only say the word, the main word. Pose the problems on whose resolution the corps of directors, sober-minded government officers administering territories and fearing a social explosion, and national entrepreneurs could consolidate.

A mobilization plan is needed for the salvation of Russia. And it is in it, in this plan, that an "informal" official ideology, an official instinct, should be manifested. And I am afraid that if in the coming weeks what I have attempted to formulate is not stated publicly, this initiative will have been intercepted.

Security Council Scientific Council Plans

944Q0239A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by Andrey Vaganov: "National Security as a Systemic Problem: An In-House Scientific Council Has Been Created in the Structure of the Security Council of Russia"]

[Text] The Scientific Council (SC) under the auspices of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, which was formed by Edict No. 1807 of the president of the Russian Federation of 1 November 1993, held its first meeting last Friday. "Organizational-presentational" was how Academician Vladimir Pirumov, chairman of the SC and vice president of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, defined its tasks. The creation of such a structure in the system of the highest state authorities is an unprecedented step for Russia.

As Vladimir Pirumov declared, there is an insistent need today for the shaping of official policy in respect to the protection of man, society, and the environment against the ever-increasing impact of a variety of dangers. The preliminary structure of the research work of the SC will include such sections as foreign policy, defense, economic, and environmental security and the fight against crime and information security. In addition, the Scientific Council is

being entrusted with tasks of legal and information-analytical support for the activity of the machinery of the Security Council, the preparation of analytical material, and scientific expert evaluation and tutorials on various federal programs.

In the geopolitical situation in which the present Russia has found itself, it is no longer possible to adopt the principle of the separate assurance of security for each enumerated sphere. This is becoming a truly comprehensive, systemic problem. On the other hand, it is impossible to protect each and everything—there are neither the money nor the forces. The need to determine priorities in the sphere of security is absolutely obvious. The difficulty of the work for the SC will be primarily, evidently, finding the resultant of these varidirectional vectors of interests. It was for this reason that there was such a long and careful selection of the composition of the Scientific Council. It consists of 27 persons. They include, for example, Anatoliy Alekseyev, chief of the Russian Federation MVD Academy, Sergey Dyakov, chief of the Russian Federation FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service] Academy, Vitaliy Zhurkin, academician-secretary of the Department of Problems of World Economics and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Nikolay Karlov, chairman of the VAK [precise expansion unknown; possibly Supreme Arbitration Commission] of Russia, Yevgeniy Severin, general director of the All-Russia Scientific Center of Molecular Diagnostics and Treatment, and Vyacheslav Senchagov, rector of the Economics Academy of the Ministry of Economics of Russia. The other members of the SC are also burdened with no less high degrees, titles, and positions. It is anticipated that five "branch" groups will be created within the SC: public health care and environmental safety, assessment of foreign policy activity and defense and information security, conversion, and economic, and a public and state security group.

The work plans of the SC for 1994 include discussion of measures to limit the exodus of specialists and figures of science and culture abroad, questions of scientific and technological cooperation with foreign countries, a strengthening of the legal and organizational principles of the use and protection of Russia's scientific achievements, and scientific and technological problems of the equipping, arming, and special outfitting of servicemen.

Initially, however, members of the SC will, evidently, be dealing with more prosaic matters. It was felt at the first meeting that a system of interaction of the SC and the Security Council has yet to be worked out. In addition, the efficiency of the work of the Scientific Council could perfectly well be reduced unless problems of a purely internal nature are avoided. Thus it is contemplated that the SC will be centrally funded (according to information available to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, it will receive approximately R3 billion in 1994). The client of the work will be the Security Council. And although it is stipulated that this money must under no circumstances go to subsidize this department or research institute or the other, only a specific group of executants, it will, perhaps, be very difficult to avoid lobbying attempts on the part of members of the SC for their "own" structures.

The integration of existing efforts in the sphere of security in the programs planned for execution by the SC will be no less complex a problem.

And, finally, lest the SC become a kind of elite club of Moscow intellectuals, it will be necessary to give serious thought to how to make rational use in its work of Russia's regional research.

Spokesmen on Counterintelligence Changes

944K0920A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 11, 16 Mar 94 p 13

[Interview with Federal Counterintelligence Service officers Sergey Bogdanov and Sergey Vorobyev by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editors and correspondents; prepared and recorded by Oleg Blotskiy; date not given: "Lubyanka: A Strange Place for Its Own People?"]

[Text] The KGB is being divided and branched out, plaques taken down and different ones hung, top officials endlessly replaced.

Had it only been plaques and bosses... Growing tired of spasmodic and senseless reforms, experienced officers are leaving—those who did not go around chasing "skinheads" but were doing serious work combating crime and espionage.

To explain what is happening at Lubyanka, Federal Counterintelligence Service officers Sergey Bogdanov and Sergey Vorobyev visited the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA investigations department.

Yu. Shchekochikhin, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA investigations department editor: What is really happening over there these days?

S. Bogdanov, Federal Counterintelligence Service (FCS) officer: What is happening? The border troops are now an independent service subordinate directly to the president. The investigative department has been eliminated, as has the administration for investigations and corresponding units on the local level—in territorial administrations. These are probably the most significant among structural changes.

Thanks to public pressure, so far rehabilitation work has remained with us. GULAG veterans were extremely concerned that corresponding units would be eliminated. So far this line of work remains ours.

We now have about 75,000 staff members left.

Yu. Shchekochikhin: Where do your officers go?

S. Bogdanov: Staff reductions occurred mainly in the border troops and the investigative apparatus. Keeping in mind, however, that the former Ministry of Security [MB] was on average 20 percent understaffed, those who want to be in the service and pass the certification do not have any problem.

O. Blotskiy, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent: What are the selection criteria?

S. Bogdanov: We were informed that the main criteria are professional fitness and loyalty to the motherland.

D. Molchanov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent: How does one determine professional fitness?

S. Bogdanov: I am not a commission member and do not know how it is determined.

D. Molchanov: Do you see in the latest actions regarding the MB an element of strengthening the president's personal power?

S. Bogdanov: Theoretically—yes. In practice we will only be able to tell after we get specific assignments over a period of half a year.

Yu. Shchekochikhin: According to our information, many state security functions have now been transferred to the president's Main Protection Administration.

S. Bogdanov: In the past there was the KGB's Ninth Directorate. Part of the work of a number of units in the rest of the KGB was to support operational work of this directorate: operational information, operational investigations, and so on.

In principle, the Ninth Directorate's task was physical protection of the president. As to operational work around protected objects, including protected routes, this was done, among others, by staff members of the Moscow Administration. When the Main Protection Directorate was created, this unit was transferred there as a whole. Those who did not want a transfer stayed in the Moscow Administration.

Yu. Shchekochikhin: Where is the pay better—over there or with you?

S. Vorobyev, FCS officer: Over there, of course.

Yu. Shchekochikhin: Let us go back to politics. There have been many complaints about the MB in connection with the October 1993 events: The MB did not know what had been going on, they said.

S. Vorobyev: An organization that does not know what is happening around it would not be a special service. The question is who is the consumer of this information and how is it used. We knew, and provided this information.

S. Bogdanov: Materials of preliminary investigation on the basis of mass media reports regarding Barkashov were sent to the procuracy three times. But the latter did not find sufficient grounds to initiate criminal proceedings.

Celestine Bohlen, NEW YORK TIMES correspondent: I would like to go back to the October events. Do you think that the MB reorganization is related to these events?

S. Bogdanov: Probably yes. Going back to these events, I want to remind you that we knew about the plans, the concrete disposition of forces, up to how many combat detachments and commandos there were and which window bay or corridor they would be guarding. Therefore nobody can say it was an unexpected turn of events. The main issue is utilization of information.

I can tell as an example how the information on Chernobyl was used. A year before the catastrophe, 76 documents were sent from KGB units to various officials saying that these industrial nuclear systems cannot be used for scientific purposes. Nobody listened to us.

The same goes for the Bashkiria oil pipeline. While it was still under construction we were getting alarming information from foreign agents.

S. Vorobyev: We were sent a lot of materials, even aerial photos taken from a helicopter. We showed those six bent pipes on television. And what happened? I believe there is still no decision on it.

S. Bogdanov: This is all about the past; what about now? Have you even asked yourself how many times the initials of our institution have been changed over the past years? Do you know what this means? This means a change of leadership from top to bottom, not only the head of the organization, but all top officials. And from the day this all started, it still goes on. Tell me, how can a special service work under these circumstances?

Yu. Shchekochikhin: Will the latest change in initials help to correct the situation you were talking about?

S. Bogdanov: It depends on how long these initials stay.

S. Vorobyev: By the way, many officers are not certain that things are not going to be reshuffled again.

S. Bogdanov: Every time there are elections, there is change.

S. Vorobyev: Today our officers formally separated from their work. This sitting and waiting, which has been going on for the second month already, results in people's skills as operatives gradually beginning to deteriorate. If this situation continues for any length of time, we cannot be sure that a mass exodus to the civilian sector will not begin.

O. Blotskiy: Your investigative department is now being transferred to the procuracy. Cases have been transferred, but the personnel do not want to. What is happening to the investigative officers?

S. Bogdanov: Right now most officers do not want a transfer. They will be found jobs in our organization.

C. Bohlen: Why do they not want to transfer?

S. Bogdanov: You know, it is the same as happened to the Vypel unit. People came to work specifically for state security. And they do not want to leave this organization. It has its own traditions, its own system of relations, its own perks after all.

Yu. Shchekochikhin: How do you feel about the fact that investigations will now be carried out by the procuracy instead of the KGB? Some jurists have been pushing this for a long time, while others were against it...

S. Bogdanov: Right now, for instance, one of the contra-band cases has been transferred to the procuracy for investigation, and the man in charge of it has specialized in murders and rapes all his life.

D. Molchanov: How do you feel about the old KGB times? From a professional standpoint.

S. Bogdanov: I will give a most routine example. There was a Moscow Administration chief who could transfer his aide out of sight if the telephone in reception rang twice and nobody picked up the receiver. That is, on the third ring you knew for sure that you had just lost your year-end bonus. Now you can listen to the phone ringing for half an hour.

D. Molchanov: Now you cannot get through at all. Nobody answers. Or you call, and they say that such and such is not

in. Pardon me, I ask, who am I talking to? The person on the other end says: "I am just waiting here in the reception and answering the phone." (Laughter)

Yu. Shchekochikhin: Seriously speaking, however, I am convinced that the current government cannot do without the special services for its personal needs. Whichever major Russian politician I talk to, they are all convinced that their telephones are tapped. Do our leaders not need today to have at least a personal special service? After all, they are all children of those times; they cannot do without it.

S. Bogdanov: Any politicians needs to have a personal special service—regardless of whether he is an offspring of a communist or another state. I have no doubt about this.

As to telephone tapping, today the respective FCS unit can simultaneously listen to 2,000 telephones across the entire country of Russia. For comparison: Switzerland has the capability of simultaneously listening to 10,000.

P. Shirov, "Echo Moskv": has there been a considerable personnel turnover, especially over the past two years?

S. Bogdanov: We have come to the conclusion that the number of resignation letters submitted has fallen off considerably. Several years ago there were mass resignations. Every time our plaque is changed, the number of resignation requests immediately shoots up. Now, however, we have come to a point where, in my opinion, the people who are there are precisely the kind of people who should be working there.

Yu. Shchekochikhin: What happened to the administration for combating organized crime and corruption?

S. Bogdanov: It became the administration for combating smuggling and corruption.

O. Blotskiy: What is the FCS reaction to the six-year sentence handed down in the case of a CIA agent who was arrested and indicted a couple of months ago?

S. Bogdanov: The reaction to all these incidents and sentences now that there have been traitors among ourselves is—tiredness.

But when traitors became heroes—after this to talk about the fact that somebody got six years...

C. Bohlen: What about the Mirzayanov case?

S. Bogdanov: There is currently a temporary list of items constituting state secrets, signed by the president. Therefore, in principle, part of the information disclosed by Mirzayanov may not fall under that list. If we look at the substance, however, it has been established that the information he made public constitutes a state secret, but it is not on the list. Again, who defines the level of secrecy? It is defined by the company doing this development. Not us. No. For us, it is very important to have a document that says that this or that is information that constitutes a state secret. A specific point.

In the past the whole thing boiled down to a company or ministry classifying their work according to their list, at the request of a laboratory or department. Our duty was to protect these secrets. Now we are reaping very grave consequences of that system, because at the time it was

never considered important to patent development work. We have concrete examples: Suddenly, for instance, the SS-20 missile is being manufactured in, shall we say, a certain large country in the east, and sold on foreign markets. We are beginning to investigate how it ended up there.

It turns out that a foreign delegation visited a certain enterprise to sign a protocol of intentions. They promised mountains of gold. The director was deliriously happy. (By the way, amazingly, most of our directors, especially those of defense enterprises, turned out to be great altruists.) He is told: "You know, in order for us to figure things out better, we need one or two 'samples.'" The SS-20 missile alone incorporates about 120 inventions. None of which, naturally, had been patented.

Now, back to the Mirzayanov case. We signed an international treaty on not producing new chemical weapons (this is more or less what it is called). We violated the convention. But we do not have a single word anywhere in the law on anybody's culpability for violating an international treaty. On a global scale, Mirzayanov has performed a service for humanity.

On the other hand, those who work on this problem are carrying out the task set for them by the state, because it is the state that finances them.

Yu. Shchekochikhin: During Brezhnev's times and even afterwards, in order to conduct an operational action with respect to a secretary of a provincial party oblast committee, you needed the sanction of the party leadership. Now I know that the operational work of some high-level Moscow officials has been stopped at the very top. Is there a category of persons today who are better left alone?

S. Bogdanov: Of course there is. Who is included in this category depends on many factors. And also, let me put it this way, on the professional and civic courage of the operative and his boss. "Immunity," by the way, also stems from imperfections in our legislation.

Such new forms of corruption have appeared on the scene now that they absolutely do not fall under our criminal law. Sometimes, though, the court's terrible inertia also plays a role.

K. Belyaninov: Representations of the former republics have now become embassies. But if there are embassies, it means there are also intelligence units. Have you caught, for instance, many Uzbek spies? I am quite serious.

S. Bogdanov: Uzbek? I do not recall any. With some republics, treaties have been signed at the presidential level on not conducting intelligence activities against one another, interaction in matters of state security or information exchange, transfer of cases, joint investigation of major entities, combating drug trafficking, etc.

One head of an Estonian district counterintelligence was detained when he was trying to break through in an "Ural" vehicle with five tonnes of copper from Pskov Oblast to his district. He stole the vehicle in the Pskov Paratroop Division, the copper—somewhere else, and made a fighting attempt to get across the border.

By the way, many of our current friends who used to be enemies conduct intelligence operations from the territories of former USSR republics.

Apprehending a spy or a foreign intelligence officer is not the highest-class work. Foreign intelligence officers are arrested in the event of political expediency. In any case, in the past this was the only reason. For instance, two of ours are expelled from Sweden—intelligence immediately runs to counterintelligence: Guys, who do you have in your sights? Our pleasure! As many as you need! In the Swedish Embassy alone a total of six diplomats. Shall we expel them all together or one at a time? A corresponding memorandum goes to the Politburo, signed by the KGB chairman. We get the appropriate memorandum from Gromyko. Relations with him were very difficult: Gentlemen, you are spoiling my peace-loving policy. When Shevardnadze was appointed minister of foreign affairs, things became easier. You may recall: They expel ours from England—we expel some, too; they expel more, we expel more. And on top of that we outwitted them, because some wives of British diplomats had diplomatic status. Therefore we selected husbands whose wives also were diplomats, but expelled only the husbands. As a result they had to recall more diplomats. The Americans expelled our people—we took away their service personnel: Wash your own dishes. At this point the fight was more or less on even ground. So, this is the political case.

The other case is when the damage is already unavoidable. We knew, for instance, in the case of Tolkachev, that he was passing over material that would do irreparable damage. This means we have to take him. But if we take him, we take the American, too. Or, for instance, they take one of ours—we have to respond so they will not get away with it. So we take one, too. In short, the basic point is that you do this when you can no longer play operational games. Because the highest level in counterintelligence is operational games.

S. Smirnov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent: Do you still use recruitment?

S. Bogdanov: We do.

S. Smirnov: I mean, through blackmail and...

S. Bogdanov: In intelligence or counterintelligence?

S. Smirnov: Both.

S. Bogdanov: All right. Anyway, this goes for both intelligence and counterintelligence. When the MB was still there, a decision was made in keeping with the law on federal organs of state security that we could pay agents. The KGB paid agents only in rare instances. And rather small sums.

Nevertheless, both we and intelligence can pay. Intelligence pays more, though. Still, we never had the kind of money to outdo, for instance, the CIA.

When I was still going through training, one of our still-current intelligence officers shared his experience: "Guys, remember, the principle of our work is this (this was his personal opinion, one of the methods of recruitment). We look for a person who is not doing well, and make it even worse: turn him into a spy. Before, he merely

embezzled or cheated on his wife; we make a spy out of him." Cynicism exists in every line of work.

The most reliable agents (and this is recognized by all intelligence services in the world without exception) are those doing it for ideological and political reasons. For a CIA officer, for instance, there existed only two compromising points for which he could be dismissed from the service: homosexuality and drugs. That was all! Ours were recruited, or attempts were made to recruit them, on anything: drinking, women, video and audio equipment he may have bought somewhere at a discount, and so on, and so on.

How are things in our counterintelligence? We have no money, trust me. Blackmail—on what? Theoretically, we can blackmail a person threatening to say that he is our agent. But why would we need him after we say this? And recruit him on this? It is laughable.

O. Blotskiy: Russia has transparent borders with practically all states. Can the FCS work effectively in the current situation, where any citizen of any contiguous state can travel unimpeded wherever he wants?

S. Bogdanov: To work effectively, we have to start not with borders. What we need is for the state—through the president, the Federal Assembly, the Security Council—to tell us what the national interests of Russia are and what it is we need to protect.

Let the president set the task to put an end to organized crime. Within what timeframe? Half a year? Ten years? In the FRG, for instance, it is considered normal to work on a criminal group for five-10 years. Over there, however, both counterintelligence and police work on it. But then they take the entire group. With accounts in Bolivia, Switzerland, safe houses, dead drops, and so on, and so on.

We are all worse off because we, in effect, do not have a concept of national security—one that is serious and comprehensive. [end Bogdanov]

Yes, the former KGB has been destroyed... This is the truth. But not the whole truth. Read the opinion of Vadim Bakatin in an upcoming issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

Director on Future of Radio Broadcasting

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in Russian No 11, 16 Mar 94 p 8

[Interview with Sergey Davydov, director of Radio Russia, by Oleg Moroz, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA columnist; place and date not given: "State Radio Cannot Be Apolitical in Today's Russia"]

[Text] [Moroz] The first question that is most frequently asked by journalists when they meet one another is: How are you doing moneywise? So, Sergey Vyacheslavovich, how are things going with you at Radio Russia? How are you able to stay afloat? It is said that there are plans to cut your appropriations sharply.

[Davydov] I cannot answer anything about this question today. It is very frightening. Some figures were mentioned recently—50 percent of the needed financing, now—32 percent, in my opinion... I have simply stopped thinking about it, because this is all promises, not money. What are we living on now? On the money that we earn. That is

earned by the entire television and radio company, not only radio. Of course, there is not enough money. But you get tired more of the uncertainty... They should already have decided exactly how many hours of broadcasting are needed. If 22 hours are not needed, like now, but five, then let it be five. But these five hours a day must have full financing. In exactly the same way, it should be decided clearly how many state radio broadcasting channels are required. As is known, there are now five of them.

[Moroz] Does it not seem to you that radio is dying out, being squeezed out by television, and that it is being perceived more and more frequently as some kind of half-finished product—a phonogram without "pictures?"

[Davydov] No, it does not seem that way. I think that radio will die when the last cultured person dies. Just what is a television "picture?" It is a means of making up for our laziness: After hearing some text, we are too lazy to think and do some additional imagining of what was heard; and so the task is made easier for us, we are given an image. Therefore, in particular, television theater and radio theater are completely different things. And radio theater is the same kind of cultural possession as television theater. Like the drama theater. What is more, there are after all genre theater and purely radio theater. For example, literary readings. There is a special radio audience. The blind, invalids... In addition, I suspect that today the number of radio listeners is growing. Imagine the television set breaking down; it is very expensive to repair now, so a person is limited to the radio set... Of course, radio, as well as television, is experiencing elements of a crisis, but it seems to me that the crisis in radio—in a cultural sense—is not that severe.

[Moroz] In what, nonetheless, do you see this crisis?

[Davydov] In many things. In particular, the departure of announcers of the old school and the arrival of journalists at the microphone has reduced the level of broadcasting culture somewhat. Errors have become more frequent...

[Moroz] You understand, of course, that I asked the question about the possible death of radio exclusively for the sake of sharpening the conversation, and in order to provoke your professional pride. Nonetheless, do radio journalists not have a feeling of decline and second-grade status in comparison with television workers? After all, the whole country knows those who are on the air continuously. A person could be a rather average journalist, but the feeling is such that this is a dominant influence. Briefly, it is more prestigious to work in television than in radio. In such a case, do you not suffer from turncoats?

[Davydov] The idea of the second-grade status of radio in comparison with television exists more outside the professional environment of radio journalists. We have had people who moved over to television, but not that many. Isolated cases. And they are journalists who did not become professionals in radio. A person who has worked in radio for a dozen or so years, as a rule, no longer aspires to television. He understands that radio is ANOTHER type of journalism, another type of art. It is like moving from opera to ballet. After all, there are opera and ballet theaters, and these seem to be close things. Close, but not very. But the attitude of the state and society toward radio

really is like toward something secondary. It is remembered as a last resort, in periods of putsches and right after them, when television has distinctly exhausted its resources. At that time a stream of high-standing visitors rushes to us. They are all amazed at what squalor we live in and antiquated equipment we have, and they promise us the moon, but, naturally, as soon as the crisis situation passes they forget about their promises.

[Moroz] What do you consider the framework of your radio day to be? What are its pivotal programs. And what are the main ideas that you put into your broadcasting?

[Davydov] Of course, hourly information releases constitute the framework. It not we who make them—they are made by the Radio Russia information service. But this is the framework. Then we create our fillers. Firstly, the morning programs. Basically, journal and musical. Then there are the daily programs. These are children's and do-it-yourself programs. "Interlocutor" left us for Radio 1, and the "Home Academy" do-it-yourself program appeared. How to build a house, how to keep house, how to feed the family... The need for such programs is being felt more and more now. Politics is already starting to get boring. The "Author's Channel 'From the First Person'" grew out of the five hours of our first underground political broadcasting in 1990-1991. This is our main political program. Its title speaks for itself. This is an authors' radio, if you wish. After 1800 a block starts that, perhaps, is dearest to me—I hope employees who work on other programs are not offended by me—the artistic broadcasting block. Here even social and political journalism is done with a nuance of art. And at 2220 the purely hip youth program "Four Fourths" starts. It continues until 0200. It, of course, has its own problems, but the main thing is that there was nothing like this on radio. Although many of us grew up on the radio station Youth.

Frankly, when this program started up, there was resistance—and tremendous resistance—from a number of listeners and a listlessly intelligent resistance on the part of the management of the company. But the young people, nonetheless, showed that there should be such a youth program. We still do not use it as an element of political propaganda, but I fear that it will be necessary to use it in this capacity as well: The mood among youth is an important factor in politics.

[Moroz] What is the balance here between serious and entertainment programs, between culture and popular culture, for which you are striving in your broadcasting?

[Davydov] Popular culture and entertainment is now concentrated here mainly, perhaps, in the "Four Fourths" program that I mentioned. There are also elements of entertainment in the morning program "The Beginning," although I would not call it entertaining. This year we changed the approach to thematic programs somewhat. They still were somewhat heavy. We cut their time to 15-20 minutes. And we expanded the musical flow of sound. Mainly at the expense of classical music and retrospective reviews. Moreover, it became clear that we hit the nail on the head here. There is a strong nostalgia in our society with respect to the 1960's and 1970's. It is also

happy with retrospective music. But the classics are classics. The need for the eternal and imperishable is always alive among people. It is a number one problem for us—nothing to laugh at.

So-called humorous programs have appeared here this year, but there is no particular response to them yet. And there is a problem with game programs. We have, perhaps, only one game program—"VZV" (Evening Amusement for Adults), which is done by Leonid Azarkh. It is necessary to play on radio. Radio games exist in the whole world.

As I have already said, we concentrate politics in four hours on the "Authors' Channel." And this is probably the optimal variant.

[Moroz] Do you know what kind of audience you have?

[Davydov] Of course, we know, although, perhaps, not in great detail. Any kind of sociological poll is now too expensive. This audience is very broad and mixed... And rather conservative. Russia is a conservative country in general. This is not my observation and not my discovery. As one of my colleagues said, Moscow is not Russia, Moscow is Moscow, an entirely different country starts beyond the ring road. But it is mainly Muscovites who work for us, and they are young people as well. They do not always understand that beyond the bounds of the capital there is a very different country. So that we do not have 100 percent confidence that we know our listeners.

[Moroz] To what extent do you depend on listeners?

[Davydov] Unfortunately, to no extent. The other day there was a funny telegram: The main production line of the AZLK [Moscow Leninist Komsomol Automobile Plant] was shut down as a sign of protest against discrimination with respect to the program "Interlocutor" (this program is now transmitted on the third channel). Well, where else can a production line of a very large automobile plant shut down as a result of the fact that a program ceased to exist on one channel and switched to another? But imagine what it would entail if such a thing happened somewhere else suddenly—let us say, the FIAT plant in Italy came to a stop, because of some perturbations on radio? At a minimum there would be parliamentary hearings. But in our country—nothing. Even such serious threats do not influence us in any way. In the meantime, dependence on listeners, perhaps, is exactly what would save us in the economic situation in which we find ourselves. If it were financial. But today, whether we pay for a radio point or not, whether we pay taxes or not, this has no effect at all on the work of the radio. Everything is dissolved in the common pot, it is depersonalized...

[Moroz] How do you differ from other radio channels? From Mayak it is clear, but, let us say, from Radio 1?

[Davydov] Our difference not only from Mayak but also from Youth and Orpheus is clear. But as for Radio 1, we have a significant similarity. The fact that we started to broadcast on the "first button" compelled us to arrange our broadcasting with a view to the first all-Union program. Our main difference from this channel is, perhaps, that we are a younger and more mobile radio. And now we have become even more dynamic—in connection with

program timing and the expansion of musical elements, about which I have already talked.

[Moroz] As a result of the departure of "Interlocutor" from your wavelengths, people were prepared to bring the automobile plant to a halt. But "Interlocutor" is not your program...

[Davydov] Yes, it was accommodated on our wavelengths in a contract with Ostankino. This contract ended in 1993.

[Moroz]...But do you have your own programs that are just as popular, that are liked as much by the people, and whose cancellation or switch to another wavelength would cause such a powerful listener protest?

[Davydov] I am afraid of such a definition "liked by the people": Each program has its listeners. There are programs that are simply destined for success. No matter how they were made. Take, for example, the program "An old gramophone reminded me..." Or "A meeting with a song." I can simply sit, read letters, and play songs that people request. And it will meet with success. I do not want to diminish the role of those who produce these programs, but I repeat, they are destined for success. Or, for example, "Home Academy." Four young female employees "cover" five hours of air time in a week. They are real heroines, and a monument should be erected to them. But if I simply sat an announcer down who would read how to boil buckwheat, how to bring up a child...the program would be popular all the same. But there are programs of another kind—let us assume "Roots and Branches," which deals with the fates of a classic legacy in contemporary life. People appear in it of such a level as Yuriy Mikhailovich Lotman and Dmitryy Sergeyevich Likhachev. I cannot call it popular. But this program also established the face of the channel. Or we have the young radio journalist Sasha Korshunov—a fellow who digs into history. Moreover, who finds in it not cheap sensations but exposes many of its pages anew. There also was never a big stream of letters on its broadcast, and no production line will stop for the sake of it, but it has its listeners. This is also our face.

[Moroz] What can you say about the innovations in recent years—the widespread use of going live on the air, telephone participation of radio listeners in broadcasts, and so forth? Do they not lower the quality of broadcasting?

[Davydov] We went through a stage of being infatuated with listener telephone calls, while still working on the youth channel of radio station Youth, and in the first period of activity of Radio Russia. We very rarely resort to this now. Telephone communications with listeners occurs with us, as a rule, somewhat differently: We simply provide an open line telephone, next to which our invited guest sits for an hour to an hour and a half. But starting on 9 March a permanent open line telephone has been working on Radio Russia—in the reception room. Listeners can call it up from 1400 to 1800 during the day, Moscow time. But now local stations usually put listeners who call on the telephone on live broadcasts: This way, people bring their troubles and their problems to the attention of local officials. As for our live broadcasting, it takes up 10 of our 22 hours every day. In broadcasting to the European zone. The ratio is different in rebroadcasts. Here there are two sides. It is bad that it is impossible to correct anything. What is said is what is heard. But it is

impossible to work without live broadcasting today. The situation in the country is changing rapidly. If only recording is used, you cannot keep up with this situation.

[Moroz] The other day corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Khasbulatov who was released from prison said in one of his numerous interviews that the most trying experience in the prison cell was Mayak and Radio Russia, which were continuously broadcasting a stream of lies. According to him, it is necessary to have a powerful brain in order to come up with so much lying. He also said that one radio station was enough "to beat one's brains"—true, this was only said about Mayak. What do you think about this?

[Davydov] In principle, I can limit myself to one phrase: We have not lost one court case to date.

[Moroz] Have there been many trials?

[Davydov] One or two are always going on. So, let Khasbulatov go to court, and we will figure out who lied where.

[Moroz] I think the scientist had in mind not lies in a literal sense, but Radio Russia's political orientation.

[Davydov] In that case, things have to be called by their correct names. If, while carrying out a certain political policy, we are also not sinning against the truth, our opponent may himself answer for slander. However, we will not begin, of course, to expend either the time or the money on such a court examination.

[Moroz] But you do not intend to change your political orientation? After all, many are changing it now...

[Davydov] You see, I am frequently told: "State radio should be apolitical." I reply: "Yes, in a normal society." Radio Russia was planned as a political radio "under Yeltsin." Well, I am a person who is more or less apolitical—it was simply interesting to me to make a new channel out of nothing. And journalists came here mainly out of political considerations. But when in the middle of 1992 a struggle of the two authorities began, we tried to maintain an objective approach. Deputies themselves commented here on everything that was happening. Aksyuchits did not scramble out of our radio. I am not now talking about broadcasting the meetings of the Supreme Soviet. Then the political fight intensified. It seemed to the Supreme Soviet that it was getting little air time. The idea came up for a "Parliamentary Hour." I tried to show that the appearance of this program would throw Radio Russia sharply into another, opposite direction. I was not listened to. From the very first minutes of the existence of the "Parliamentary Hour," streams of abuse came down on the president. And we were compelled to defend him. Today, of course, the situation is different, but the political struggle continues. The fate of the country depends on its outcome. But for this reason I will say once more, Radio Russia, like all state radio, cannot allow itself to be apolitical. Although, of course, we strive to present all viewpoints that exist in society.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

RF 1993 Ethnopolitical Situation Surveyed

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in Russian 1 Mar 94 p 5

[Article by Zhan Toshchenko: "Potentially Dangerous Points; The Ethnopolitical Situation in Russia in 1993"]

[Text] In characterizing the ethnopolitical situation, we proceed from the fact that at the present time the national ideal has become basic in the process of implementing various types of sovereignization, and it is being used in the struggle for power, for ownership, and for regional privileges.

The specifics of the period which we are experiencing are such that under current conditions the primary threat to Russia's national security stems not so much from foreign sources as from various destructive forces within the country. Among the most dangerous factors, along with the prolonged and deep economic and social crisis, we must cite also the crisis of national policy of the state as a whole.

The absence of a unified conception of national policy in essence has made it impossible to localize even one of the inter-ethnic conflicts arising during the period of disintegration of the USSR as well as after it, to expose the main reasons for their emergence, and to develop a mechanism for early prevention and effective reaction to crisis situations.

The State of Interethnic Accord and Possible Prospects for Its Development

A rather high level of inter-ethnic tensions continued to be retained in 1993. Experimental studies and an analysis of the conflicts allow us to conclude that at the present time there are three levels of tension in inter-ethnic relations.

The first of these—ethnic limitation (i.e., the unwillingness to opt for contacts beyond the boundaries of one's ethnic group)—is the most widespread. It is manifested in increased interest toward creation of mono-national families (there is a reduction in the relative share of mixed marriages), in a preference to work in mono-national collectives, and in the monopolization of leadership positions of all levels by representatives of one's own people.

Practically each of the peoples, especially those which have a national-state or national-territorial autonomy, is gripped with this illness, which is the initial and primary basis for disintegration of interethnic accord.

The second level—ethnic egoism (the desire to ensure advantages for one's own people at the expense of others)—is becoming ever more widespread.

Up to 30-40 percent of the native population of the republics believes that it is natural for them to get advantages over other peoples populating this republic. It has become almost the rule that the employment of Russians exceeds their relative share in the population only in industry and partially in science, public health and education. In all other spheres and sectors, including the organs of state and economic administration and the make-up of the student population, the relative share of Russians is lower than their specific share in the make-up of the population. In Tatariya, for example, there is a de facto

introduction of strict limitations by national indicator on the ownership and management of natural resources. Russian joint-stock holders are being edged out, and the representatives of the Tatar people are gaining the controlling packets of stock, etc.

In Dagestan, ethnic egoism is manifested in the hidden opposition of the Laktsy and the Kumyks (because of Kumyk lands), and in the desire by the Nogay to achieve unification of Nogay territories which are currently divided up between Dagestan, Stavropol Kray and Chechnya.

Ethnic egoism may go into the third stage—ethnophobia, which is characterized by open enmity and irreconcilability in regard to other people who are "foreign" and "not one's own." This has been particularly manifested in the well-known Ossetin-Ingush conflict, when the fires of hatred, nonrecognition and mutual accusations continue to rage on an interpersonal level.

Individual regions of the Cossack brotherhood and certain rayons of the North Caucasus stand on the brink of open opposition to the interests of various peoples.

However, the level of acuteness in national relations has become stabilized. While undoubtedly being exceedingly high, it has nevertheless been retained within the framework of 1992 indicators. As compared with a year ago, the mass consciousness of the native population is somewhat less taken with the ideas of national separatism and unification of one's ethnic groups presently living on other territories into a single state formation.

Ethnopolitical Movements, Organizations and Parties

Their growth in 1993 continued. There was an increasing number of associations and organizations based on the principles of national rebirth and self-preservation. Their organizational consolidation continued, and in some of them the extremist wing grew stronger. Their actions led to a forced decision on the rates and content of sovereignization. Part of the national associations strived to become parallel organs of power, to replace the state structures. Efforts were made to create militarized formations. In a number of republics (Komi, for example), they were granted the right of legislative initiative, as well as the actual right to conduct expert evaluation of drafts of legislative decisions.

Many of them became the bearers of new consolidating principles, appealing not to the political consciousness of the citizens, but to the historical, ethnic, and ethnosocial, i.e., to more universal interests than, for example, class or group interests.

And although more significant differences were manifested in 1993 than before, differences between positions of titular peoples and their "representative" national parties and movements (extremist nationalist demands were supported by 10-15 percent of the native population, with an alarm indicator of 7-8 percent), we cannot underestimate their negative influence.

Thus, the activity of the All-*Osset Council "Styr Nakhas"* and the socio-political association "*Our Ossetiya*" not only

intensifies the Osset-Ingush conflict, but also facilitates the emergence of anti-Russian and anti-military sentiments among the Osset people.

In the second half of 1993 there was a sharp increase in the propaganda of nationalist ideas in the Republic of Dagestan by the socio-political movements "*Tenglik*," "*Birlik*," and "*People's Front imeni Shamil*," whose leaders call for the struggle against the colonial policy of Russia in the North Caucasus as one of the conditions for prosperity of the nations.

The Lezghin people's movement *Sadval* promotes in its activity the idea of forming a "*Unified Lezghistan*," which leads to the violation of the territorial integrity of Russia and Azerbaijan.

The activity of the Komi national party "*Doryams AsnyMES*" ("*We Will Defend Ourselves*") has a notably expressed nationalistic and anti-Russian position.

The Buryat-Mongol People's Party promotes the idea of unifying all Mongols with an orientation toward Mongolia.

The "*Union of the Banished*," the "*Eastern Prussia*" association of fellow countrymen and other organizations of an extremist ilk in Kaliningrad Oblast have set for themselves the goal of creating a powerful German community by means of implementing broad economic cooperation with Germany, which may also evoke negative consequences.

The Party for Chuvash Rebirth and the Chuvash National Congress are expanding contacts with representatives of Turkish religious centers for the purpose of spreading the principles of Islam and gradually edging out Christianity, which may cause friction between the adherents of different religious confessions.

A particularly destabilizing factor in inter-ethnic relations is the presence or creation of possible military or militarized formations. In the Chechen Republic there are subdivisions of the regular army in various stages of formulation. Among these are a mountain-infantry brigade, tank and artillery regiments, a border brigade, and a special purpose regiment. Within the make-up of the ChR [Chechen Republic] national guard there is a regiment of the national guard, a Muslim fighting regiment, and an "*Abkhaz batalion*." Detachments of the people's militia are being created or have already been created in each population center, based on territorial principle.

In North Ossetia there are also measures being implemented on the formation of a future national army, the nucleus of which is the Administration for Defense of Facilities of the National Economy. At the end of 1993, its ranks numbered up to 7,000 persons and around 100 units of armored equipment.

The overall number of personnel of various military formations in Ingushetia is in excess of 2,500 people.

And finally, the emergence (retention) of interethnic tensions, work on regulating conflict situations which is long in its duration and ineffective in its content and, on the contrary, a stable situation in multinational regions largely depends on the opposition of the national-political elite. The conceptions of national statehood and national sovereignty of individual national-state formations often conceal the political ambitions of the ethnic elite, and efforts

to translate their slogans into the language of practical actions end in human tragedies.

At the same time, the danger of ethnopolitical organizations for the present time is most likely exaggerated (perhaps with the exception of Tatarstan and, in part, Dagestan). They are for the ruling national elite sooner a means of trade with Moscow than a real opposition. The pressure of national organizations on the leaders of republics will evidently continue, but its effectiveness will be determined in the nearest time by the will of the national majority—the people, and not by the degree of pressure exerted by the extremist part of the national parties and movements.

Refugees and Forced Migrants

1993 was a year of gradual transition of almost all parties to a more precise definition of their positions in regard to Russians in the "near abroad" countries. Out of a total of 26 million people who found themselves abroad in the Spring of 1991, 2 million have already returned to Russia. According to official statistical data, in 1990-1992, one-fourth of the Russians left Tajikistan and Azerbaijan, and 17 percent left Georgia. Central Asia and the Transcaucasus gave up $\frac{3}{4}$ of the repatriates (although only 16 percent of the Russians located in the near abroad countries live there).

On the whole, the return of a total of 6 million people is expected.

The complexity of solving the problems of Russian refugees (in the political plane) consists of the fact that they represent a dynamic, active and explosive group under conditions of Russia, inclined to support nationalist forces and nationalist organizations.

At the same time, this is the most skilled, the most organized and creative part of the Russians living abroad, which by its knowledge, experience and skill is capable of successfully resolving economic and social problems and actively aiding the new Russia.

Migration of the Population

Along with the continuation of emigration of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, there has been a significant increase in the influx of people of other nationalities who have left their native land as a result of economic and political instability in their regions, as well as inter-clan and inter-tribal clashes under the threat of physical and moral annihilation.

An operative analysis of the flow of migrants to Kaluga Oblast shows that, along with Russian refugees, a significant portion is comprised of forced migrants from Moldova, Armenia, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and the republics of the Northern Caucasus. Aside from the difficulties of integrating into a foreign-speaking environment, this situation bears contradictions which are difficult to resolve:

- the urban population predominates within the influx of refugees and migrants, while Kaluga oblast (like most of the Russian oblasts) primarily offers them employment involving farm labor;
- among the refugees and migrants there is a very high relative share of the intelligentsia, which in a certain

sense hinders its employment due to lack of correspondence of skills to available jobs, or due to saturation of traditional professions.

We should also note that the influx of the foreign-speaking population to the territory of Russia will increase, because along with the political reasons there is an increase in the significance of socio-economic ones: Growing unemployment (lack of jobs), especially for young people, as well as problems of water and land.

The lack of resolution of the newly emerging problem—the foreign-speaking population among the native Russian population—requires increased attention in 1994 in order to prevent the emergence of ethnic tensions and conflicts in the central part of Russia.

Sore Spots in Interethnic Relations

The retained tendencies toward intensification of regional separatism, the expansion of interethnic conflicts, the aspirations of the national elite toward re-division of the territories and toward greater sovereignty, and the struggle for power all pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the country and Russian statehood in general.

The direct sources of real threats in the sphere of interethnic relations are: Efforts to form enclaves according to the ethnic principle on the territory of the Russian Federation; intensification of socioeconomic inequality of various peoples and ethnic groups; increase in ethnic migrations, migration of refugees and forced migrants; mass violations of civil rights and freedoms in individual regions.

By indicator of conflict, all the sore spots in Russia may be classified by the following principles:

- zones of acute crisis (military conflicts or balancing on their brink);
- potential crisis situations;
- zones of strong regional separatism;
- zones of moderate regional separatism;
- zones of weakly expressed separatism.

We will deal primarily with the "painful", crisis zones.

Regions of Acute Crisis Situations

The most explosive remains the situation in the zone of North Ossetia and Ingushetiya. After the trip by the Russian Federation President to the zone of conflict and the 13 December 1993 edict on the procedure for returning refugees and forced migrants to Digaron, Chermen, Kurtat and Dachnoye, the tensions have not declined, but continue to increase.

Despite the positive evaluation expressed by officials of these republics regarding the results of the achieved accord, there is, nevertheless, an expression of apprehension that extremist forces will make use of the situation and will push the Ingush toward elemental resettlement to the indicated population centers, the negative consequences of which are unpredictable.

Meetings of extremist directionality have been held in North Ossetia, organized by the opposition. The session of the North Ossetia Supreme Soviet refused to rescind its previous decision on the impossibility of Ingush and Osset

living together. The information spread by extremists regarding the forceful provision of Ingush resettlement to places of their former residence once again intensifies the mutual enmity.

Negotiations within the framework of the mixed commission have been suspended. Efforts by the temporary administration to put the factors of "people's diplomacy" into action have not yielded positive results.

In order to reduce tensions in this region, it seems expedient to implement a series of successive measures. First of all, to tie in the solution of the problem of refugees not with the territorial aspirations of the Ingush and Osset, but with the creation of opportunities for each people for realization of their rights to national self-sufficiency.

Secondly, stricter measures are needed for disarmament of the military formations created in Ingushetiya and North Ossetia after the armed conflict.

Thirdly, it seems expedient to more effectively utilize the additional financing of Ingushetiya and North Ossetia, to establish strict control over the expenditure of financial means allocated for target programs.

Fourthly, it has long been time to give a public legal and political evaluation of the events of October-November 1992 and to name the names of the organizers and participants in the criminal actions.

Fifth, it is necessary to change over from a military-administrative form of administration to a direct federal form of administration and to repeal the state of martial law.

Another point which personifies the acute crisis situation is Chechnya and the indeterminacy of its status, as well as the separatist policy of its current leadership. The approaches to the problem of Chechnya as defined at the conference in Nalchik on 7 December 1993 do not have favorable prospects. Moreover, the closure of the border with the Chechen Republic along its entire perimeter, including the undefined line of administrative division with Ingushetiya, may lead to an exacerbation of the situation in the region and to provocation of anti-Russian sentiments. A mild course toward keeping Chechnya within the make-up of Russia, juridically and economically, seems more preferable. The interests of stabilization of the situation in the region and reduction in the criminal situation in Chechnya would be served by efforts of the leadership of Dagestan and Stavropol to conclude bilateral agreements with the regime of D. Dudayev regarding cooperation in resolution of socio-economic questions and provision of human rights. At the same time, it would be expedient to continue contacts with the opposition to D. Dudayev's regime, and to support the social base of the opposition. This course is desirable also because the Chechen diaspora in the nearby and distant foreign countries is beginning to speak out against the regime of D. Dudayev.

It would be expedient to involve such influential movements as the Conference of Peoples of the Caucasus and the Tersk Cossack Brotherhood in the regulation of problems of a crisis character in the North Caucasus.

Potential Acute Crisis Situations

Among these we must cite primarily the tense ethnopolitical situation taking shape in the Republic of Tyva (Tuva). Beginning in 1990, the separatist course of the People's Front of Tuva provoked the mass departure of the Russian-speaking population. Tensions are being increased by the actions of organizations of former prisoners, particularly by the mass "seizure" of the vacated apartments of refugees.

On the wave of increased nationalism, increase in crime, and decline in productivity, the Supreme Soviet of Tuva adopted a new constitution in November of 1993. The first article of this constitution calls the republic a sovereign state within the make-up of Russia, having the right to full self-determination by means of an all-people's referendum. At the same time (29 November of this year), the Supreme Soviet of Tuva adopted a decree on holding a referendum on the question of Tuva remaining in the Russian Federation.

Considering the fact that Tuva was included in the make-up of the USSR only in 1944 and that Tuvinians comprise the overwhelming majority in the republic (around 65 percent), the probability of its separation from Russia in the next few years is very great. The population of Tuva is largely comprised of lamaists of the Mongol doctrine and is culturally oriented toward its former suzerain—the Mongol state. Unemployment and a high crime rate facilitate the increase in anti-Russian demonstrations, which are not opposed by the official authorities.

The second zone of potential acute conflict is Krasnodar Kray, which has become multi-national. Analysis shows that it is among the regions which are most explosive in a national sense. The concentration of situations generating conflict has long been prevalent here, but especially since the late 1980's, and continues to the present time.

The causes of such situations which arise in the kray are varied. One of the reasons is concealed in the multi-nationality of the kray, where along with the 4-million Russian population there are representatives of 22 peoples, including Ukrainians, Armenians, Adygey, Greeks, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Meskhetin Turks and others. Most live compactly and represent groups which are ethnically rather cohesive, retaining their native language and traditions.

The second factor giving rise to inter-ethnic conflicts in the kray is associated with migration, primarily forced migration, and the influx of refugees which was facilitated by the disintegration of the Union, the inter-ethnic conflicts, the exacerbation of socio-economic and national situation in a number of regions. The changed geopolitical position of Krasnodar Kray evoked a new wave of migrations. It became a border region of Russia.

The migration processes in Krasnodar Kray occurred in the 1970's-1980's. Crimean Tatars, Meskhetin Turks and Kurds moved here. A new wave of influx of Meskhetins was caused by the events of 1980 in Fergan. The influx of Armenians into Krasnodar Kray increased in connection with the earthquake in Armenia in 1988, and was later spurred by the flare-up of genocide in Sumgait and Baku and the war in Karabakh. The Abkhazo-Georgian War

gave a new impetus to forced migrations—of Russian, Armenian and other refugees from Abkhaziya.

The dynamics of refugees in Krasnodar Kray is such: The first half of 1991—32,000 persons; October 1991—38,500; January 1992—54,000; April 1992—53,000; June 1992—58,500. In 1993 the flow of refugees increased even more. By nationality, the refugees were distributed as follows: Russians and Russian-speaking peoples—27,000; Armenians—over 16,000; Meskhetin Turks—around 13,500, and Azerbaijanis—1,500.

The influx of refugees and forced emigrants is continually complicating the situation in the kray. Part of them are not registered, and therefore cannot be employed. Inter-ethnic relations between the Russians and the Armenians, the Cossacks and the other population, the Adygeys and the Russians have become particularly acute. In recent times there have been repeated demands for the deportation of the Armenians and the Meskhetin Turks. There are frequent cases of deportation of new settlers from the kray. According to a sociological survey conducted among the local deputies, the conflict situation in the kray may intensify, since 60 percent of the population (throughout Russia it is 20-25 percent) believes there is a possibility of open conflict between individual national groups.

The third potentially dangerous point may become the Republic of Dagestan. Although on the whole it has been possible to keep the situation under control there, the probability of a breakdown and violation of relative ethnopolitical stability and inter-ethnic accord is great.

A zone of increased conflict is the region settled by the Chechen-Akkin, the once liquidated Aukhovskiy Rayon. The authorities have been able to find a compromise decision which satisfies the Chechen (their rayon is being restored) and the Laktsy and Avartsy who are living here, and who are now being relocated to new lands next to the Kumyk. On the other hand, sentiments are increasing among the Kumyk against the occupation of the "Kumyk lands" by the Laktsy. As the settlement continues, the prospect of a conflict with the local Kumyk population becomes rather probable.

Another notable point of inter-ethnic opposition in Dagestan is the situation in the south of the republic, where the Lezghin popular movement "Sadval" actively speaks out for the preservation of the ethno-cultural and ethnopolitical unity of the two parts of the Lezghin ethnos, currently separated by the borders of the RF [Russian Federation] and Azerbaijan (there are over 170,000 Lezghin living in Azerbaijan, and over 75,000 Azerbaijanis living in Dagestan). The formulation of the boundary in this region may evoke sharp exacerbation of the situation and lead to conflict.

Of the other points of inter-ethnic tensions, one that requires particular attention is the Kumyk problem, which consists of the desire by part of the Kumyk population for administrative separation of their ethnic territory, as well as the Nogay problem, which reflects the intentions of the Nogay people to achieve unification of all Nogay territories which are currently divided between Dagestan, Stavropol Kray and Chechnya.

Regions (zones) of Strong Separatism

The Republic of Tatarstan occupies a peculiar place in the ethnopolitical situation. The republic is located in the center of the Russian Federation, and its population is almost half comprised of Russians (43.3 percent). The most numerous and influential national parties agitate for secession from the Russian Federation and acknowledgement of equal rights for Tatarstan. It is possible to preserve peace in Tatarstan because the current leaders of Tatarstan are among the proponents of Tatarstan independence who are gravitating toward gradual disunification with Russia.

Slogans about Turkic unity are becoming ever more popular, although on the whole the idea of creating a parliament of the entire Tatar people, presented at the 1st All-Tatar Congress in February of 1992 by the newly formed Milli Medjlis (people's parliament), did not find deep-seated support in society. The appearance of the Milli Medjlis changed the placement of political forces: An organ emerged which was an alternative to the official parliament. In the case of a political crisis in the Republic of Tatarstan, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Milli Medjlis may be changed into some semblance of an all-national congress and that there will be a changeover by members of the Milli Medjlis to extremely strict positions in regard to the existing organs of power. A confirmation of this is the joint announcement, in which the only lawful organ of power of the Tatar people is acknowledged to be the Milli Medjlis, and which contains an appeal for cohesion of the Tatar people under its flag.

In the last two years there has been a radical re-distribution of power and prestigious positions in favor of the Tatars: 70-80 percent of all heads of administration and chairmen of rayon soviets, rayon procurators, chairmen of rayon courts, leaders of the RUVD [rayon internal affairs administrations] and chief physicians. Nevertheless, the leadership of Tatarstan stands on the positions of preserving ties with Russia and conducting civilized negotiations with Moscow on all important questions, especially on problems of handing over the rights and authorities of the federation subject to the center.*

Regions of Moderate Regional Separatism

The political situation in the Republic of Komi is becoming more complicated. The organization "Komi kotyr" created in January of 1991, which speaks out as the initiator of consolidation of the Komi national movement, has formed a permanent organ—the Committee for Rebirth of the Komi People. The active work of this committee in the republic and close cooperation with analogous organizations of Finno-Ugric peoples have significantly increased the prestige of the Committee for Rebirth of the Komi People and its influence on the ethnopolitical situation in the republic.

We must note that, within the Komi national movement, a tendency has emerged toward merging of the Committee for Rebirth of the Komi People with the constitutional system of power, turning it into an organ representing the Komi people on the foreign economic arena. At the demand of the Second Congress of the Komi People (December 1992), the Republic of Komi Supreme Soviet adopted a law on granting the congresses of the Komi national movement the right of legislative initiative.

The Third Congress of the Komi People (December 1993) demanded that an article be included in the republic's constitution stating that Komi is a sovereign republic, with the right of secession from the make-up of the RF. Demands were also presented regarding the return to the Republic of Komi of five rayons which had "previously been handed over" to the make-up of Arkhangelsk Oblast.

We must stress that the Committee for Rebirth of the Komi People is trying to establish control over the power structures of the republic and, relying on the support of Estonia, to take a course toward national self-determination.

We may also relate the situations which have arisen in Yakutiya, Kalmykiya, and Gorny Altay to the zones of moderate separatism. Despite the assurances by the republic leadership that they have no intention of seceding from Russia, already today the line of their legislative and executive organs of power toward treaty, and not constitutional, relations with the Russian center is becoming quite evident. This in fact leads, at best, to the establishment of a specific form of confederative relations.

And finally, we should note the group of regions with the lowest level of inter-ethnic tensions. These include the territories populated by the minor peoples of the European north, Siberia and the Far East, a number of republics in Povolzhye, Kareliya, specifically "Russian" krays and oblasts, as well as regions of compact settlement of peoples who do not have national statehood or autonomy (Veps, Izhor, Greeks, Koreans, Tofalars, etc.).

Prognosis for 1994

New conflicts of a violent character over a large part of the territory of Russia are improbable in 1994, although in the North Caucasus and in Dagestan the conflict potential is more significant than in other regions.

On the whole, 1994 will not be a year of opposition by specifically national groups or confessions. It will be a year of "war" of the federal and national-republic structures over the division of statehood, property and authority, over questions of citizenship, the state language, and especially questions regarding the sale (or redistribution) of land.

At the same time, the following problems will become objects of political discussions and speculations, and may exacerbate and undermine inter-ethnic accord.

The Russian Republic

A number of social movements and political parties are actively promoting the idea of the possibility of creating a Russian Republic in Russia, based on the fact that Russians do not have statehood, despite the fact that they are the most numerous ethnic group. Russia is characterized as a federation without Russians, and in this connection the task of struggling for the creation of a single unitarian Russian state on the territory of Russia is presented. For the present, this demand does not yet find support in the mass consciousness. However, we cannot exclude the possibility of an increase in the number of its supporters.

The very idea, naturally, increases the status of Russians in Russia, but the creation of a Russian Republic would lead to an actual dismantling of the RF and a disintegration of Russia.

Russian Nationalism

There is a real danger that the Russian national ideal will grow into a militant force, into everyday chauvenism, when, under the influence of economic disintegration and political instability, the mechanism of national self defense will begin to operate in the public consciousness, growing into aggressive behavior.

If we do not oppose this process now, then, by its consequences, the nationalism of a large people cannot be compared to any social catastrophes.

Territorial Disputes Between Russia and the 'Near Abroad' Countries and Within Russia

Although there are no pretensions between the republics of the former USSR at the state level, in fact there are a number of situations which, under certain circumstances, may turn latent (hidden) processes into open ones.

First of all, this is manifested in the position of part of the Russian population (and certain foreign national groups associated with them) not to migrate to Russia, but to go under Russia's jurisdiction together with the territory on which they are living. This concerns the Dniester region, the Crimea, the region of Kokhtla-Yarve and Narva in Estonia, and certain regions in the Northern Caucasus and Eastern Ukraine.

Secondly, this is the desire by a number of autonomies or a number of peoples to enter the make-up of the Russian Federation—Abkhaziya, South Ossetia, or the Lezghin (37 percent of whom presently live in Azerbaijan).

Thirdly, there are territorial claims also inside the republics, stemming from the fact that the people of a given nationality live on adjoining territories. This is manifested in the claims of a number of political leaders of Tatarstan to regions with a predominant Tatar population in the Republic of Mari El and the Republic of Bashkortostan, and in Ulyanovsk and Samara Oblasts. Among the Komi people, the notion of reunification with the Komi-Permyaks, who have their own okrug within Perm Oblast, is actively propagandized. There is an analogous situation in Buryatiya, where the idea of reunification with fellow countrymen having their national formations in Irkutsk and Chita Oblasts is actively supported. An intensification of Kalmykiya's claims regarding the regions which have been "lost" and handed over to Astrakhan Oblast and Krasnodar Kray can also not be excluded.

And finally, there is the desire by a number of peoples, especially those who had been previously deported and now returned to their homeland, to regain all the territory which previously belonged to them.

The problem of the Germans in the Povolzhye [Volga region] occupies a special place. And although many demands have as yet been expressed in the form of wishes, this does not remove the danger of aspirations to review the boundaries.

Despite all the disputes, indecisiveness and even historical injustice, to try to change the existing boundaries at the present time means to create a dangerous groundwork for the emergence of bloody inter-ethnic conflicts. Moreover, the first precedent of this sort will open the way for violence on an inter-ethnic basis, which, taking on an avalanche character, has the prospect of lasting for many generations.

All disputed questions must be resolved only by means of lengthy negotiations and through striving for accord. In this sense, we must return once again and permanently declare a correction to the previously adopted law, "On Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples," which states that their political rehabilitation is associated with the restoration of the boundaries lost during the time of relocation of these peoples. As experience shows, the implementation of this law in terms of defining the national-territorial boundaries must be repealed, making the consideration of the interests of the peoples previously living here dependant on other methods of resolution.

The minor peoples (national minorities)

Among the most numerous people of Russia, aside from the Russians (82 percent), are the Tatars (3.7), Ukrainians (3 percent), Chuvash (1.2 percent), Bashkirs (0.9 percent), the peoples of Dagestan (1.2 percent), and the Belorussians (0.7 percent). These seven peoples make up 93 percent of the population. The remaining 7 percent are comprised of 110 peoples, among which only 26 number more than 100,000 persons. Thus, there are currently 29 primary peoples residing in Dagestan (according to the census of 1926 there were 81 ethnic groups).

On the whole, the picture appears as follows: 16 national groups (a total of 7.8 million people) represent the peoples of the CIS countries; 30 national groups (1.3 million people) represent the peoples outside the boundaries of the CIS countries (Englishmen, Bulgarians, Finns, etc.); Another 30 national groups (173,000 people) represent the peoples which do not have statehood anywhere in the world (Gypsies, Assyrians, Uygurs, Kurds, etc.). There are another 22 peoples (116,000) living in Russia but not having national-territorial formations. And, finally, there are 10 peoples (67,000 people) who do not have any national territories, neither in the RF, nor in the CIS, nor in third countries.

Based on the fact of such a large number of peoples, we may conclude that the primary means of development for most of them is the creation and strengthening of a national-cultural, and in a number of places also a national-territorial autonomy. In principle this is the most progressive approach for Russia, in which, due to historical peculiarities, the national groups are found in compact groups as well as being dispersed.

As for the representatives of all peoples, it would be possible to create a civic (national) assembly under the Russian government, which would operate as a consultative organ according to the principle of representation: One people—one vote.

Possible Scenarios for the Development of the Ethnopolitical Process

These scenarios are closely associated with the resolution of cardinal tasks on reforming Russia, and with the effect of

outlined tendencies in the development of basic spheres of society, including the sphere of relations between various ethnic communities and groups and their political structures.

Variant 1. This could be called the ideal. It presupposes the development of events under which the program of stabilization of the economy would be successfully realized, social protection of the population would be ensured, the impulses of market relations would manifest themselves in a positive manner, demands would be unconditionally met, including those directly relating to the problems of inter-ethnic relations on the basis of the negotiation process.

In this case, we would be able to expect a resolution of acute inter-ethnic conflicts, an extinguishing of the "hot spots," and a significant reduction in the level of tensions in inter-ethnic relations.

However, the realities are such that the negative factors in the economy in 1994 will not disappear, and at times may even make themselves known in more acute forms. The currently intensifying heterogeneity in development of subjects of the RF, and the national-state and national-territorial transformations are manifested in the ever-deepening gap in living standards, and in the indicators of meeting the material and cultural needs of various ethnic groups. As for the possibility of the effect of such a factor of a centripetal tendency as the constitution, this is in grave doubt. Based on the fact that the constitution has been adopted by only a part of the republics, efforts at its active application may evidently exacerbate inter-ethnic contradictions to a certain degree and intensify the negative attitude of the ethnopolitical elite in some republics who view the RF Basic Law as an effort to "tighten the screws" on the part of the center and to turn Russia into a dictatorship or at best a unitarian state.

Thus, the factors stimulating centrifugal tendencies are still strongly making themselves known. Therefore, the examined variant of the prognosis, if we keep in mind the near future, is improbable.

Variant 2. This characterizes the disperse state of inter-ethnic relations in Russia, distinguished by a rather high degree of tension and national-regional instability. We are speaking specifically about the fact that tensions may be manifested in one form or another within the scope of one or several regions. These are primarily the Northern Caucasus, Povolzhye, certain border zones, places of accumulation of refugees, etc. This variant is probably the most likely. Under such a variation, the primary task will consist of putting a timely end to the conflagration in one region or another, using non-violent methods wherever possible, and not allowing the conflict to expand to an all-federal level. Evidently, it will be necessary to act in such a manner for a number of years. An obstacle to the realization of this variant will be the rather deep mistrust of the real possibilities and abilities of the power structures to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts.

Variant 3. This may conditionally be called the "division of Russia." Its scenario presupposes the possibility of such a situation when several republics at once (for example, two or three) reject the requirements of the RF Constitution, and in the process of the escalating confrontation with the center strive to leave the make-up of the Federation.

In no case should we underestimate this variant, even though it seems significantly less probable than the second.

Variant 4. The "Yugoslavian." This is war, blood, pain and suffering for millions of people—representatives of various ethnic groups. It is the least probable and is reviewed only as a warning. However, we must not lose vigilance. The world of inter-ethnic relations is so complex and multiplanar that what yesterday seemed merely an "abnormal" phenomenon may tomorrow suddenly turn out to be a great misfortune.

Footnotes

1. Associates from the Department of Analysis, Prediction and Operative Reaction of the RF Goskomsfederalitsiya [State Committee on the Federation], presently reorganized into the Ministry on Affairs of the Federation and Nationality, participated in the preparation of this expert evaluation.

* - Notes were prepared in January of 1994, prior to signing of the treaty between Russia and Tatarstan. (NG note).

Tatarstan Notes Progress in Fighting Mafia

944F0464A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN
in Russian 17 Mar 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Office for Combating Organized Crime Against the Mafia: Offensive Continues"]

[Text] A briefing of leaders of the Office for Combating Organized Crime (UOP) was held yesterday in the republic's MVD.

Office Chief R. Galimbekov, who was appointed to this position last November, told the representatives of the news media about the current business and immediate plans of the structural subdivision of the law enforcement authorities that is at the forward edge of the fight against crime. In recent months the UOP has stepped up its activity considerably by way of the organization of new departments in cities and rayons of the republic, reinforcement of the physical plant, and closer interaction with the KGB, criminal investigation, the Office for Economic Crimes, and other services of the MVD.

More than 20 of the 109 registered criminal groupings have been neutralized and broken up and criminal proceedings have been and continue to be instituted against more than 500 of their active members and leaders in the republic in recent months with the direct involvement of the UOP. A large quantity of firearms, ammunition, hardware, and financial resources has been confiscated from the criminals.

Tatarstan Social Protection Measures

944F0464B Kazan IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA
in Russian 18 Mar 94 p 1

[Tamara Levina report: "An Agreement That Stabilizes Life"]

[Text] An agreement among the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan, the republic Council of Trade Unions, and the Association of State-Owned Enterprises of

Tatarstan for 1994 was ceremonially signed in Kazan yesterday. The document was sealed by the signatures of Mukhammat Sabirov, prime minister of the Republic of Tatarstan, Farida Gaynullina, chairman of the republic Council of Trade Unions, and Yuner Yemaletdinov, president of the Association of State-Owned Enterprises.

This is the fourth agreement among the government, the unions, and the employers on joint participation and guarantees in the solution of labor and socioeconomic questions based on current legislation and the implementation of additional measures. The previous ones helped create in Tatarstan a well-oiled system of targeted social protection, curb the growth of unemployment, preserve the system of preschools, and decide a number of other questions.

The present year does not promise to be easy, and the new agreement provides for the creation of conditions for stabilization of the economy, social protection for the working people and public, jobs for the population and development of the labor market, pay and occupational and environmental safety guarantees, and development of the social sphere in rural localities. The commitments of each of the parties are clearly drawn. For example, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan will retain state regulation of the maximum levels of profitability and fixed prices on products of the monopoly sectors and enterprises, energy, and socially significant groups of commodities (individual foods, prescription drugs and medication, children's items, and so forth) and also on vitally important services, the public service of passenger transport, individual types of communications services, and public utilities, public gas, electric, and heating tariffs, and the charge for housing, having entered the corresponding resources in the republic budget. The Association of State-Owned Enterprises of the Republic of Tatarstan will organize work on placing at the enterprises orders for the manufacture of machinery, mechanisms, equipment, instruments, and spares for the needs of the national economy of the Republic of Tatarstan.

In addition, from the resources of state social insurance the parties plan to send to sanatoriums and recreation centers 43,000 workers (including 2,700 children); to preventive health-sanatoriums, 80,000 persons (10,000 children); to health-and-fitness camps, 135,000 children.

The agreement took effect the moment it was signed.

Ossetian Official Views Crisis Program

944F0433A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Kazbek Gostiyev, chairman of the board of the North Ossetian Fund for the Restoration of National Traditions and Customs: "Destined To Be Neighbors"]

[Text] The Ossetian-Ingush emergency zone is still in a state of emergency. After taking a first-hand look at the situation there, B.N. Yeltsin signed an edict "On the Procedure For Returning Refugees and Victims of Forced Resettlement Within the Territory of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic to Their Permanent Place of Residence." The edict evoked conflicting reactions in the two republics.

In any case, one thing is clear: Until the causes of the confrontation between the two republics have been eliminated and public thinking has undergone radical changes, it will be difficult to expect these measures to have the desired impact. The tense atmosphere has to be defused, and all of the attempts to do this have been clearly inadequate.

From Hatred to Tolerance

In my opinion, there is a method of paving the way for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The first condition would be the identification of the group of individuals who have committed serious crimes that are punishable by all standards of law and morality in any country. This could turn out to be impossible, but as long as murderers and warmongers are not governed by the criminal code of the Russian Federation, genuine reconciliation will be out of the question.

The second condition is the use of the ethical factor. It consists in the wisdom of our people, who developed a procedure long ago for the reconciliation of conflicting parties. In essence, until the parties in a blood feud had reconciled, they would have to live according to the Islamic common law of the mountain people, with strict rules governing each step they took, even going so far as to tell them which streets they could use, which places they could visit, and which party would have to yield the road to the other.

These strict rules of behavior in blood feuds attest to the use of separation as the main deterrent. This was done because feelings of rage and revenge were so strong that the feuding parties would kill each other when they met. It was not until after reconciliation that mediators and the close associates of the feuding parties would begin establishing favorable conditions (an art in itself) for communication, contacts, "chance meetings," and other exchanges between the reconciled parties. The process was accomplished one step at a time.

Our leaders would be completely justified in making use of the priceless experience of past generations in big politics.

For the sake of peace and accord, we need compromises and mutual concessions, and in this context it is extremely important for one nationality to put itself in the other's place, guided by the golden rule of morality: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." In this context, I am proposing a "program of emergence from crisis."

The Reality Factor

The stream of unsubstantiated mutual accusations and seething passions are keeping the two nationalities from taking a sober look at one another and realizing that they are both victims of the totalitarian regime.

The Ingush people have to realize that the Ossetians did not seize a single inch of Ingush land themselves. As for the disputed rural communities in Prigorodnyy Rayon, they became part of North Ossetia in 1944 by a decision of the government officials of that time, who were demanding the settlement of these territories. The people there now are third-generation natives with no other homeland. Their forcible inclusion in the Ingush Republic is a new act of violence, which cannot contribute anything, to put it mildly, to the improvement of the situation.

In short, it is impossible to ignore the historical realities that took shape in Prigorodnyy Rayon over the last 50 years, irrespective of our wishes and opinions. These realities have much more force than emotional outbursts and mercenary interests, and the main one is the fact that the inhabitants of Prigorodnyy Rayon, with the exception of people of the Ingush nationality, categorically oppose their annexation by another republic. Their forced annexation would put us on the road to war, with all of its tragic consequences.

Although I wish to retain an objective view of the actions of both sides, I would like to say that the Ossetians should sympathize more with the suffering of the Ingush people, the tragedy of their forcible eviction, and the difficulties of returning to their historical homeland and settling down there. This applies to the past and the present.

Tens of thousands of innocent families lost their homes and livelihood. They are victims, not criminals: No one leaves his home, and everything he has ever worked for, by choice. We cannot call ourselves civilized if we are indifferent to the suffering of people to whom we are related by a common history.

By the same token, it seems to me that the Ingush people also should be more careful in choosing their leaders. Ambitious extremists and mafia elements have driven their people to the verge of ruin. Their actions and appeals for the violent resolution of the territorial dispute have been ruinous for their innocent and unfortunate people.

Renounce the Blood Feud

The art of public diplomacy consists in promoting the kind of situation in which mutual forgiveness lies at the basis of reconciliation. The reconciliation of the parties in the blood feud could breach the thinking of most people and help them move from a state of mutual hatred to a recognition of the need to live in peace. Whether we like it or not, we were chosen by God and Destiny to live as neighbors. The sooner we realize this, the quicker the process of resolution will be. We have to finally admit that we have no other choice. The only alternative is brutal confrontation and war.

There is still a good chance that reason will prevail and that our people will find the road to peace and accord.

[Box]

Program of Emergence From Crisis

1. A coordinating council, elected from among national and religious authorities with the participation of official government agencies, will set up reconciliation commissions in the republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia on the republic, rayon, village, neighborhood, street, and building levels for the reconciliation of the feuding parties and the families of the deceased.
2. The reconciliation commissions in the republics of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, in contrast to conciliation commissions, must do the following:
 - a) compile absolutely precise lists of the names of individuals who lost members of their families in the armed conflict in October-November 1992;

- b) conduct meetings with victims (those who lost family members) in North Ossetia and in Ingushetia and, after preliminary agreement on the terms of reconciliation, seek their approval of a declaration of reconciliation between the two nationalities and their refusal to persecute anyone for the bloodshed;
 - c) elect authorized representatives of each side at meetings of the reconciliation commissions in the republics of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, with mediators from the Russian Federation and the republics, krais, and oblasts of the North Caucasus, and the possible participation of observers from the international community if necessary;
 - d) conduct an official forum of authorized representatives, who will sign a memorandum based on the decisions of the reconciliation commissions at a joint meeting;
 - e) complete the reconciliation by organizing a reconciliation table, where both sides will take a sacred vow—orally, in accordance with the customs of the Caucasus—to never resort to the use of arms again in the settlement of disagreements, reinforcing this commitment by shaking hands and calling upon Almighty God and all of the saints as witnesses.
3. The process of the reconciliation of feuding parties will not apply to those who treated their victims with brutality and savagery.
 4. An essential condition for the reconciliation of the parties in a blood feud is the payment of blood money, taking the form of financial compensation and emotional satisfaction.
 5. During the reconciliation process, conciliation commissions will also be working simultaneously on solutions to two major problems:
 - a) the search for missing persons;
 - b) the return (sequential) of innocent victims to their previous place of residence.

Kabardino-Balkaria Legislation Chief on Republic Parliament

944F0458A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 94 p 3

[Interview with I. Bechelov, by I. Mezova: "Ilyas Bechelov: I See in Today's Parliament Elements of Reforming the Representative Authority"]

[Text] Ilyas Bechelov is a colonel in the internal service, former chief of the Corrective Affairs and Social Rehabilitation Service, and chairman of the Legislative Commission of the former KBR [Kabardino-Balkaria Republic] VS [Supreme Soviet]. He is a graduate of the School of Physics and Mathematics, KBGU [Kabardino-Balkaria State University] and the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Academy. At the December election he once again became a deputy to the Council of the Republic of the KBR Parliament and once again headed the same commission—the Commission on Legislation, Law and Order, Security, and Human Rights. He is married, and has a son and two daughters.

[Mezova] Ilyas Borisovich, why, after serving twenty years in the MVD system, did you decide to run for election, first to the Supreme Soviet, and then to the KBR Parliament?

[Bechelov] For me it was a complete surprise when, in 1991, people from my home town in Kamenka came to me and suggested that they nominate me as a candidate for election to the Supreme Soviet. I must confess that many people advised me not to run, saying that an MVD worker would not be elected, especially since there were more popular candidates, including farm managers. Nevertheless I agreed and, to my surprise, I won. It may be that something that played a role was the fact that I had grown up in Kamenka and had gone to school there. I have a lot of friends in the district: Balkarians, Karbadinians, Russians...

[Mezova] In December of last year you decided to run for election again. Does that mean that you didn't really like the work of making laws?

[Bechelov] At first I did not want to run again, and I even took a job at the Tsentribirkom [Central Electoral Commission]. In general, I was planning to return to the MVD. After all, it is specific work that I was accustomed to. Once again the voters began arriving. My current electoral district is big, and is absorbing a large number of populated places: Bulungu, Khushto-Syrt, Nizhniy Chegem, Yanikoy, Lechinka, Kamenka... I was nominated by the collective at the Sovkhoz imeni Baysultanov, and the voters—and I am tremendously grateful to them for this—supported me again.

[Mezova] But certainly it must not have been such a simple thing, after the MVD, to engage—and successfully—in the work of creating legislation.

[Bechelov] Definitely... There is a big difference in the nature of the work. At first I was greatly tormented by all that paperwork. I was not accustomed to that kind of monotonous, painstaking work. However, I adjusted to it gradually and have even learned to enjoy it.

[Mezova] But how do you sense the difference in the activities of the former Supreme Soviet and the present Council of the Republic, which is operating on a professional basis?

[Bechelov] Here too there is a substantial difference. The work at the Council of the Republic is proceeding, in my opinion, in a time-responsive and efficient manner. We literally "chewed up" our Provisional Rules, for example, since we worked so carefully on them. We passed them in two readings. Of course, the working commission responsible for developing and modifying that vast document also worked scrupulously. The document is ready for publication. On the insistence of Yuriy Mairov, Chairman of the KBR Constitutional Court, we thoroughly wrote out the procedure for reviewing the budget and included it in the Rules.

[Mezova] Was the budget under joint jurisdiction from the very beginning?

[Bechelov] Yes. Its initial review was our responsibility.

[Mezova] Is there a difference between the initial and secondary discussions?

[Bechelov] The difference is contained in the names themselves. We are the first to review the document. The Representatives' Council accepts our recommendations and comments and, after discussion, submits the document for joint review.

[Mezova] Are you satisfied with the powers that have been assigned to the Council of the Republic?

[Bechelov] The question of powers was resolved in a constitutional and, in my opinion, completely satisfactory manner. We shared with the Representatives' Council the question of confidence or lack of confidence in the government, and the Representatives' Council, in its turn, shared with us the question of reviewing the budget. It is completely logical that such important questions have to be reviewed jointly. I also consider it to be correct that a large number of other questions are also under joint jurisdiction. In that way they will be developed more efficiently. It would scarcely seem to be desirable to transfer just to the Council of the Republic all the questions that the Supreme Soviet used to engage in.

[Mezova] What other differences do you think exist between the present Parliament and the former KBR VS?

[Bechelov] Primarily there has been a change in the functions and the structure. There is no Presidium, that narrow group of people that used to decide many very important questions, including those dealing with personnel. In order to resolve specifically the joint questions and to define the agenda of the joint sessions, the Coordination Council was created. In today's Parliament I see, to a certain extent, elements of reforming the representative authority.

[Mezova] Could we dwell more concretely on those elements?

[Bechelov] First of all, there is the two-house system, the beginning of the formation of a professional parliament, albeit by way of one house. Today the Parliament will resolve questions of an interethnic nature through a committee that was specially created for that purpose; the procedure for reviewing and making decisions dealing with those questions has already been firmly established in the Constitution.

[Mezova] What can you say about the makeup of the Council of the Republic?

[Bechelov] It seems to me that, on the whole, the deputies to that house are rather competent and are capable resolving any questions. They have a sufficient amount both of professional and everyday experience, and the necessary logic for thinking things out. I do not see in our house any people who are extremist in their views, but all of them are rather independent. There are many young people, and I like to work with them: they are restrained and knowledgeable people. The makeup of the house is rather varied. Many people have left their jobs and have taken up the professional work of creating legislation. I am convinced that, in a year, the Council of the Republic will be asserting itself in a loud voice.

[Mezova] Do you foresee the formation of factions and blocs in the Council of the Republic?

[Bechelov] Most of the deputies, it seems to me, adhere to centrist views. Possible blocs based on nationality are absorbed by the Committee on Interethnic Relations.

[Mezova] What will your commission, which is one of the leading ones in the house, engage in?

[Bechelov] There is no need to offend the other commissions, each of which is the base commission in its field for the creation of legislation. Naturally, we shall create laws, conduct parliamentary hearings and audits, take active part in developing RF [Russian Federation] legislative acts, and give our findings on drafts that are prepared by other commissions.

[Mezova] Am I correct in thinking that your commission needs professionals more than any other one does?

[Bechelov] The makeup of the commission is rather good, and professionally trained. In addition to me there are Khazan Shorov, a jurist and militia lieutenant-colonel; Zamir Shbizukhov, investigator from the Urvanskiy procurator's office; Khazanbi Shogenov, criminal-affairs procurator from the KBR procurator's office; Vitaliy Protasov, retired colonel; and Robert Zhurtov, economist, correspondence-course student at the KBGU Law School.

[Mezova] At the beginning of our conversation you mentioned in passing what a few people have been asserting: that an MVD worker would not be elected. But in the present Parliament MVD workers have occupied what I think is a rather solid position. Do you think that this attests to the fact that the population's attitude toward your associates is changing?

[Bechelov] Yes, there are six of us in the makeup of the present Parliament. I must say that Khusey Eneyev, Yuriy Kokov, Khasan Shorov, Boris Kerefov, and Adalbi Shkha-goshev are not only real professionals, but are also people whose reputations are completely unsullied. Yes, I am convinced that people's idea of the MVD is changing. Also, it is obvious that the crime problem that is engulfing us must be resolved. And, finally, this fact attests to people's confidence and high evaluation, and this must be perceived as an advance.

[Mezova] Are you satisfied with the house's Provisional Rules?

[Bechelov] In my opinion, there have been definite achievements. The most important questions will be decided by secret voting. The house's work is carried out in three state languages. A question that has caused long disputes is the question of keeping an account of the work performed by the deputy. A new section on parliamentary hearings provides considerable rights to the commissions for reviewing various important questions. For the first time the Provisional Rules deal with the procedure for holding sessions, and define the spring and autumn sessions and the summer and winter parliamentary vacations.

[Mezova] Almost two vacations? Isn't that too lavish?

[Bechelov] That is how it is done throughout the civilized world. And the same thing is stated in the Russian rules. The work days have been defined: Monday and Tuesday in the permanent commissions; Wednesday and Thursday, house sessions; and on Friday the deputies work in the districts. We have also planned that on Thursdays, for one

hour, and that the members of the government will reply to the deputies' oral or written questions.

[Mezova] Do you think that, in the new Parliament, the status of deputy has risen, or has fallen?

[Bechelov] I think that it has risen. First of all, a professional house has appeared. That is on the whole. This is attested to by the procedure for reviewing questions at the sessions, and by the parliamentary hearings...

[Mezova] What are the tasks that are confronting the house in the near future?

[Bechelov] Our commission has defined a working group to develop drafts about local self-government. Other groups have been created: a group to prepare the publication of the KBR Constitution (Basic Law) with a consideration of the amendments and additions that have been made; and a group to develop the Rules for the joint sessions of the two houses. Things are also proceeding in the same way in the other commissions. In general, the ice has been broken, and our speaker was right when he said in an interview that the house has taken the direct line in creating legislation.

[Mezova] Is there anything that you would like to convey to your constituents and the readers of our newspaper?

[Bechelov] Almost all the deputies, in their pre-election statements, mentioned the need to preserve peace and stability in the republic. I would hope that everyone will remember that and will apply all his efforts to assure that our nation lives in tranquility.

Kabardino-Balkaria Representatives' Council Chief on Current Tasks

944F0456A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 94 p 3

[Interview with M. Zhaboyev, under rubric "Politics," by I. Mezova: "Makhmud Zhaboyev: I Like To Be Surrounded by Strong People..."]

[Text] After the 12 December 1993 election, one of the houses of the KBR [Kabardino-Balkaria Republic] Parliament—the Representatives' Council—was headed by 55-year-old M. N. Zhaboyev, who had previously worked for more than 30 years at the Tyrnauz Tungsten-Molybdenum Combine.

[Mezova] Makhmud Nazirovich, you are a new person in the republic's agencies of authority. Could you tell our readers a bit about yourself?

[Zhaboyev] I was born in 1938 in the settlement of Belaya Rechka, in a school teacher's family. My father was called to the front on the second day of the war, and he never returned. He did not even manage to come home to say goodbye, but I am told that he wanted very much to see me, his elder son, before he left. My cousin, hearing about this, put me on his bicycle, and we dashed to the railroad station, but we were too late. In 1946 my mother died in Kirgizia, where she had gone, together with many other Balkarians who had been forcibly evicted from their homeland. My younger brother, five-year-old Muzafar, and I were left completely alone.

[Mezova] You were about eight years old. How, then, did your life unfold?

[Zhaboyev] We were taken in by uncles on my father's side who were living at that time in Kazakhstan. I grew up in the family of Sultan Babayev, and Muzafar grew up in the family of Musa Sozayev. We were among the first to return to our homeland—in 1955. My uncle's family was one of three that had received authorization to do that, and so we came here. I was still in the tenth grade then. At first, everything in our life was complicated, so my uncle took me to a boarding school for orphans. The people met me there, to my surprise, in a welcoming way, and I completed my schooling there. Nevertheless, I never did get the reservation [for higher education] that was issued to almost all the children at the boarding school, even though I had received a good certificate: I had let people know my feelings about the so-called Balkarian question, which had not yet been finally resolved. But I did not get depressed about that. Instead I enrolled at the Kiev Polytechnical Institute.

[Mezova] You went to Kiev? Why did you go so far away?

[Zhaboyev] The fact of the matter is that my father had sent his last letter from around there, and somewhere deep within my soul I harbored a crazy, completely unfounded hope. Anything can happen, I kept telling myself, and suddenly I would find out something. But my trips through the archives and the graveyards did not yield anything. I did not see my father's first or last name anywhere.

[Mezova] So you enrolled at the institute. How did your education go there?

[Zhaboyev] I passed my examinations, got through the competition, and, naturally, enrolled there. My education proceeded normally. I got a stipend, and that practically was all I had to live on. Although I did find odd jobs from time to time. I became friends with some Ukrainian guys, about whom I still have the best recollections: knowing my situation, they always shared with me the food that their parents had sent them.

[Mezova] What specialty did you acquire?

[Zhaboyev] Mining engineer. The year was 1961. The institute received a telephone call from Kabardino-Balkaria about student Zhaboyev. But they did not want to release me. There was also a shortage of specialists in Kiev. After much difficulty I managed to get released, and arrived at my homeland. However, in Tyrnauz the chief of the Molibden [Molybdenum] Mine said that there was no work for me.

[Mezova] What? After they had called for you?

[Zhaboyev] Not only that, but I said that I was agreeable to begin working there, but that was not to his liking. It was not until chief accountant Zhilyayev and chief geologist Dzagoyev intervened that I was given a job. Two months later the same mine chief, thanks to what he called my good references, made me a mining foreman.

[Mezova] And you have been working at the combine since then?

[Zhaboyev] In general, yes. But in 1963 I was elected first secretary of the Komsomol's first Tyrnyauz City Committee. I worked two years there and decided to return to the combine.

[Mezova] Why? Didn't you like Komsomol work?

[Zhaboyev] It was not because I didn't like it or that it wasn't in my area of specialization. They even asked me to continue working there. But my heart was drawn more to a specific kind of work, and I had to stand on my own two feet as a professional. At any rate, in order to make a statement about myself in public work or politics, I had to have two kinds of experience—everyday experience and professional experience.

[Mezova] Did you return to the same position?

[Zhaboyev] Yes, the position of mining foreman. And I went up absolutely all the rungs of my career ladder. My last position at the combine was chief engineer. The time was good, especially when I was working as the chief of high-speed drilling. It was fashionable at that time—that is, it was not fashionable, but there a requirement of the day, inasmuch as the international situation was complicated and there was a need for metal—to establish records. Twice we established nationwide records for the drilling of mines, and twice I was received by the country's minister of nonferrous metallurgy. I also received awards—governmental orders and medals. The most cherished of them were the VDNKh [Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy] Gold Medal and the badge "In Recognition of Aggressive Work in the Komsomol."

[Mezova] All told, you gave the combine 31 years. Am I correct in thinking that it was not so simple for you to break away from it, to change your life so sharply?

[Zhaboyev] Yes, it was no simple matter, and it is not even a matter of the number of years. In my previous work, things were more concrete, and one could see the results more clearly. There were more opportunities to display my on-the-job qualities there. And also, to tell the truth, there is nothing that can replace communicating with the working class, with unspoiled, unsophisticated people. These actually are not high-sounding words for me. Thanks to the workers, I felt strong. I was convinced that they would never let me down, and I would never let them down either.

[Mezova] And so, Makhmud Nazirovich, you arrived at Parliament. With what hopes? What did you hope to bring into its activity?

[Zhaboyev] You can see what we turned production into. We enterprise managers rushed into politics in order to exert an influence on the poorly thought-out, unjust attitude toward the producer. Do you think that the director corps developed this aggressiveness from having had a good life? Industry is in a very serious situation. The kolkhozes are being ruined. It is unbearable to feel helpless and incapable of helping one's own collective. People would say, "Hand over your last jacket without even thinking about it!" But what justifications were there for bringing the country to that point? None.

[Mezova] There are a lot of famous people in your house—administration heads, and managers of large enterprises,

kolkhozes, and sovkhoses. Do you think that they will succeed in making life better for the nation?

[Zhaboyev] Unfortunately, everything does not depend on us. It is impossible to build a good life in an individual republic when things are bad all around. First, I am convinced that we shall never get rich unless we economize.

[Mezova] How do you think we must or can economize?

[Zhaboyev] It is necessary to put the budget under strict monitoring: where is the money going, for what purpose, and what return will it provide? The money should not disappear down a hole in the ice. Instead it should float to the surface in the form of new schools, new shops, etc. That process should be broadly illumined. Secondly, taxes and all kinds of assessments have stifled both the private and state producers. Someone ought to study this situation.

[Mezova] Who, for example?

[Zhaboyev] Maybe even Parliament. The appropriate commissions of both houses should analyze the situation, develop specific recommendations, and submit them to the government. The third problem is crime. In order to eradicate it, it is necessary to create new jobs. It is necessary to give a person the opportunity to earn a living by honest labor. If he is deprived of that opportunity, he chooses another path.

[Mezova] How can we create new jobs if the jobs that do exist are standing idle?

[Zhaboyev] I currently drive out to the enterprises and become acquainted with their financial and economic situation. I have also recommended that to our deputies. We must not bring everyone to the point of collapse. A few more and even the director corps will be unable to withstand it. Incidentally, in our republic that corps is very strong. Nor is the engineer-administrative complement any weaker. It is simply criminal to lose it. After all, it took three or four decades to create it.

[Mezova] You have a large amount of practical experience, as well as an equal amount of everyday experience. How do you think the republic should attempt to get out of the crisis? Are there any previously unused reserves?

[Zhaboyev] Our agriculture and industry are operating at a loss. In my opinion, we have good reserves of various types of building materials. We have unexploited reserves of millions of cubic meters of sand and gravel that are in short supply in Stavropol and other regions, and even in foreign countries.

A second source of our prosperity could be the tourist industry. It might make sense here to take advantage of the services of foreign investors, or maybe even to sell certain items... But it is necessary to begin somewhere.

[Mezova] Parliament was formed not too long ago, but you already know many of the members of your house from the previous Supreme Soviet. What would you say about the makeup of the Representatives' Council?

[Zhaboyev] I am very satisfied with it and I feel that it is sufficiently strong. Most of the deputies have a large

amount of everyday and professional experience. In general, I have always liked to be surrounded by strong people, by a strong team. In Parliament, once again, I have been fortunate in this regard.

[Mezova] In addition to the tasks that were previously enumerated, what do you consider to be an inseparable task of Parliament?

[Zhaboyev] The RF government, in my opinion, is making certain reasonable attempts to help the producer. For some reason they are being ignored or met with bayonets. It seems to me that Parliament must go to the Federal Assembly with official declarations about supporting the government's efforts and stabilizing the population's life. I do not remember any precedents for this, but why cannot this be done by way of our deputies in the Federal Assembly, of whom we have three? Of course, other alternatives are also possible.

Something that upsets me very much is the fate of our youth. We really ought to revive the public youth organizations, even under different names, with other ideals. But they should be revived. Such an important job as educating the upcoming generation should not be allowed to drift along unguided.

[Mezova] I remember, Makhmud Nazirovich, the statement that you made against a professional Parliament...

[Zhaboyev] Yes, I was against it, inasmuch as I felt that the parliamentarians would rapidly divorce themselves from the vitally important problems, from real life. In any case, we must remember that today is not the time for politics mongering. It is better to give everyone the opportunity to buy bread.

Today Parliament in its work is proceeding, as it were, by touch, but I feel that it will find itself and there will be work for it to do.

Pskov Oblast January Election Fiasco Reviewed

944F0442A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
12 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent Viktor Karpov, Pskov Oblast, under rubric "Apropos Notes": "There's No Respect for the Mandates...: What the Unheld Election Demonstrated to the Pskov Oblast Assembly of Deputies"]

[Text] The election to the Pskov Oblast Assembly of Deputies was scheduled for 29 January. After the Soviets had been dispersed (it is difficult to use any other term), similar kray, oblast, and city Dumas, boards, *hurals*, etc., etc. are supposed to be—in the minds of the new "constitutionalists" who seized the upper hand over the Soviet authority in October of last year—from now on the representative authority at the regional level. They are supposed to be, so to speak, a balance to the executive authority. Although what kind of "balance" can that be, if their weight categories are simply not comparable? It's like the elephant and the mosquito. The executive authority long ago become overgrown to its indecently swollen state, and more and more departments are multiplying more rapidly than rabbits. Incidentally, there were supposed to be a total of 21 "Duma men" in that same Pskov Assembly, of whom only eight were "with portfolio," that is, salaried. So just

try "balancing" this incomplete platoon with an army of officials which, a very long time ago, became crowded in the thick-walled building of the former cadet corps that, quite recently, used to be called the oblast House of Soviets. It makes you wonder whether the "Duma men" will become such important, but, alas, decorative *farces majeures* under the ruling "court" for the purpose of playing ring-around-the-rosy there.

As for the ring-around-the-rosy, there have already been precedents. You might recall that, at the dawn of perestroika, its "romantic Rastrelli" reproached the Soviets, coupled with the trade unions and public organizations: don't play ring-around-the-rosy with us "prorabs [work superintendents] of perestroika, but toughen up! Fight for people and for their welfare, without worrying about your own stomach! But they did not take heed... It was all in vain. They played ring-around-the-rosy... The Soviets do not exist as a political force—it took just one rescript to flatten them like an importunate fly. The trade unions also do not really exist any more, and those that do are completely remote from real life... But this is really apropos. Let's return to the Pskov election.

It was the first election to be held in Russia. It was Saturday. I'm sitting there, drinking my tea... The voting district where I am registered is around the corner, in a nearby school. I wonder whether or not I should go there. I recall how many times during the past two years the authority had called me, requested me, and entreated me to go to the ballot box so that I could give it my mandate to do what it later would attempt to do in order to make my life happy and cloudfree. But it is becoming not better, but increasingly difficult to live from day to day.

So I'm sitting there, drinking my tea, and looking out of the window. I recall how, a month and a half earlier, when our last and decisive fight in front of the ballot boxes was announced again, people in the dark morning hours (it was, after all, December) walked single-file across my courtyard on their way to the school. But today it is already the middle of the day, and there don't seem to be many citizens who are inspired by the election. Just one or two, and that's it.

My contemplative tea-drinking was suddenly disturbed. The local television company broke off its broadcast on the Russia-wide channel, and a member of the okrug electoral commission appeared on the screen: my dear voters, he says with a somewhat reproachful tone of voice, it might be a good time to remind you about performing your civic duty, rather than beating all your carpets and vacuuming your rooms. The voting, he said, is being discontinued so that it looks as though it might be necessary to hold a re-election, once again at the expense of you taxpayers. I must confess that this pressure upon my freedom of choice, this unceremonious conduct, coupled with the threat to empty once again my already empty pocket, irked me. And if this had happened in the much vaunted Western democracies, it certainly wouldn't have done much good for the frisky guy from the electoral commission. Because he broke the citizens' right: to vote for, or against, or not at all. And that "hand-breaker" who had smashed the voter's hands would have been fired and given a big fine., and the election results would have been disputed in court. But that is how "they" do it...

In our country, on the other hand, people, even though they are not well versed with regard to their electoral right, are nevertheless hardened—they were not even afraid of those goadings from the television set. The result was the complete failure of the election in Pskov, in Velikiye Luki (and there approximately one-third of the electoral oblast), and this predetermined the failure of the election to the oblast assembly. But in the rural rayons, on the other hand, the activity was sufficient, and their residents gave mandates to their 13 emissaries to the oblast parliament. (More later about why that occurred.) However, there was just one mandate lacking to get the quorum necessary to proclaim the oblast assembly of deputies. Therefore the oblast parliament has not yet occurred, and a re-election has been scheduled for 27 March. That is enough time also to think a bit about why today's voter "does not have any respect for mandates," and about where the pointer of the political barometer in the province is currently pointing.

At a session of the okrug electoral commission the election results were evaluated as a surprise. A few people also mentioned the reason why the people had "voted with their feet": they said that, both in Pskov and in Velikiye Luki, on the eve of the election not only the so-called "budget people," but also the workers at many plants and factories, had not received their wages. And if that is so, then why the hell do we need an authority that does not pay us for our work? They explained that people have got completely tired of elections, referendums, and also those that only worsen the Russia-wide crisis. It was noted that even the day—Saturday—had been poorly chosen. And was it really a good idea to come out with this election "ahead of all of Russia"? Especially so early, in January, when nothing, not even the budget, was yet definite.

Well, there probably is a grain of truth in these explanations (true, they were made after the fact). They would have been exhaustive if the executive authority—and it was precisely that authority that became the lead horse in holding the election campaign—would honestly admit that this time it had been undone by impatience. They thought that people had not yet recovered after the December "presidential triumph" and once again would obediently do what they were told to do. But it did not happen...

By and large, the voters in the major cities "voted with their feet" against the unbearable living conditions today. They voted against the reforms being carried out hurriedly, high-handedly, at a full gallop. And, finally, the impoverished people, who in addition are under the threat of complete unemployment tomorrow, oppose such attacks. Are we really supposed to believe that there is anyone who does not understand this yet?

Just as, incidentally, the fact that the voters lowered the boom on the way to the seats in the oblast parliament to those contenders for those seats who include themselves in the "democratic" camp. And with what a clamor they had been making their way there! With what "programs"! One contender beat himself on the chest, swearing that he would become the only defender of all the offended and abused. Another one promised in a single blow to end all the political battles that had brought the country and the oblast to collapse. And still another one, a businessman, planned to start a "vendetta" against bureaucrats of all kinds. What scope, what boldness of ideas! One might

think that this was not an oblast assembly with a clearly delineated scope of competency that the person was dashing into, but at least some European parliament. "All this, my friend, is words, words, words," Pushkin used to say, and so the voter proved to be nobody's fool. He saw through the blabbermouths with their promises. The rating that most of the "Pskov fathers of democracy" got was bad enough for them to shoot themselves.

They were not even helped by the "letters of recommendation" from the Moscow "fathers of democracy and apostles of reforms," that were widely printed in the local newspapers. Yes, that is what the general practice is now—"just like in the better homes..." Previously the recommendations used to be given there to all the governesses, intellectuals not of noble birth, and beginning clerks who were seeking work with ruined petty-bourgeois noblemen... Today they also are taking care of "their own," but it is their own from one political clan. True, it is with the proviso that this "tutor" serves the clan loyally. Unfortunately, the undertaking with these letters also was unsuccessful. As they say, this is a matter not just of cash, but also of the Moscow "wedding generals" who once again got into a mess with their wards, this time having proven at the regional level that they always, in any pre-election battles, superciliously underestimate the voter, refusing the "man in the street" the right to decide for himself what is what.

And now let us consider this from the position of the oblast "province," those 13 rural electoral districts where the election to the oblast assembly took place. In and of itself, the fact that the "province" had gone to the ballot boxes is not really surprising. Even in these harrowing times, the ordinary peasant understands that it is impossible to live without authority. With authority, things are more reliable. But whether the authority always worries about the peasant is another question. So he went to the ballot box, taking with him possibly his last hope that now Moscow would know what was pressing down on the peasant, and that his own homegrown people would do everything to stand up for him. So he chose. Whom? The one who is well aware of whom he can trust, to whom he is accustomed to go with every need of his.

Well, actually, why is there a need for some kind of laudatory indulgence from some high and mighty "democrat" flitting around the Moscow corridors? Why does Ivan Mikhaylovich Semenov, director of the Vyazye State Pedigree Stock Farm, need it, if the voters of Dedobichskiy and Dnovskiy rayons know him as an excellent specialist, organizer, and understanding person? If Vyazye, even today, in the grip of stifling reforms, continues to be famous for its superelite pure-bred hogs which foreigners envy! Or Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Sharstuk, chairman of the Pamyat Ilich Kolkhoz, Pechorskiy Rayon, a young, energetic person who, during his short period of time as chairman, has completed the construction of an excellent settlement on half the kolkhoz—why does he need it? Or Aleksandr Ivanovich Bukashkin, who took the Truzhenik Kolkhoz out of his father's hands and improved the farm... It is the deeds themselves and the Christian spirit of these and other agrarians that are the best propaganda for them.

Incidentally, the rural candidates, unfortunately, could not even count on those propaganda "volleys" by which many of their urban associates literally deafened their voters. But

the only funny thing that happened is that, having lost, certain city-dweller candidates immediately began crying, "Who will give me back those 'lemons' that were spent on the importunate 'Choose me, choose me...?'" Because it turns out that that's how much a seat in the oblast parliament costs—a paltry two or three million. And that is not including the funds that were officially allocated to the oblast election along the line of Tsentribirkom [Central Electoral Commission]. Funds, we might note, that were tremendous.

But the "bird of happiness tomorrow," fortunately, is in the possession of those who were chosen. It is gratifying that, among them, more than a third are pure agrarians. And this is symptomatic: in an agrarian oblast, it would seem, the people who are running the dance, in the good sense of the word, should be people not from the asphalt, but people from the land, people from behind the plow. It is good that the legitimate deputies to the oblast assembly have already realized that and have offered the administration a package of documents pertaining to the fate of the agrarian reform in Pskov Oblast. Without waiting for the March re-election, they are already holding their working meetings, gradually developing the drafts of working documents for the oblast "Duma." People like this are not accustomed to let things get mired down in empty talking. Thank God!

Voronezh Copes With Burden of Federal Budget

944F0449A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
16 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Vadim Soskov under the rubric "Situation":
"An Oblast-Level Emergency"]

[Text] Once again the consolidated budget situation is alarming at both the federal and oblast levels. The regions are not making ends meet. Arrears in the payment of wages, especially to employees of social, cultural, and consumer service facilities, come to several months. Social tensions are rising, and confidence in the power structures is dwindling. Under the circumstances, the regional authorities are more often than not acting in the traditional manner: They send envoys to the Ministry of Finance, and the envoys try to "lobby" for yet another billion for their oblast, kray, or republic. However, carving up the budgetary pie is becoming increasingly difficult. There is no money.

Less frequently, the oblast authorities try to find a way out on their own, without assistance from the center. After all, it is no secret that tremendous amounts are left uncollected at the regional level. The Voronezh Oblast administration has resolved to get at least some of them.

Deputy head of the Voronezh Oblast Administration Igor Neznamov said: "For us to live like we did in 1993 the oblast needs 240 billion rubles [R] in the first quarter. However, in reality a budget of R124 billion has been put together. The deficit comes to R116 billion. All these numbers are based on prices of the fourth quarter of last year. Meanwhile, prices for gasoline, electricity, raw and other materials, and medicines increased sharply in January. Prices have gone up, but no recalculation has been done so far. As a result, in January alone we needed to

allocate R80 to the sector financed from the budget. However, we were able to fund only R33 billion.

As is known, Voronezh Oblast is primarily an agrarian region. Enterprises of the defense industry account for the bulk of the industrial potential, but these enterprises are in need of assistance themselves. For example, the neighboring Lipetsk is one-half the size of Voronezh in terms of population, but the volume of industrial production is two times greater there.

In a word, the consolidated budget situation in Voronezh is extreme. Suffice it to mention that, if funding for preschool facilities is cut off, employment will fall sharply because of nonworking mothers, and the volume of industrial production in the oblast will decline another 70 percent. Under the circumstances, emergency financing procedures were temporarily introduced in Voronezh Oblast in March. Governor A. Kovalev signed a package of 17 decrees. The task is to regain control of the economic situation in the oblast.

First of all, measures are envisioned that will bring about a reduction in the expenditures of the oblast budget. Only the "protected" items of expenditure of organizations financed from the budget are funded on a priority basis: wages, electricity, municipal services. For example, the Decree "On Streamlining Funding for Health Care in the Oblast" introduced strict item-specific financing in health care facilities of the oblast. It is forbidden for hospitals, polyclinics, and medical services departments to purchase drugs at prices exceeding the wholesale-factory prices of the Farmatsiya state enterprise, or to purchase expensive equipment, except for that directly supporting the provision of medical care to the population. Monitoring of transfers of funds to the fund of compulsory medical insurance will be reinforced.

Negotiated prices in construction are also becoming a matter of the past. Firm cost estimates for construction products are being introduced which proceed from the 1991 base price multiplied by a uniform sectoral index. The latter will now be determined by an oblast center for price setting in the construction sector. At the same time, tax relief is envisioned for private enterprises building facilities that are included on the list of state needs of the oblast.

Measures to raise the rate of the profit tax taken in by the local budget to 25 percent for enterprises and organizations and 30 percent for insurance organizations, i.e. 3 and 8 percent more, respectively, are aimed at boosting the revenue side of the budget. A fee of R2 million a month will be assessed on all commercial stands.

Mutual offsetting of the debts of enterprises in Voronezh Oblast will soon be performed. The plan is to subsequently expand it to all oblasts of the Central Chernozem area.

In the opinion of Igor Neznamov, carrying out these decisions will yield about R20 billion per month to the oblast budget. This does not solve all the problems, but will be a substantial help to the organs of executive power in funding organizations financed from the budget.

Siberian Economist on Tax Differentiation

944F0471A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK
in Russian 18 Mar 94 p 4

[Interview with Candidate of Economic Sciences Boris Melentyev, by VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK correspondent Yuriy Voronchikhin; place and date not given: "Those Hated Taxes"]

[Text] The state tax policy is being subjected to serious criticism by entrepreneurs, producers, and the population. The issue of creating a federal tax system that is differentiated by the country's regions is being raised with increasing urgency. Our correspondent met with Candidate of Economic Sciences Boris Viktorovich Melentyev, a specialist on regional and interregional problems and a research associate at the Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The topic of their conversation is taxes.

[Voronchikhin] Boris Viktorovich, literally everyone today is moaning about chaos in taxation. It is complicated, confusing, too much, unfair, and so on. In the past we only knew about income tax, plus childless people had to pay a certain percentage of their wages. Now there are all sorts of deductions. I bet that soon there will be a tax on beards. Do we really need such a multitude of taxes, and can we not do without them altogether?

[Melentyev] By tax we usually understand mandatory payments appropriated by the state. We usually part with this money with regret, especially if taxes are high. Nevertheless, a certain part of taxes, especially at the all-Russia (federal) level, are a necessary attribute of financial regulation of economic activities. They are needed because the state, through tax revenue, finances directly out of the budget, among other things, defense, the pension and other social funds, targeted development of new production, etc.

[Voronchikhin] Since it is a "production necessity," dictated by "harsh reality," then should there not be, instead of the chaos that reigns today in state tax policy, a flexible system of duties that is agreeable for everyone?

[Melentyev] Creating a logical system of taxes is to a certain extent an art: They must be simple; the principles for calculating them, understandable for everyone; there should not be many of them; and they should not be too high and should not suppress the initiative of economic growth. In order for taxes to serve as active means of state policy, it is desirable that they fulfill several functions—for instance, not only ensure the flow of revenue, but also stimulate achievement of certain policy goals. In particular, high excise tax on tobacco and alcohol products constrains consumption of these products by young people; increasing tax on profit if it is used for wages provides an incentive to direct it into production development.

Unfortunately, most existing taxes do not meet these requirements. I will point out one peculiarity that is not typical of the tax systems of other countries, but for us it is simply mandatory. It is appropriation of an enterprise's extra income for its placement in favorable climatic conditions (one of the kinds of differential rents). In the world practice a differential rent is not calculated separately and

is included in enterprise's income, therefore is appropriated only partially within the limits of tax on profit. But the world does not have other countries comparable to Russia in terms of territorial size. Differential rents manifest themselves in the income from foreign trade of southern countries with those in the north because of lower costs of agricultural products.

A transition from the prevailing old system of financial regulation of economic activities by planned targets to management where economic (market) principles become increasingly predominant constitutes the main contents of the reforms began in 1985. Their goal is to shift to profit as the criterion of activities, and by providing a combination of centralized administration and market regulation to expand the principles of self-financing not only for territorial entities (oblasts, republics).

[Voronchikhin] This means that today a lot depends on the competent actions of bodies of state administration?

[Melentyev] Modern practice demands a transition from a rigid planning, lessening, and reduction of this function of central bodies, to strict measures of financial regulation. The old system of economic management could not make serious demands on the financial sphere. For instance, the prices enterprises charged for their products did not necessarily cover the costs, since what was demanded of enterprises was first and foremost to fulfill the plan. The all-national economic balance—distribution of the output produced—was carried out only at the top level; at the bottom, the disbalance was covered by subsidies. In the new environment, state administration bodies have to create for all economic entities an adequate economic and legal environment. It is characterized by a fair tax system, setting up a mechanism of mutual responsibility between enterprises and financial bodies, maintaining equivalent circulation, and timely banking and credit clearing.

[Voronchikhin] You were talking about climatic conditions; I assume you had in mind northern allowances and the Siberian coefficient?..

[Melentyev] The process of expanding the regulating role of the state with the help of economic elements of administration (prices for the output of monopolist enterprises, taxes, credits, etc.) have their special peculiarities in our country because of its great territory and sharp differences in natural and climatic conditions. This peculiarity requires equalizing the operating environment across the regions. People living in the regions with harsher climate spend more on warm clothing and food. Also of considerable importance is that consumer goods are more expensive here as well. This means that wages in these regions must be higher than in the south. A man, no matter in what region he lives, should get for the same labor the wages that would provide him with the same standard of living.

Until now the state regulated the factor of such differentials in the form of centrally set territorial coefficients to base wages. In addition, prices for enterprises' output also were centrally differentiated by region: in the south they were lower, and in the north, higher. This way differential rent was appropriated and production environment was equalized across the regions. In modern market relations most prices are set either by the market or by regional rather than central bodies. As is known, prices in any

market have a tendency to equalize. For instance, during V. Chernomyrdin's visit to the Far East in August of last year, a demand was made to set electric power rates there at the same level as in the rest of Russia. But with prices the same on average across the regions, the differential rent ends up in the southerners' income. This is not fair since this income is not associated directly with the labor expenditures of those who have appropriated this income in a disguised form.

Now the state function of factoring territorial differences is narrowed down and includes only entities financed out of the federal budget. For economically independent enterprises the principle of factoring regional costs and deduction of differential rent must be determined differently.

[Voronchikhin] How?

[Melentyev] Wages are an element of enterprises' costs. Therefore, those located in harsher climatic conditions objectively will have higher costs at least because of higher wages. In addition, harsh climate requires greater use of electric power, fuels, additional costs... This means that enterprises in the north will produce more expensive products that are not competitive with those produced by enterprises in the south. I do not have to explain the consequences.

You cannot place the entire population in the square adjacent to the White House. It is in the interest of the state to distribute the population across the entire territory of the country. Therefore, wages must be differentiated, while enterprises' income must be equalized in accordance with the principle of social justice. The proposal is very simple: to introduce a federal tax on land; [column line missing] in the north it will be lower. The difference between the level of taxes must cover the additional expenses incurred in the north because of the harsh climatic conditions and the distance from industrially developed centers.

[Voronchikhin] As many centuries of Russian history show us, the issue of land is one of the most difficult to resolve. Perhaps taxes would provide that very tool with the help of which this delicate problem at least may be regulated less painfully?

[Melentyev] The impact of this tax is multifaceted. First, it provides an incentive for enterprises not to halt production, because this tax always has to be paid, even when the enterprise has no output. Second, it provides an incentive for prudent land use, because this use is not free. The aforementioned principle of equalizing production conditions sharply diminishes the need to develop a system of prices for transportable products produced by monopolist enterprises that are differentiated by zones, because a regional differential from the average national price will be determined by the difference in selling and transportation costs in deliveries between regions. Besides, land tax is more stable than prices. After all, its level does not depend on the changing state of the market and other operational environment.

Establishing such a tax is not a goal in itself—it is an element of improving the system of financial regulation of economic activities. The main principle of the tax policy should be as follows: Only after fulfilling the equalizing

function with the help of regionally differentiated land-use rent can a unified principle of taxation by other factors be ensured.

[Voronchikhin] A regional tax differential probably should be scientifically substantiated, pass the expert evaluation of the Federal Assembly, and be codified in law, should it not?

[Melentyev] Unfortunately, the idea of a regional tax differential makes headway with great difficulty and sometimes degenerates into foreign forms. Instead of differentiating taxes as such, the share of contribution into local and federal budgets is differentiated. This situation creates a basis for bureaucratic arbitrariness with very familiar rules: to give or not to give; how much to give and how much to take? [Word missing] for instance, the republics of Chechnya, Yakutia, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan transfer the entire revenue from the value-added tax into local budgets; some oblasts transfer 20 percent, and some, 50 percent. Apparently, what is behind it is not economic calculation but rather the level of noise produced by statements of their sovereignty.

[Voronchikhin] Is this not why other federation components before the adoption of the new constitution so actively demanded republic status?

[Melentyev] Most likely. Keeping in mind the caution of federal authorities in this delicate business—what share of taxes to give up to the federal budget—it becomes necessary to set custom duties for one or another republic or oblast with respect to the import and export of products. The level of "import" duties should exactly correspond to the value of differential rents charged.

For instance, Russia does not produce citrus fruit or grapes; this means that import of these products should be duty-free. But when we import what we make ourselves, we should apply the tax—in order to equalize the economic conditions of production, to protect domestic producers. Hence, the slogan of a single economic space that is currently being touted by the presidents of the CIS southern republics is unsuitable for Russia. Just as Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova have the right to purchase our gas or other goods in their own way, on different terms.

Implementing the principles described above to construct a regional differential federal tax system finally will allow liquidation of the statute on unsubsidized development of the northern territories, or at least reduce the subsidies to one-time events, that is, temporary state subventions (development-aimed incentive subsidies). We have to hurry, because economic contradictions between regions and injustice usually result in social tension...

Kaliningrad Admin Chief on Economy, Lithuania

944F0422A Moscow MEGAPOLIS-EXPRESS
in Russian No 9, 2 Mar 94 p 10

[Interview with Yuriy Matochkin, Kaliningrad Oblast administration chief, by Eduard Govorushko, under rubric "The Economy, Numbers, Analyses, Society": "Why Not Create a Baltic Republic?"; place and date not given]

[Text] Yuriy Semyonovich Matochkin, born 1931, doctor of economic science, member of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly. Kaliningrad old-timer. Cruised the Baltic

and the Atlantic as a navigator and later captain of large ships, was chairman of a fishing kolkhoz. After receiving his doctorate became president of one of Kaliningrad's institutes. Appointed chief of the Kaliningrad Oblast administration in August 1991. Says that he will not leave his position until he creates a normative and legal basis for the development of the Yantar [Amber] Free Economic Zone.

[Govorushko] Yuriy Semyonovich, is it easy for the oblast to be a Russian enclave?

[Matochkin] A component of the Russian Federation. But unfortunately, not everyone in the government understands what it means to live two countries away from Moscow. The problems that arise during transit through Lithuania are known and, on the whole, understood. But suddenly we learned that, the same as last year, our own Ministry of Railways introduced international freight rates for us... And we had thought, naively, that the question had been settled once and for all.

In general, we can only hope that it will be recognized at all governmental levels: there is a foreign territory of the Russian Federation. Any document signed with the Baltic states, Belarus or other of the oblast's neighbors—even for intra-Russian use—must take our geopolitical situation and interests into account. But sometimes Russia forgets about us.

[Govorushko] So it seems that most of the problems for the oblast are created not by Lithuania or other adjoining states, but by the Russian government itself?

[Matochkin] No, I wouldn't say that. Lithuania creates problems, but it would be easier to resolve them if Russia helped actively. Because Lithuania, as a sovereign state, quite justifiably is interested in negotiating at the national level, regarding dialog with us as merely preparing the ground.

[Govorushko] Why not give the oblast greater authority in negotiating with its neighbors?

[Matochkin] We count on this happening after passage of the law on the status of Kaliningrad Oblast, which the Russian Duma is to consider soon. But there had never been any enclaves in Russian history, so we can only guess what the deputies will think of the bill. A new statute for the oblast is only a first step. In future I do not preclude formation of a Baltic Russian Republic, in the framework of a single state. I think the administration chief or governor—the name doesn't matter—should be appointed by the president so as to stress that the region is inseparable from Russia. The president's vicegerent should be authorized to negotiate with neighboring countries on all the territory's problems. Incidentally, the government has given me such authority with regard to the northeastern provinces of Poland.

We would like to use the future status law to become, for example, an associate member of the community of Baltic and northern states, representing Russian interests there. This process has already begun in some measure. I came to this conclusion after a meeting of officials of the Baltic region in Helsinki, in which I took part as a member of the Russian delegation. But so far our relations with Poland are developing more dynamically. Yet we would gladly accede to an understanding on, say, a non-visa regime for

inhabitants of the three Baltic states. Besides, restoration of a new type of Hanseatic Union would be impossible without Kaliningrad Oblast, its ports and transit routes as a connecting link between East and West.

[Govorushko] What is the socio-economic situation in the oblast? Did it gain anything from the free economic zone status?

[Matochkin] Actually, benefits for the free economic zone began to accrue only since the first quarter of last year. At the same time, due to high transportation costs per unit of output produced in the oblast, it is not competitive. That is why the rate of decline of production in industry and agriculture is higher than the average for Russia. At the same time, customs benefits for the free economic zone stimulated external economic ties and led to increased investment in construction, which is higher here than the all-Russia average. Trade and commodity reserves have increase substantially. The rate of price increases is lower than in the country: at present Kaliningrad is among the cities where goods and services are cheaper. The difference between the living minimum and average income has changed for the better. Small and medium businesses and tourism are developing actively, and many small private enterprises are being set up. The oblast now holds third place in Russia for foreign investment, after Moscow and St. Petersburg.

This year, however, began with difficulty, as in the entire country. It can't be helped: we get 90 percent of our supplementaries from the Russian Federation. The oblast remains subsidized, and will continue to be for a long time. We depend in many ways on the federal budget, which owes us 18 billion rubles for last year, while in the first quarter we didn't get a kopeck of 14 billion. What saves us, once again, is the free zone regime and the additional regional quota for exports of our own oil. This has helped build up small hard-currency reserves, on which we live, and we also invest in development of the infrastructure.

[Govorushko] The forced militarization of the oblast, as far as I know, not only complicates relations with Baltic countries but is also, probably, a deadweight on the economy?

[Matochkin] Our relations with Lithuania and Poland are not affected by this, though inter-governmental relations certainly are. But the population of the oblast supports the army and feels safer in its presence. From the economic, social and ecological aspects the armed forces are indeed a heavy burden on the oblast, something which ranking bureaucrats also sometimes fail to understand. In addition, relations between the army and local governments are another blank spot in our legislation. I can say that cuts in the armed forces of the region are already taking place, but the strategic interests of the state will not suffer.

[Govorushko] Does the name of the erstwhile all-union headman trouble the oblast?

[Matochkin] Of course. We don't know how to get rid of it yet, or how to call this now Russian city. Besides, we have many more important problems: energy resources, food, transportation, in short, at present there is no time for renamings and removing communist monuments. On the

other hand, we are seriously considering reconstructing the historical image of the oblast center and other cities and towns.

For this we are planning to build plants based on Italian technology in the near future to manufacture high-quality bricks and durable roof tile.

[Govorushko] I can't help asking about the "secrets and mysteries" of Kaliningrad Oblast: flooded German plants, attempts to locate the Amber Room...

[Matochkin] No one has either confirmed or refuted the legends about flooded aircraft plants in the Mamonovo area, because so far it has been impossible to discover where the flooded area connects with the bay. The mistake was that no serious investigation of the territory in connection with secrets of the Reich was ever undertaken and things were left to drift. Now interest in all this has subsided. Interest in the Amber Room is periodically rekindled, in particular in 1991, when a major operation was undertaken with the participation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Not long ago the Germans, together with the Japanese, proposed undertaking a search with the help of state-of-the-art equipment, but so far we have not yet defined the legal basis of such a search or the fate of future finds.

Stavropol Trade Union Aktiv Views Regional Economy

944F0422B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian
2 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by correspondent Boris Prokhorov: "Our Situation Is Desperate. But the Way Out Is Through Unity, Not Confrontation. That Is What the Stavropol Kray Trade Union Aktiv Decided After Discussing the Economic Situation in the Region"]

[Text] Yevgeniy Kuznetsov, head of the Stavropol Kray administration, met with executives of the kray trade union council and trade union activists. He told them about the state of the economy. It is, alas, catastrophic. Mainly because of the reformist center's radicalism.

The time has come to conclude a tripartite agreement between the executive power, the employers, and the trade unions. The main link—the employers—proved to be the least reliable. They are no longer subordinate to anyone, while the authorities, as the governor conceded, no longer have any levers of control over their territory.

What does such excessive independence lead us to take the example of Neftekumsk Rayon. Before it produced 7.2 million tonnes of oil, now it extracts barely 1.2-1.5 million. It is high time for municipal ownership to take over the oilfields. But no, their managers, with support from the center, resist: This is ours, don't dare to intervene, these aren't "the old days."

Now the rayon is on the verge of a strike. The entire responsibility for the social protection of its inhabitants has shifted to the executive power, while the main culprits—the no-good industrial managers—remain on the sidelines.

Nor do the trade unions have their former influence over the employers, especially in the new, post-reform structures. The managerial corps is running loose, setting unthinkable salaries for themselves and their associates, while defrauding and hurting the workers. The people's lack of legal rights is crowned by arbitrariness.

Perhaps saddest of all is that now there is no political force in the kray capable of influencing the public frame of mind. Numerous dwarf parties are up to their ears in political squabbles. The executive power's only hope is the trade unions as a more or less organized force.

Moreover, it should be recognized openly that these are all not just Stavropol's problems. Rather, they are an exact reflection of the situation in the country: Working people no longer demand higher wages and lower prices, all they demand is that the government pay off its own debts for work long since done and produce shipped.

What we see both here and in the villages is: Last harvest's grain and sugar beet have still not shipped and everything is rotting on kolkhoz threshing-floors. Wool, too. It turns out that it is more profitable for the state to import wool from Australia and sugar from Canada than to produce its own. The country's only sheep and goat breeding scientific-research institute has closed down. Elite herds and flocks have been slaughtered.

The situation is much the same in all of Russia's granaries. For example, in Orenburg Oblast they also reduced agricultural production to a minimum; all that is left is for their own needs. But the Orenburg people at least have a powerful industry, which the Stavropol country doesn't have. The kray is fully dependent on the center.

Because of this the governor asked the trade union officials to assume public control over food production and the use of various social protection funds.

Nevertheless, in response to their questions Yevgeniy Semyonovich displayed optimism.

"I don't agree that everything is going totally wrong. A new society is forming. There is a glimmer of hope that the economy will be renovated. Housing construction is proceeding at the same rate. Construction of a local oil refinery is in the works, and a rare-earth metals mine is planned. The administration is doing everything to prevent total failure."

As for calls for the government to resign and the formation of a "government of popular trust," in Kuznetsov's view, "It is foolish, a new spiral of politicking. Doubtlessly, there are forces in the country who would like to fish in the muddied waters of unbridled radicalism."

"We had before us the example of China, which has achieved the expansion of its economy without overreaching, but we didn't make use of it. Figuratively speaking, now it's not the Chinese but we who have made the 'great leap' into the market. And it looks like we've landed in a deep puddle."

The administration is now sustained only by pride, understanding that it must lead the kray out of the dead end. "There's no one else to do it," Kuznetsov says. A bitter but honest admission.

Trade union official asked the administration chief many questions. For example: How were low-income people to pay heating bills? What is being done to restore collapsed health care in the villages? Will losses suffered from a hailstorm in Novoselitskiy Rayon be covered?

The governor asked for the trade unions' help. For example, it was necessary to place the targeted distribution of subsidies to low-income people under public control, establish control over property insurance for kolkhozes and private farmers so as to prevent them from being helpless in the face of natural disasters, and so forth.

It occurred to me that many of those questions would have been resolved long ago if only V. Krasulya, deputy chief of the kray administration, who oversees them, would view the trade unions as his allies, and not as opponents of his ultraradical "democratic" views. But everyone knows that he refuses to visit the kray trade union council!

The trade union activists were, understandably, concerned when the unceremonious administrative interference in internal trade union affairs would finally end. Why do departments subordinate to V. Krasulya devote such great efforts to breaking up the kray's trade unions rather than strengthening them? They resort to administrative instructions, hatching of intrigues...

"Brush off whoever encroaches on your affairs," the governor said. "Of course, one can't expect peace and accord between trade unions and the executive power. They are bound to worry one another. But only in the interests of the working people, not to their detriment. Every rayon administration chief who promotes confrontation between the authorities and the largest public organization will be held responsible to me personally."

On the whole, the meeting was surprisingly useful and constructive. The trade union aktiv saw a leader deeply concerned with the kray's fate. It is really hard for him today. Isn't that also the concern of his partners? That means the executive power and the trade unions should become allies.

In hard times it is necessary to give the kray executive authorities worker support, that was the result of the entire meeting. It seems that in Stavropol both sides have mastered this simple truth. It would be good if it finally reached the center.

Novokuznetsk 1993 Socioeconomic Statistics Cited
944F0455A Novokuznetsk KUZNETSKIY RABOCHIY
in Russian 10 Feb 94 p 1

[Survey prepared by S. Pautova: "One Cannot Become Richer by Lowering Production." The survey is under the rubric "Economics in the Mirror of Statistics. How They Made It Through the Year."

[Text] People's standard of living, for the most part, is not determined primarily by how revenues are divided up, but by the amounts that go into the budget. And this depends directly on total amounts earned by industry.

The information presented here is based on data provided by the Municipal Directorate of Statistics.

Last year, 1993, the production output of industrial enterprises in our city totaled 1,400 billion rubles at then

current prices, the value of which was 8.3 times greater than the 1992 output. But in terms of comparative prices, the total production output of industrial enterprises decreased by 5.8 percent (if the total for 1992 is compared to that of 1991, the difference would be 16.6 percent).

More than half (that is, 64 percent) of the Novokuznetsk enterprises lowered their outputs of industrial products. Among them were the Kuznetskiy Metallurgical Combine (KMK) Joint Stock Company (for 1993, this combine's output was 86 percent of 1992 production); the Novokuznetskaya Mine (89 percent); the Polosukhinskaya Joint Stock Company (71 percent); the Bungurskaya Joint Stock Company (88 percent); the Taldinskiy Open Pit Mine (80 percent); and the Viakom Joint Stock Company—the new name for the former meat combine (75 percent).

At the same time, the decrease in the number of persons employed in the city's industrial enterprises in 1993 was insignificant. The city's enterprises employed 111,565 people (or, 99.4 percent of those employed in 1992). Labor productivity, however, fell by 5.3 percent.

And now, some words about the dynamics of producing the main kinds of goods in Novokuznetsk enterprises. In 1993, for example, 9.5 percent less coal was extracted than in 1992. This sharp decrease in extraction can be explained by the inability of users to pay for the coal, caused mainly by the higher costs of transportation services. Certain enterprises were forced to halt coal mining completely. Thus in June 1993, the Zaryanovskaya Mine did not extract any coal, and the Baydayevskaya Mine brought out only 0.7 thousand tonnes (compared to the May output of 49.1 thousand tonnes).

The output of the most important products in the metallurgical industry increased, compared to 1992: From rolled metal (by 7.1 percent), to agglomerate (by 10.4 percent), to cast iron (by 3.6 percent), and steel (by 3.0 percent). For the most part, all this production was the result of work done by the Zapadno-Sibirskiy Metallurgical Combine Joint Stock Company. In addition to the afore-mentioned KMK Joint Stock Company, two other metallurgical enterprises decreased their production of basic metal materials: The production of aluminum was 98.3 percent of the 1992 level and ferroalloys were 97 percent.

Speaking of 1993 totals for industry, it must be noted that compared to 1992, the rates of decrease for volume of production have slowed down somewhat.

Still, the percent by which production has decreased remains large. This is due to the inability of consumers to pay for products made in the city, increased costs of transportation, lack of raw materials, and sharp increase in the costs of all forms of energy.

With regard to the food branch of the city's industry, products for which there is a specific and fairly stable demand have also been affected by the overall trend of a continuing decrease in output. The output for whole milk was 77 percent, compared to 1992; meat—67 percent; bread and bakery products—88 percent; and confectioner products—82 percent.

On the whole, production of consumer goods shrank by 14.8 percent in 1993.

Still, the data for 1993 alone do not provide any understanding about the "abyss" in which our economy finds itself. Let us, therefore, compare the dynamics of average daily production of basic goods for the past four years—from 1990 through 1993.

The most important output of the city's metallurgical complex consists of rolled metal, cast iron, and steel. The daily average output of cast iron fell from 28.131 thousand tonnes in 1990 to 19.025 in 1993 (18.32 in 1992). The average daily output of steel decreased from 32.61 thousand tonnes in 1990 to 21.72 in 1993 (which is somewhat higher than the 1992 figure). Sharp decreases also occurred in rolled metal: From a daily average output of 22.34 thousand tonnes in 1990 to 16.39 in 1993.

While the metallurgical branch showed a definite, though insignificant, increase in its daily average output in 1992, the coal industry showed a different trend. In 1992 the daily average output of coal decreased by 12.34 thousand tonnes and in 1993 it fell by nearly 5 thousand tonnes, to 44.65 thousand tonnes. Similar trends can be seen in the output of construction materials. Here are the figures for the average daily production of cement in 1990, 1992, and 1993: 3.616, 2.45, and 1.99 thousand tonnes, respectively. The drop in prefabricated reinforced concrete was even greater—from 1.316 thousand cubic meters per day in 1990 to 0.4 thousand in 1993. The output of aluminum and electrical energy decreased in the city, although the rate of decrease was not quite so significant.

The general trends did not bypass the production of foodstuffs either. The daily average output of whole milk in 1990 was 334.3 tonnes. In 1993 the figure was down to 106.05 tonnes. It is doubtful that this decrease of more than two thirds in the output of a valuable product that is needed daily is attributable solely to the increase in its cost.

This is also obvious in the dynamics of bread production and pastry products. There is also a decrease here, from 162.76 tonnes per day in 1990 to 143.34 in 1993. Because of this we see constant queues in bakeries.

Understandably, our city has contributed its share to the rising inflationary spiral. The decrease in the output of the basic types of products invariably reflects both on price increases and on the inflation level, as well as on the standard of living in general. We cannot become richer if we produce and sell less and less.

Problems of Norilsk Industrial Region Discussed

Past Successes Recalled

944E0589A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 16 Mar 94 p 2

[Unattributed article: "The North: A Milking Cow Has To Be Fed—Norilsk Loved People, Why Has It Fallen Out of Love?"]

[Text] Before you is a photocopy of an article published six years ago, on April 6, 1988, in the newspaper SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA. In it, our special correspondent Edgar Elyashchev told about the life and work of polar Norilsk, about what the city and its mining and

metallurgical combine are doing for people. We are not going to retell the lengthy account, which was rich in facts and figures.

We will only repeat the most important thing, something that was very aptly expressed in the article's headline, "Norilsk Loves People." In that city, in the extreme conditions of the Far North, everything possible was done to ease for working families the concerns and hardships that made their lives difficult and to protect and strengthen people's health.

Year after year, Norilsk increased capital investments in the social sphere.

"If this pace is maintained for another five to seven years, life here will be completely normal by that time," Boris Ivanovich Kolesnikov, general director of the Norilsk Zavenyagin Mining and Metallurgical Combine, told the journalist.

That period of time has now passed. But instead of a "completely normal" life, there is crisis, poverty, and alarm. As is the case throughout the North, the situation in Norilsk is utterly desperate. Workers at the plants and mines are on the brink of holding mass protests. They sent a representative delegation to Moscow in hopes of seeing high-level officials with the help of the Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions.

The group of trade-union officials and leaders of the council of labor collectives visited the editorial offices of *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*. The guests gave us a package of documents addressed to the authorities, and here is what they told us.

Industrial Managers Comment

944E0589B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 16 Mar 94 p 2

[Interview with Norilsk Industrial Managers: "A Giant on Its Knees Can No Longer Shoulder Burden"]

[Text] Anatoliy Artemenko, deputy chairman of the Federation of Taymyr Trade Unions Executive Committee:

The combine's industrial production fell by 25 percent last year alone. In order to bring the workforce into conformity with production volumes, we have to lay off approximately 37,000 people. To this we must add 30,000 retirees who are condemned to live in the Norilsk industrial zone because they don't have enough money to move back to the "mainland." As a result of the Gaydar reform, the money they had saved for retirement or for a rainy day became worthless overnight. After all, the cost of living in the North is much higher than in the country's central regions.

They have all become hostages to the North.

Anatoliy Gluskin, member of the combine's council of labor collectives:

The Norilsk Nickel Concern, of which our combine is a part, the Krasnoyarsk Nonferrous Metals Plant, and two enterprises on the Kola Peninsula were once known as the flagship of the ferrous metals industry. There is no other combine in Russia like it. We accounted for up to 90 percent of all nickel and cobalt, 30 percent of all copper,

and 50 percent of world extraction of platinum and platinoids. But now the question of the Norilsk Combine's very survival has arisen.

The combine was always extremely profitable. Our profit margin was triple that of the gold-mining industry. We export 100,000 tonnes of nickel. But the problem is that 40 percent of our exports are intercepted by Moscow. Precious metals are also a total state monopoly. That's hundreds of millions of dollars more. At the same time, we experience constant delays in getting paid. And the banks are imposing more and more penalties for late payments.

People came to Norilsk to earn money. A man, a heart patient, comes up to me and says that the doctor has ordered him to return to the "mainland" immediately. Otherwise he won't survive. He had 23,000 rubles in his savings account. Three years ago, he could have bought himself an apartment and a car. Today that money isn't even enough to buy a ticket to Moscow.

We are like voluntary prisoners.

Boris Degtyarev, chairman of the Norilsk Design Institute's trade union:

We been making the rounds of government offices in Moscow for a week now. We tell officials that the North is a big place, with 11 million people. There are dozens and hundreds of enterprises there. But there are only a handful like the Norilsk Combine. We tell them that in order for the law on the North to be effective, there has to be a system of priorities as to who should be helped first.

If necessary, production has to be cut back. Some of the people who lose their jobs have to have a guaranteed opportunity to move to inhabited areas. What are the region's other unique characteristics? The Ukrainian diaspora alone accounts for 15 percent of the total population. These people became unwanted overnight. How can a person return today to Ukraine or Kazakhstan, for example? Every republic has its own laws. An intergovernmental agreement is needed here. These people worked for Russia too, and so Russia must play a part in providing their pensions. That's one thing.

Second, there has to be strict implementation of the government decrees that have been adopted. The government recently issued a decree that seems pretty good at first glance—"On Appropriating Interest-Free Subsidies for Housing Construction." But again, government officials, without consulting Northerners but sitting in their offices in Moscow with no knowledge of our unique situation, wrote that you can obtain the subsidies only by quitting your job in the North and moving to the place where you intend to live. That's laughable. Who is going to give you a loan in a region that is itself eking out a semi-impooverished existence?

Gennadiy Bondarenko, chairman of the Metallurgists Trade Union:

When the collective sent us to Moscow, people hoped that we would be able to air our problems at the state level. We were able to see Shakhrai only on the sixth day. He heard us out attentively and then turned us over to his aides. They, in turn, sent us to the State Duma, and there we were told to see the regional deputies faction. And that's all we've been able to do so far.

Aleksandr Danilov, chairman of the Oktyabr Mine council of labor collectives:

Today's difficulties are the result of old mistakes. The basic cause is that the social infrastructure is too big. Some 263,000 workers and office employees live in the Norilsk industrial region. Of them, 126,000 are employed by the Norilsk Combine. Of those 126,000 employees, 45,000 are our basic work force—the miners and metallurgists. So it turns out that 137,000 are people whose salaries are paid from the budget. They even outnumber the combine's employees.

The combine cannot support such a large number of people, if only because production volumes are certain to drop. Fifty percent of everything that is shipped into the territory is paid for with hard currency and proceeds from the sale of metal produced by the combine.

Most of our output is sold by the state. We are permitted to sell our products only within the country. We were among the first 10 of the second 100 enterprises that acquired licenses to sell their own output.

In conclusion, it can be said that there is no effective state program to develop the Norilsk industrial zone.

Residents Polled on Living Standard944E0589C Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 16 Mar 94 p 2

[Table: "Our Life In Norilsk"]

[Text]

Our Life In Norilsk			
	1983	1990	1993
We live from paycheck to paycheck and often have to borrow money for the most essential things; saving any money is out of the question	6.0	11.0	
We have enough money for everyday expenses, but buying clothes is a problem; to do that we have to make a special effort to put money back or take out a loan	17.2	23.7	35
We basically have enough money, and we can even save something; but we don't have enough savings to buy expensive durable goods (refrigerators, televisions, etc.) and have to buy on credit or take out a loan	31.2	30.7	30.9
Buying durable goods is not a problem for us; but if we wanted to buy something expensive (a car or apartment) we couldn't do it	26.2	24.0	8.6
At the present time we really don't have to go without anything	12.3	4.6	2.5
No response	7.3	5.9	-

(From sociological study findings.)

Regional Conference Documents Cited944E0589D Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 16 Mar 94 p 2

[Unattributed article: "God Is High Above, and Moscow Far Away"]

[Text] The following are excerpts from a resolution of an extraordinary regional conference of Norilsk industrial region workers.

- 1. To adopt a petition from the participants in the regional conference of workers and residents of the Norilsk industrial zone on Far North socioeconomic problems to the Russian Federation president, government and Federal Assembly.
- 2. To confirm the working group for work with government structures. To authorize the working group to represent and protect the rights and interests of the working people and residents of the Norilsk industrial region in the Russian Federation government.
- 3. In accordance with Article 37 of the Russian Federation Constitution, in order to organize (if necessary) mass protests by work collectives, public organizations, and the population of the Norilsk industrial region, to set up a regional coordinating committee.
- 4. To direct the regional coordinating committee to draw up and confirm a plan and timetable for collective actions by the labor collectives and population of the Norilsk industrial region. To instruct the coordinating committee to coordinate its actions with the working group.
- 5. To grant the regional committee the authority to organize and coordinate collective actions taken in accordance with the confirmed plan.

- 6. To instruct the working group to be guided in its work with the government by the draft government decree prepared at the direction of the public organizations and labor collectives.
- 7. In accordance with Article 33 of the Russian Federation Constitution, to send the collective petition to the president, the government, and the Federal Assembly.

'Official Information' on Norilsk944E0589E Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 16 Mar 94 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Official Information: The Norilsk Industrial Region and What It Means to Russia"]

[Text]

Climate and Environment.

The Norilsk industrial region is situated on the territory of the Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug.

The average annual temperature is -9.8 degrees; in January and February the temperature can dip to -54 to -57 degrees.

Air oxygen content is 20 percent less than in the country's middle latitudes.

The region is an environmental distress zone, as emissions of sulfurous gas alone into the atmosphere amounted to almost 2 million tonnes in 1993. On some days, the concentration of gas in residential areas exceeds the maximum allowable level by 30 to 50 times. As a result, 50 to 70 percent of the employees of subdivisions of the Norilsk Combine suffer from various chronic illnesses.

Transportation and Costs.

Goods are delivered primarily by water (via the Northern Sea Route and the Yenisei during the navigation season),

as well as by motor vehicle. Several-day delays in aircraft flights owing to adverse weather conditions result in the Norilsk industrial region's complete isolation.

A two- to three-fold increase in charges by the Murmansk Shipping Line in 1994 made delivery charges comparable to or even greater than the value of the cargo itself.

The cost of an airplane ticket to Moscow has risen from 15 to 45 percent of the average Norilsk resident's pay. When a family of four goes on vacation, there is not enough vacation to buy tickets for everyone.

As a result of the unchecked increases in transportation costs, food prices are rising rapidly. Up to 60 percent of all Norilsk residents are forced to spend almost the entire family income on food.

Geography and Politics.

The region is administratively subordinate to Krasnoyarsk Kray, but it is not economically linked with Krasnoyarsk. This artificial administrative association represents a historical anachronism dating from the breakup of the GULAG system in 1953.

The kray allocated 15 percent of all local taxes to Norilsk in 1992 and 28 percent in 1993. As a result, the Norilsk Combine is forced to maintain the local infrastructure and housing at its own expense.

It would be useful to make the Norilsk industrial region subordinate to federal authorities or to transfer it to the Taymyr Autonomous Okrug, with taxes to be left at the okrug's disposal.

Industry.

The industrial region's main enterprise is the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine, which includes mining, enrichment, and metallurgical production facilities. In addition to the main production facilities, there are also enterprises producing construction materials and structural elements, a high-capacity construction association, an autonomous power system, research and design organizations, and trade, public catering, and food-industry enterprises. The combine includes the Dudinka sea and river port, which handles up to 6 million tonnes of cargo annually, a well-developed network of warehouses and storage facilities, a railroad, and motor vehicle transport and passenger services.

The combine's housing and municipal-services balance sheet contains more than 5 million square meters of housing, more than 100 preschool facilities, 53 schools, hospitals, and other social-structure facilities in the cities of Norilsk, Talny, Kayerkan, Oganer, and Dudinka.

The combine employs a total of almost 137,000 people, more than 127,000 of them in the Norilsk industrial region. The region's total population is about 260,000.

The combine produces the bulk of Russia's nonferrous metals, including 80 to 90 percent of its nickel, 30 percent of its copper, 80 percent of its cobalt, and almost 100 percent of its platinum and platinoids (almost 50 percent of world production). In 1993 it exported for state needs alone 40,000 tonnes of nickel, 50,000 tonnes of copper, with budget revenues exceeding \$156 million.

A drop in or halt to production at the Norilsk Combine would have catastrophic consequences for the economy of the Norilsk industrial region and Russia as a whole.

Sakhalin 1993 Economic Figures Cited

944F0466A Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk SVOBODNYY

SAKHALIN in Russian No 6, 12 Feb 94, No 7, 19 Feb 94

[Article, under the rubric "Statistics," in two installments by Nikolay Kivchun, director of the RF State Statistics Committee Sakhalin Educational Center: "What Is Happening in the Field of Industry"]

[12 Feb p 4]

[Text] As analysis of statistical data shows, the situation in Sakhalin Oblast may be characterized as extremely serious. In order to show this clearly, I will cite data for 1993 from the oblast statistical administration.

Thus, according to the data, on 1 January 1994 there were 8,792 economic subjects registered on the territory of Sakhalin Oblast.

There were 565 commercial organizations, including state enterprises; 128 municipal organizations; 1,689 individual organizations (family and private); 269 open-type joint stock companies; 3,119 closed-type joint stock companies and limited partnerships; 1,033 peasant and private farms; and 299 production cooperatives.

Among noncommercial organizations, there were 526 state institutions and 93 public associations.

It is obvious from the figures cited that the oblast's economy has fundamentally changed; it has become a market economy. Whereas before the reforms, there used to be three forms of ownership—state, kolkhoz-cooperative, and personal, now different organizational forms and enterprises have appeared, and in choosing any one of them, they become free and independent. That is exactly what is required for a market.

In 1993 Sakhalin's industrial enterprises in current prices produced 521 billion rubles [R] worth of output (and jobs and services); that includes R70.4 billion worth in December, which is 6.8 times the same indicators for 1992.

The volume of production (in constant prices) declined by 13.8 percent as compared with last year and by 22.2 percent in December.

In the processing industry, this indicator declined by 18.1 percent, while in the chemical, petrochemical, and light industries, the figure reached 13-43 percent. In electrical power engineering and the petroleum production and coal sectors, the decline in production volumes was 11-17 percent, while for extraction industry as a whole the figure was 6 percent.

Thus, an increase in production can be shown only in monetary terms. The real volume of production declined and the decline has not stopped.

The process of destatization of enterprises continued in industry throughout 1993. As of 1 October 1993, more than half of the industrial enterprises producing more than 60 percent of the output were found in the private and mixed forms of ownership.

Nonstate forms of ownership were most common in sectors such as the building materials, light, and food industries.

Losses of work time increased; that is above all related to the lengthy shutdowns of enterprises and production facilities. The greatest losses of work time were typical for enterprises of the timber, wood-processing and pulp and paper, light, and food industries—96.5 percent of the overall losses. More than half of the enterprise shutdowns in December were related to difficulties in the marketing of output as well as the unavailability of material resources.

Of the 125 types of industrial output, the production volumes for 70 of them declined by 15 percent or more. A significant decline occurred in the food and fish (67 percent), light (10), and timber, wood-processing, and paper and pulp (8.6 percent) industries.

A higher volume of production during 1993 was observed for 26 types of output. They included cement, wallpaper, certain types of furniture, frozen and salted fish, and frozen fillets.

In the fuel and energy sectors, in December 1993 an increase in extraction (production) was noted for the basic types of energy resources; this is typical for the fall-winter period. Thus, in January-December, 2.607 billion kilowatt hours of electricity were produced (96.1 percent of last year's level); 3.667 million gigacalories of thermal power (98.2 percent); 1.6186 billion cubic meters of natural gas; 1.5609 million tonnes of oil, including gas concentrate; and 4.23 million tonnes of coal.

In 1993 as a whole as compared to the previous year, the production of oil, including gas concentrate, declined by 6.9 percent (by 9.1 percent in 1992); of gas—by 6.4 percent (as opposed to 8.4 percent in 1992); and of coal—by 6.2 percent (as compared to a 3.5 percent increase in 1992). Converted to standard units, the extraction and production of all types of energy resources declined by 5.9 percent (by 3.7 percent in 1992).

[19 Feb p 4]

[Text] Logging sector enterprises reduced the production of commercial timber by 569.2 million cubic meters in 1993; that led to a 29-60 percent decline in production of railroad crossties and timbers and a 92 percent decline in production of factory-built wooden buildings.

In the last months of last year, the production of commodity cellulose declined sharply—in all only 14,900 tonnes were produced, and that is 71.2 percent less than in 1992. A bad situation took shape in production of cardboard also; produced in December were 260 tonnes, or 11.4 percent of the level of that month in 1992.

In 1993 light industry enterprises produced 12,300 knitted items (92.3 percent) and 216,000 pairs of leather shoes (85.7 percent).

As compared with the previous year, production of shoes declined by 14.3 percent; of knitted items—by 7.7 percent; and of garments such as raincoats and rainjackets, jackets, suits, shirts, and other things—by 26-65 percent.

One of the main reasons for the decline in the volume of production in this sector is the shortage of inhouse working

capital resulting from difficulties in marketing output and the failure of customers to pay; their indebtedness as of 1 December 1993 totaled R810 million.

Food industry enterprises produced the following: 6,825 tonnes of meat, including byproducts; 28,143 tonnes of whole milk products; 4,595 tonnes of sausage products; and 63,768 tonnes of bread and bakery goods. The decline in production of the products listed above was 16-43 percent. Moreover, changes occurred in the structure of the food industry in favor of higher priced types: thus, production of smoked items increased by 5 percent, while production of thoroughly smoked sausage items increased by a factor of 1.8.

The fish catch declined by 12 percent as compared to last year's level, and that in turn entailed reduced production of fish products both overall and for certain variety groups. In particular specially dressed fish declined by 55.2 percent and culinary items declined by more than half.

In only three rayons, Kholmskiy, Kurilskiy, and Smirnykhovskiy, was the volume of industrial production above the 1992 level. The oblast's other rayons reduced production of output, and in eight rayons the drop was as much as 30-60 percent.

Labor Payment and the Number of Workers in Industry

The number of people working in industry totaled 88,375 and declined by 8.1 percent as compared to the same period last year.

The average wages in November 1993 rose by a factor of 11.9 as compared with the corresponding period last year.

The wages of power engineering workers were 56 percent higher than the average in industry; of coal miners—44 percent higher; and of dairy industry workers—50 percent higher.

The number of people working in enterprises with the state form of ownership as of 1 October 1993 was 36,150, or 40 percent of people working, and their average wages in September were R161,232.

There were 200 people (0.2 percent) working at enterprises with the municipal form of ownership with average wages of R45,388.

There are 46,943 people, or 54 percent of all people working in the oblast's industry, laboring in open-type joint stock companies with a mixed form of ownership where the average wages in September were R165,076.

The number of people working during the first 9 months in closed-type joint stock companies with the private form of ownership was 2,632 (3 percent), while the average wages in September were R160,139.

An extremely serious, one might say disastrous, situation took shape in the oblast's economy in January 1994. The decline in production totaled 34.2 percent, while wholesale prices rose by 30.5 percent as compared with December 1993 and 10-fold as compared with January 1993.

There were 22 enterprises of the timber, wood-processing, pulp and paper, and food industries standing idle in Sakhalin in January; as a result 18,200 worker-days of work time were lost.

Just what are the reasons for this situation?

In my opinion, the main reason is that the proportions in the economy have been disrupted. While changing to the market, we have arrived at anarchy and completely discontinued planning and forecasting economic development. Even though it is well known that in countries where market relations have existed for decades, the state does not stop regulating them.

A second, quite important reason for the situation which has taken shape is that there is no stable, scientifically substantiated legislation. Thousands of edicts and decrees which contradict one another and do not comply with the Constitution are issued.

The next trouble is the present tax system. If it is not refined, the producer will have no incentive to produce output and, consequently, there will be no market.

At this time, most of the goods coming to the oblast are imported. We export raw materials and create jobs for Japanese, South Koreans, and Americans and expect finished output from them. But just what are we ourselves supposed to do?

And, finally, one of the extremely important reasons for the bad situation in the sphere of economics is the psychology of our people, who for 70 years were taught not to believe in private property, initiative, and entrepreneurship. And now we find ourselves in the position of people who have been cast into the sea without bothering to find out if we know how to swim or not.

Of course, time is needed for people to learn how to live and work in market conditions. And during this transitional period all the problems which are arising must be regulated at the state level; otherwise the country will be completely dependent on foreign capital and lose any kind of independence.

Luzhkov Calls for RF To Grant Sevastopol Special Status

944F0443A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Mar 94 p 1

[Interview with Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, by N. Batalova: "We Cannot Leave the People of Sevastopol Alone"; place and date not given]

[Text] We are perhaps only just beginning to comprehend the extent of the tragedy. The tragedy of people who, at the whim of politicians, have ended up separated from their motherland, outside of their own country. It has singed Russians and our hometown Muscovites.

Recall how proud we were to see points on the map of the Union named in honor of the capital. State farms named "Moskovskiy" and "Krasnopresnenskiy" were organized on the virgin lands of Kazakhstan: it was from Moscow railway stations that trainloads of young people departed to develop the virgin lands. We were proud that boys at the Moskva frontier post were guarding the country's borders.

But could the soldiers of the Moskva frontier detachment ever have expected that the border would cross the hot Tajik-Afghan mountains? Could the virgin-land developers have imagined, even momentarily, that Moscow and their native Presnya would now be in another country?

And now, at the center of political, not ocean, storms is the antisubmarine missile cruiser Moskva, a ship of the Black Sea Fleet. Each morning the command is given on board the cruiser, as it is on all the ships based in Sevastopol: "Hoist the flag!" And the flag of Russia unfurls over the fleet's ships. The sailors remain true to their oath of allegiance. To them the Black Sea Fleet is a Russian fleet, just as Sevastopol, city of Russian glory and great historical military traditions of the Russian state, is a Russian national shrine.

Perhaps that is why one of the signs in Sevastopol greeting the Moscow delegation headed by Mayor Yu. Luzhkov bore the words: "Sevastopol—Moscow—Russia!" The delegation visited the city during Fatherland Defenders' Day. We asked Yuriy Mikhaylovich Luzhkov to comment on that visit.

"First, the purpose of our visit. Our primary purpose was to meet with fellow Muscovites, sailors serving on the cruiser Moskva. That day we wanted to meet the crew of a ship which for many years has been under the patronage of the capital's enterprises and organizations whose names include the name Moscow. Muscovites fully realize how difficult it is to serve in the Black Sea Fleet, how difficult it is today for sailors and their families waiting for them on shore, how difficult it is for the people of Sevastopol. Our Il-76 plane delivered 30 tons of food gifts: sugar, canned meat, products of a Moscow cracker and dried lunch plant, cigarettes, toiletries. Personnel of the Moskva and Moskovskiy department stores prepared gifts for the sailors, officers and children. Our delegation included performers, and it was good to see how Moscow artists were received on the cruiser and at the Culture House.

"In Sevastopol we keenly felt how much such meetings mean to people. We spoke with sailors and many inhabitants of the city: they spoke frankly of the situation developing in Sevastopol and around it. Indeed, how is that, in a city where the majority of the population are Russians for whom Russian is their native language, all business is conducted in the Ukrainian language and the people cannot view Russian TV programs? Currently there are only two Russian-language newspapers in Sevastopol, and radio broadcasts are also only in Ukrainian. Kindergartens, schools and other educational establishments are being Ukrainized. The Ukrainian authorities are doing all this contrary to the interests and desires of the bulk of the city population.

"People may say that today Ukraine is an independent country with its own state language. But the thing is that Sevastopol is a very special city. In conversations with people we felt that they cannot conceive of themselves outside of Russia. They consider themselves a part of Russia. That is why people here respond so keenly and painfully to any injustice or ill-considered action of the administration.

"Some may not like my words, some may protest, but I must say: our delegation gained the impression that the

Ukrainian authorities were not too eager for us to meet with the people of Sevastopol, so the plane's landing was switched several times from one airfield to another.

"Yet we were traveling to Sevastopol with the best intentions. We consider that Russians and Muscovites cannot leave the people of Sevastopol alone. They must help them resolve vitally important social problems. That is why we attended a ceremony to lay the foundation of a 100-apartment house, construction of which will be paid for with money provided by a Moscow construction complex. Sailors will receive housing already this year."

"Will apartments in it be offered only to officers from the cruiser Moskva?"

"Those from our protege cruiser first, of course. But the housing problem is so acute for the Black Sea Fleet that apartments will also probably be offered to others in need.

"But I must say that resolution of the housing problem in Sevastopol is aggravated by the fact that politics is intervening in such a seemingly essentially public matter. Imagine an officer who needs an apartment, but he is a Russian officer and serves in the Russian navy; he is a Russian citizen, but to get an apartment he must become a Ukrainian citizen, because that country doesn't recognize dual citizenship. You can imagine what it means for a man of honor and duty to get a passport of another country.

"I think it is necessary to formulate a special statute for Sevastopol. Without that it is impossible to resolve its problems and create suitable conditions for the sailors' military service. The Russian government must finally say its word. After all, the Black Sea Fleet protects the frontiers of Russia. It is a guarantor of peace in the Black Sea region. As for me, firstly, I will report our delegation's impressions of this visit to the president. Secondly, we have already appealed to the administration heads of 22 Russian regions whose representatives serve on ships and in units of the Black Sea Fleet, asking to help the sailors and people of Sevastopol in today's hard times: they should constantly feel that Russia is concerned for them and will not abandon them. That they are Russians."

Moscow's Western Administrative District Prefect on Housing Crisis

944F0444A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 4 Mar 94 p 3

[Interview with Aleksey Bryachikhin, prefect of Moscow's Western Administrative District, by Nikolay Andreyev, under "Our Life" rubric: "Fair and Square—Is That 50-50? How To Develop a Formula To Make It Possible To Move Muscovites Out of 'Khrushchev Slums'"]

[Text] Another major problem has hit Moscow: many of the "Khrushchev slums" have long exceeded their designated lifetime and living in them is getting not only uncomfortable, but simply dangerous. They should be torn down, but that is easier said than done: where to get the trillions of rubles needed to tear down old houses and build new ones to move people into? The capital's lean treasury has no money for such a major undertaking, and no help from the federal government is forthcoming. Is there no way out? "There is," says A. Bryachikhin, prefect of the Western Administrative District.

[Andreyev] What are your plans on this score, Aleksey Mikheyevich?

[Bryachikhin] Why just plans? We try not to talk, but to do at least something for real. We have already begun to move people out of "Khrushchev slums." Their first occupants will celebrate housewarmings in the first half of this year.

[Andreyev] Where will they celebrate their housewarmings when, as I know, the district receives very little free municipal housing, while the waiting list is huge?

[Bryachikhin] We are already building new apartment houses to resettle people from old houses on a commercial basis in the Matveyevskoye, Mosfilmovskiy, Solntsevo, and several other municipal districts. Twenty thousand square meters of housing were built last year, and 200,000 are nearing completion this year. I anticipate your next question: "Where do you get the money?" We have only one solution: attract investors. Here is one example of business cooperation. Construction of new housing in a neighborhood in the Fili-Davydkovo municipal district, where seventeen 22-story buildings will go up, will be financed by the Russian company KONTI, the design was produced by Mosproyekt-1 workshop No. 14, and the main subcontractor is the Sokoliniye Gory Construction House joint-stock company. We are carrying out reconstruction jobs in batches, block by block.

[Andreyev] On what terms did you contract the investors?

[Bryachikhin] Fair and square: fifty-fifty. The authorities contribute land, the investors all the rest: financing, design, construction, and ownership. For that the contract assigns them half the property—apartments in the new houses, with the other half going to us to resettle people from the "Khrushchev slums."

[Andreyev] Isn't the cost pretty steep?

[Bryachikhin] What can one do if there is no other way out? Waiting for the old houses to start collapsing, and, God forbid, with human casualties, is simply criminal.

[Andreyev] What do you plan to do with the old buildings: tear them down or reconstruct or reinforce them?

[Bryachikhin] We will only tear them down, because many of the buildings of that series simply cannot be reconstructed. As for those houses where it might be possible, the cost would be higher than new construction. And one more question: who would undertake the reconstruction, and how? Builders would not come, because new construction is continuous, with high productivity, so they earn fairly well. It would hardly be possible to earn as much in reconstruction.

[Andreyev] So you will just tear down the houses and dump the rubble?

[Bryachikhin] Not at all. We already have the experience of the former Sevastopol rayon, where they had begun to tear down old buildings. The bathroom fixtures were removed, the panels were crushed into gravel, which can be used to build good roads or cottages on garden plots. We will do likewise.

[Andreyev] I heard of your prefecture's conflict with the municipal housing department regarding a new house on Michurinskiy Prospekt avenue. Can you explain this?

[Bryachikhin] Indeed, our prefecture has filed a suit against the municipal housing department with the arbitration court. Here is the issue: Jointly with the Sovtels firm we built an apartment house in the 38th block of the avenue on the following conditions: 45 percent of the apartments go to the company, 25 percent to the subcontractor, and 35 percent to us and the district police. We worked together, built the house, and then what? The municipal housing department, which had virtually nothing to do with the house, took it over and began distributing housing as it saw fit. Many want a share...

[Andreyev] But that is daytime robbery...

[Bryachikhin] There is nothing I can say. I appealed to Yuriy Mikhaylovich Luzhkov, he instructed the department to return the housing. They returned the company's share, but the prefecture has still received nothing. Many investors got concerned, and one can understand them: is it worth risking, investing huge sums, which then may go to the wind? Because of the municipal housing department we could not only lose investors, but a vital important undertaking may grind to a halt.

[Andreyev] Aleksey Mikhayevich, not long ago our paper published an item that the mayor had dispatched some kind of special commission to your prefecture to check abuses by heads of municipal districts and services of the district. Is the commission already "digging"?

[Bryachikhin] It is quite different. There is indeed a commission from the mayor's office in the district, but it is here on a regular basis. The government decided to have district heads report on the resolution of strategic and current issues of servicing the population. They began with us. As for the arrest of three district executives, which did take place, only the court can decide what violations they committed. The investigation is continuing.

News From St Petersburg

'Democratic Unity' on Political Cooperation

944F0467A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 3 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Vadim Tyagniryadno: "How To Make St. Petersburg a Safe City"]

[Text] Leaders of the preelection bloc Democratic Unity of St. Petersburg rejected the idea of coming to an agreement in the first round of voting with other blocs concerning the consolidation of votes and the coordinated withdrawal of candidacies in favor of aspirants having the greatest chance of getting elected. Aleksandr Belyayev, leader of the bloc, reported this at a news conference yesterday.

However, according to his words, such a position does not mean that the DUP [Democratic Unity of St. Petersburg] will not cooperate with other blocs in the second round of the elections. The bloc is conducting negotiations on the possible mutual support of candidates who won the sympathy of the voters in the first round.

But yesterday the DUP finally published its preelection program. Its main thesis—St. Petersburg should become a safe city, which includes the guarantee of the personal safety of citizens, a fight against crime and corruption, a

fight against ecological crimes, and the prevention of social conflicts. The social and economic policy of the municipal authorities should be subordinated to these tasks.

As for the fate of the head of the executive authority of the city, Aleksandr Belyayev did not agree with certain preelection associations that are proposing holding mayoral elections before the end of this year. In his opinion, conditions have not yet ripened for early elections.

Peasant Party Campaign Statement

944F0467B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 4

[Article by Yuriy Chernichenko, chairman of the Peasant Party of Russia: "Our Choice"]

[Text] To the chairmen of oblast, kray, and rayon organizations of the KPR [Peasant Party of Russia], and to members and friends of the Peasant Party of Russia.

The Peasant Party of Russia is faced with a major test. The first elections of the organs of local authority on a multi-party basis are drawing near.

Local elections are our elections. Find and nominate candidates for each seat in the oblast дума and in rayon-village organs of authority. Farmers, do not shun your nomination: Leaving authority to the communists will turn into your leaving your own land. Mobilize resources for the election campaign—your own, peasant, and the offerings of sympathizers. Agitation for a candidate should be simple, easy to understand, and take place everywhere. Our leaflet should be in the rural store, and our conversation—at the well, in the farmyard, and in the workshop. Do not go on the defense; the best defense is offense. Your candidates are worthy, respectable, and reliable people; your agitation is just; the farmer movement is liberation. Be able to explain to a kolkhoz woman on pension her benefits from owning a share of land, try to gain the support of all honorable workers, and do not be afraid to talk about the obvious vices of the Agrolulag—the universal theft, drunkenness, laziness, deceit, and corruption. The people know everything, be the yeast in the dough.

The party of free peasants will be opposed by the team of communists and agrarian bosses of the refurbished kolkhozes. There are a lot of industrious and knowledgeable people among them, but this does not change the fundamentals. We are for free labor on our own land, and they are for the preservation of the Agrolulag.

Rural life is such that the support of one head of administration is dearer than all the president's edicts. A village elder headman elected from the farmer movement can create the conditions of life and labor for hundreds of people. But a loss in the elections can echo with the ruin of strong farms. As it is, bankruptcy among farmers is extremely high. In 1993, 87,100 individual farms were established, which is less than in 1992 by a factor of 1.5, while in 1993, 19,200 farms broke up, which is more than in 1992 by a factor of 3.8.

Local elections are a test of our political will and maturity. Do not spare any efforts—victory will come!

[Signed] Yuriy Chernichenko, chairman of the Peasant Party of Russia, KPR executive committee.

Preparations for Elections Noted

944F0467C St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 3 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Vadim Stasov: "The Oblast Just Before the Elections"]

[Text] The preparation for elections in Leningrad Oblast is proceeding smoothly, in contrast to the preelection campaign in St. Petersburg. As was reported by Aleksandr Karpov, deputy governor of the oblast, the electoral commissions did not remove any of the aspirants and nominated candidates from the preelection race. All of them have been registered and are continuing the preelection campaign.

Despite the fact that the legislative assembly of the oblast will have very limited powers, a lot of people were found who want to become deputies. Today, 106 candidates are aspiring to 25 deputy seats, and in a district of the Volosovskiy Rayon, eight aspirants are campaigning simultaneously for one seat.

Preparation for the elections to the municipality are also moving ahead at full speed. The candidates are also displaying activeness here: There are 1,031 aspirants for 430 seats in the preelection campaign. The sharpest rivalry of the candidates developed in Slantsy, where 40 persons are vying for seven seats. In addition, the voters in Shlisselburg will also have to elect a new city mayor, who will replace his predecessor, who was removed several months ago for various violations. In addition to the ballots with the names of the candidates, on the day of the forthcoming elections the residents of the oblast will receive sheets for voting in the referendum on the by-laws of Leningrad Oblast.

But the elections of representatives of a new type in the localities of the oblast—elders—have already started, and 671 elders have been elected to date.

City Death, Birth Rates

944F0467D St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by Irina Baglikova: "Alarming Statistics"]

[Text] Heretofore unheard-of figures were cited yesterday at a meeting in Smolny: 32,400 children were born in St. Petersburg in 1993, while in the same period 85,600 persons died. For the first time in the history of the city, the mortality rate exceeded the birth rate by a factor of more than 2.5. The family crisis situation is leading to the fact that the birth rate is dropping catastrophically not only in St. Petersburg, but in the whole country—89.9 percent of the families consist of two to four persons; moreover, a big part consists of two persons. There has been a significant increase in recent years in the number of single mothers older than 40 years of age and younger than 18.

The attention of the rayon family and children departments was turned at the conference to the socially unprotected families—giving them material (and humanitarian) assistance and offering moral support. The obligations of the

rayons also include making resources available for subsidizing school lunches. After approving the city budget, compensation will be paid, as before, for newborn children....

How effective such assistance is can be evaluated according to the very same statistical data—only 98,000 children out of the 997,700 children of St. Petersburg are being reared in large families. It is probable that the birth rate is unlikely to increase this year either.

News From St Petersburg**Citizens Comment on Elections**

944F0460A St. Petersburg SANKT PETERSBURGSKIYE
VEDOMOSTI in Russian 15 Mar 94 p 4

[Article by Ye. Dolgopyatova: "I Will Ask My Neighbor Who To Vote For"]

[Text] One week before the elections to the City Assembly, do the voters know at least something about the candidates and the coalitions they represent? Do Petersburg residents intend to vote at all? To get an answer to these questions I positioned myself, tape recorder in hand, during rush hour, when people are on their way home from work, in front of the building at 17 Bolshaya Monetnaya Street, which houses two Petrogradskiy Rayon district electoral commissions—No. 40 and No. 41. Here are some typical answers.

Kapitolina Alekseyevna Kholopova, pensioner:

"I will vote. I am not yet familiar with the candidates, so I plan to stop at the electoral commission right now. You see, the candidate for whom we had collected signatures in our microrayon later removed himself from the race. I recently attended a meeting with another candidate, but I have forgotten his name. I will ask my neighbor."

A young woman who refused to give her name:

"I am not going anywhere. I am up to my ears in work and family; I have no time for elections."

Next passerby—two young men:

"No, we are not going anywhere; actually, we have no idea where to go and who to vote for. No one has enlightened us."

Valentina Petrovna, pensioner:

"I do not know the candidates. In my opinion, the preparations for the elections have been handled very poorly this time. I think that a serious mistake has been made on the part of the election organizers. City residents have practically no information. We now do not even see candidates for deputy on television, where one could at least somehow form an opinion and learn about the candidates' programs."

A young man, first-time voter:

"We had the leaflets of some candidate plastered on the wall in our apartment building entrance, but I do not really know even his name. Since elections are being held, I have to vote, although I do not see any difference in principle whether a City Assembly gets elected or not. After all, we live without one now..."

Yelena Shevchenko answers, holding two toddlers by the hand:

"I am not going to vote because I do not trust or believe any candidate."

An elderly woman: txt1 "I have not heard anything on the radio—who we are supposed to vote for; we are waiting for information."

[Dolgopyatova] Do you not know that this time there will be no such detailed information on each candidate either on the radio or on television? Perhaps it would be better to stop by the district electoral commission and ask about the candidates' programs?

[Woman] And where is our electoral commission?

[Dolgopyatova] Right here, where we are standing now—at 17 Bolshaya Monetnaya.

[Woman] I did not know. And how many candidates do we have?

There are 15 candidates registered at Electoral District No. 40, and 16 in district No. 41. So Petrogradskiy Rayon residents will have to make a rather difficult choice—provided it takes place at all.

Igor Yuryevich Zabrodin, chairman of the No. 40 commission, also has doubts that the elections will be successful:

"Even if the voters turn out for the first round of elections, I have great doubts that they will show up for the second. Spring is on the way; everybody tries to get to their private plots on weekends," says Zabrodin. "Actually, we should take it in stride. In all countries only 40-50 percent of the population take an active civic stance. The others simply are not interested. It is another matter, however, that no other country has such "uncultured" elections. I mean the inability and lack of desire on the part of electoral blocs to unite. Many programs differ little from each other and practically proclaim truisms, which everybody knows by heart. But if you all advocate the same thing, why not field three or five candidates in the district instead of 15? I believe that in Petrogradskiy Rayon, instead of each three candidates, one could by agreement represent several coalitions."

...Well, all we have to do is wait and see what the voters will say and what they will do; in any event, theirs is the last word.

Election Registration Complaints

944F0460B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 15 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Vadim Peshkov: "Will the Election Date Be Moved?"]

[Text] St. Petersburg City Court continues the hearings directly related to the City Assembly elections set for 20 March.

Yesterday hearings were held on the complaints of independent candidates for deputies, who had been refused registration by the district electoral commission on the grounds of invalidation of some of the signatures collected.

Dina Shulgina, chairman of a consumer rights protection society in Kalininskiy Rayon, collected the number of signatures required for registration—more than 2,000, but a small number of the signatures were collected outside the boundaries of the electoral district where she was going to run. The reason was that one of Petersburg newspapers printed some incorrect information on the addresses of buildings included in her district. The number of "outside" votes was not great, but the district commission refused to register D. Shulgina, and the city commission upheld the decision. The city court, in turn, dismissed D. Shulgina's complaint about the elections commissions' actions. Despite the fact that the elections are to be held in just a few days, the rejected candidate for deputy intends to continue her court battle for validation of her candidacy. D. Shulgina's appeal will be sent by mail to the Supreme Court of Russia. It is obvious that it will not be considered in time for the elections.

A similar complaint was filed by Vladimir Radushnov, president of Tais-Sport—a St. Petersburg joint-stock company. As the Dzerzhinskiy Rayon district commission established, some of those who signed for Vladimir Radushnov also signed for his competitor in the same district. All these "duplicate" signatures were invalidated. As a result, Vladimir Radushnov came up several hundred votes short of qualifying as a candidate. Nobody questioned the citizens as to whom in fact they support. As experience shows, questionable issues in matters of signature collection are not interpreted in favor of the candidates.

It is interesting that court hearings are taking place just a few days before the elections. The mayor's decision, which excluded some citizens from participating in the elections, was recently challenged by Federation Council Deputy Aleksandr Belyayev, who won the case. His complaint was found valid, and A. Sobchak's decision illegal. As we learned, A. Sobchak has appealed the city court ruling at the Supreme Court. Until the complaint is heard in Moscow, the city court decision is not in force. But the elections are to take place on 20 March. And some citizens will be deprived of an opportunity for full participation in them. On these grounds a group of unregistered deputies, as well as the Russian Peasant Party's branch, sent a letter to Russian Electoral Commission Chairman N. Ryabov asking him to interfere in the actions of the St. Petersburg city electoral commission and to postpone the elections. At this point, Moscow has not made its reaction known...

Today the city court will hear the Peasant Party's complaint on the city electoral commission's actions. There are five days left until the elections.

Yeltsin Representative on Local Elections

944F0460C St. Petersburg SMENA in Russian 15 Mar 94
p 1

[Report by Svetlana Gavrilova: "Sergey Tsipliyayev: The Choice Will Be Almost Random"]

[Text] The City Assembly will be adopting the City Charter and regional laws that will be mandatory. Therefore, the City Assembly will have a very important role in our life, Sergey Tsipliyayev emphasized in yesterday's conversation with journalists in St. Petersburg.

The president's representative is concerned about the outcome of the election campaign mainly because it was not properly covered in the mass media. There is no question, remarked Tsiplyayev, that if each of the more than 700 candidates were given 20 minutes of air time, we could only pity our voters. Television debates between blocs and coalitions, however, would have helped voters make a choice.

As it stands, said Sergey Tsiplyayev, name recognition is about the only factor that can affect the choice; if there is no recognized name on the candidate list, the choice will be almost random. This was exacerbated, on top of everything else, by shortcomings in the preliminary screening mechanism, which allowed 10-15 candidates per one seat to remain on the ballot.

Political capital is not earned overnight on the eve of elections; in order to avoid the current difficulties next time, a city political elite should form. A considerable role in this may belong to the mass media, noted Tsiplyayev.

Militia Prepares for Elections

944F0460D St. Petersburg SANKT PETERSBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 16 Mar 94 p 1

[Report by city administration of internal affairs press service: "Militia Shifts to Emergency Status"]

[Text] In connection with the preparations for elections to the St. Petersburg City Assembly and the Leningrad Oblast Assembly, GUV D [city administration of internal affairs] chief A.G. Kramarov made a decision to shift the city and oblast internal affairs organs to an emergency status beginning 15 March.

In keeping with the GUV D chief's directive, the work of operations and investigations groups in all rayons will be reinforced; round-the-clock duty shifts will be organized for the top officials of city rayon organs; additional militia personnel will be posted at voting sites; measures have been taken to ensure proper protection of ballots at the time of their delivery and vote counting, as well as observance of fire safety procedures at election precincts.

Violations of Press Law in City Protested

944F0460E St. Petersburg SMENA in Russian 7 Mar 94 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Lvov under the rubric "The Press": "Foundation for Protection of Glasnost Protests Violations of Media Rights in Petersburg"]

[Text] Aleksey Simonov, chairman of the board of the Foundation for the Protection of Glasnost, sent a protest to Deputy Mayor Valeriy Malyshev regarding the violation of radio broadcasting companies' rights in Petersburg contained in the "Directives" sent by Malyshev to heads of rayon administrations and in the proposed contract between the STRC [State Television and Radio Company] Petersburg—Channel 5 and rayon administrations.

A broadcaster called "Administration" is not envisaged in any law, and granting this subject—mythical from the standpoint of the "Law on the Mass Media"—the right to enter a contract with a STRC is not only illegal but simply unnatural. There are rayon desks registered as mass media entities (dependent or independent of rayon administrations), and only they may be the subject of contracts involving broadcasting, says the protest.

In addition, Simonov draws Malyshev's attention to the fact the STRC Petersburg—Channel 5 itself does not have a license to conduct broadcasting over the wire, and therefore its claim to exclusivity in wire broadcasting is extremely questionable.

And finally, the unit that has been set up in the STRC for the purpose of monitoring the content of radio programs broadcast by rayons is an act of local censorship, which in principle is contrary to the current law.

As to election materials and their broadcasting through rayon "desks," the executive branch does not have the prerogative to sanction or ban this, even less so the "mother" television and radio company.

"The fund is ready to support a court action by any of the rayon desks, whose legitimate rights are infringed on either by the 'Directives' or the 'Contract,' of which we hereby inform you simultaneously with this letter," Aleksey Simonov continued.

Eyewitness on Vladivostok Mayor Ouster

944F0463A Vladivostok UTRO ROSSII in Russian 18 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by D. Brodyanskiy, authorized electoral representative of Russian Republican Party Maritime Kray organization and authorized representative of candidates to kray дума V.I. Cherepkov and T.G. Romanenko, under the "An Eyewitness Account" rubric: "Lebedinets and Tolstoshein Took the Mayoralty by Storm"]

[Text] A roundtable at the UTRO ROSSII editorial offices was interrupted by an agitated female voice: The mayoralty is under attack. But.... the mayoralty was not stormed for another.... 15-20 minutes. They began at 1814: An OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] detachment poured out from a couple of dozen cars and, having easily pushed aside the women at the entrance, stomped to the 10th floor. The door to the mayor's office was broken down (this is the way they probably "seize" apartments?). Women were dragged out of the building by the arm. I personally saw V.A. Gilgenberg, for the third day the acting mayor (the mayor himself is ill) being thrown out of the building; in the process the metal door was thrown open by Gilgenberg's head squeezed under the arm of a powerfully built OMON soldier. The whole operation was directed personally by Lebedinets, who had announced the dismissal of the mayor on the grounds of criminal proceedings initiated against him and the appointment of a new mayor—Tolstoshein, and his deputy Terekhov. Attorney Ulitskiy was not permitted to visit Cherepkov.

At 0100 the pickets and journalists who gathered at the mayoralty became witnesses and participants in the concluding part of the operation: An OMON group, pushing their way through the crowd, carried out V.I. Cherepkov; his face was a strange green color and lifeless. The mayor was placed into an ambulance surrounded by militiamen, which then took him and his wife home. The small apartment quickly filled with people (it had not occurred to our mayor to get for himself a larger apartment while he was in power). The ambulance physician apologized—she was only carrying out orders. She recalled what a good doctor Gartman used to be. Now this participant in the operation approved the "transfer" of the patient that night. Which means that Gartman used to

be a doctor; who he is now is not for us to judge. Among those watching the proceedings from the mayoralty's steps was a militia officer and some imposing figure in a "macho" black coat. I asked him to introduce himself but got no answer. I was told this actually was Tolstoshein.

At the same time, in a classic Bolshevik manner, they went after rayons where new heads of administration were installed. Head of Pervorechenskiy Rayon A.V. Kuchinskiy had his official car—some "land-cruiser" that before then had served Tolstoshein—confiscated while he was riding in it. The coup was now complete.

People we called in the State Duma assured us that this was all illegal. That opening a door with a man's head is illegal is obvious even without the Duma. That a sick man is "treated" by OMON is inhuman. That on the eve of elections all this is done to candidates is a mockery of the recently adopted Constitution. All together it is a slap in the face of the city, all of us. People may have different feelings about the mayor and his supporters, but when the law is trampled so brazenly, openly, it means that no one is safe—tomorrow they can use the head of any of us as a battering ram. Kray Procurator V.V. Vasilenko postponed a telephone conversation regarding candidates' rights until tomorrow, and denied his part in the operation—it is the investigator, he said. Someone among the "bearers" told Gilgenberg that the "kray court had concurred" on the action.

The militia—dozens of cars and about 100 participants—have demonstrated its might and drive. Would it not be nice if they used all this might against racketeers, apartment burglars, and pickpockets—Vladivostok would be safer than Lillehammer.

Office windows lit up one after another at the mayoralty's floors; S.P. Goryacheva probably will now have more material for new denunciations of the trashed mayoralty. There was no concern for observing due process—it is not necessary to comply with its norms during a coup. What to do, everybody will now decide for himself. But we do have to turn out for elections. And vote in such a way that would deprive the party of the nomenklatura coup from getting the votes—at least in our city.

Reaction to Vladivostok Events

944F0463B Vladivostok UTRO ROSSII in Russian
18 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by T. Smirnova: "The Law in Camouflage Fatigues"]

[Text] A naive people, until recently we consoled ourselves: This is it; we have exhausted, through our grandmothers and grandfathers, mothers and fathers, a full measure of wars and revolutions, night searches and cattle boxcars. We played hide-and-seek with ourselves: A generation without wars, we will certainly sail into a quiet old age, will tend to our grandchildren and contemplate eternity. Alas, one cannot sidle into history!

The mayoralty was seized the second time. After correcting the minor flaps that had occurred during the first try. So you did not like the timing? You say: Why was the raid organized on a weekend; the people were not warned; and why did you stomp the floor, brandishing submachine guns? Our apologies—we all learn from our mistakes. Would Wednesday, in

the middle of the week, be better for you? At 1800, after work? We can dispense with the submachine guns, too—are there any volunteers to go against the trained OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments] guys and their truncheons? Regarding the warning—that you also had! As early as on Monday, authorized comrades had been trying to break through into the mayoralty with the order to replace the authorities. And by Wednesday the kray leadership paid a visit to the "Gray House," with the mission of dethroning Mayor V.I. Cherepkov and his first deputy, the city administrator V.A. Gilgenberg. The action was carried out by kray governor's deputies I.P. Lebedinets and A.V. Gartman, as well as kray administration department chiefs A.I. Yegorov, V.F. Terekhov, and K.B. Tolstoshein. A decree by acting head of kray administration I.P. Lebedinets was read out, relieving from his duties V.I. Cherepkov and appointing K.B. Tolstoshein as acting head of the city administration. In short, the protocol was observed—according to eyewitnesses inside the building.

As to eyewitnesses outside of it, they did not get to see much. OMON soldiers were behind the glass door, blocking it. The clank of that same door, letting out—in batches—mayoralty personnel. There were smiles on the faces of some ladies: Finally, real masters have arrived! Reinforcements arrived—an additional OMON group in camouflage fatigues.

"I managed to slip into the building several minutes before the raid: I had been warned on the impending action," says P.M. Dovganyuk, a former kray soviet deputy, and a candidate for the kray дума deputy. I was in V.I. Cherepkov's waiting room. Heard stomping feet and noise downstairs. Someone in the waiting room ran to close the door. I interfered—it did not make sense to close the door, it would be smashed into pieces anyway. They agreed with me. At that very moment OMON charged in. The storm troopers were being directed by a man in civilian clothes. He introduced himself as Ivanov.... City administrator Vladimir Gilgenberg behaved with great dignity...."

The closing scene of the city administrator's "dignified" appearance before the crowd milling in front of the building soon materialized. The door opened with a clank and Gilgenberg was thrown out, landing at the crowd's feet.

"As of today, in keeping with the directive, I was the acting mayor, because Viktor Ivanovich is sick," Vladimir Gilgenberg began his street interview to the surrounding journalists. "As usual, we were busy with work on that day. Adopted an additional decision on procedures for use of public transportation—free for city residents. Were putting the final touches on financing with respect to sanitation cleanup of the city. There were numerous financial documents, directives, important papers on my desk. And suddenly—the raid; my office is broken into, door kicked off hinges, and a rude "hassle" begins.... They dragged me out of the building head down.... Among the things left in my office were documents, my passport, personal effects, 400,000 rubles issued to me for the election campaign as a candidate for kray дума deputy, plus an advance I had received...."

Dusk was enveloping the city. Temperatures dropped to freezing. Many of those gathered at the mayoralty steps were stomping their feet, made short jogs to keep themselves warm—the cold was getting to people through spring-season short coats and jackets. Many were hatless but were afraid to leave. Against the background of the darkened building, the tenth floor was brightly lit. In his office, Mayor V.I. Cherepkov was bedridden, hooked to an IV. His wife was keeping watch at his bedside. The full "illumination" in Gilgenberg's office was easy to explain: A search was still under way there. The eyes of the people on the street were glued to this strip of light at the top. Cars with special license plates were lurking here and there around the building. An ambulance with the "03" telephone number on the hood. Minivans with tinted windows—"Black Nellies," picket members suspected.

In those moments, many felt themselves lost, helpless, and... unneeded. What do you do—shout in the middle of the night, in the center of the city getting ready to turn in for the night? Demand somebody or something? Deputy mayors, heads of rayon administrations were here; together with everyone else, shivering in the wind, these people stood outside their office building—now unemployed. They had been dismissed from jobs without any explanations, practically across the board—new bureaucrats, or to be precise, bureaucrats who had formerly held these jobs—already had been appointed. The circle had closed; the system had regenerated itself, rejecting a "foreign body...." Someone in the crowd kept repeating in amazement: "But why Tolstoshein? He had nearly the lowest rating during the mayoral elections—the people rejected him.... How can he, without blinking an eye, take the place of a person still there!" But nobody listened to these questions anymore—they were academic.

"What do you intend to do now?" the indefatigable ones kept pressing Gilgenberg. "How will events develop, anyway?"

"I remain a deputy to the kray дума. I will be meeting with my constituents. If necessary, right on the street. Let people see what can be done to the law here...."

Cherepkov was carried out from the building at past 0100.

"OMON soldiers were carrying the mayor feet first," said T.G. Romanenko, a candidate for kray дума deputy who kept vigil in the building until almost 0300. "There were so many people in camouflage uniforms that you could not see Cherepkov himself—only an occasional glimpse of sock-clad feet...."

This is how the incident in the mayoralty was carried out. Promptly and successfully. In the morning, numerous documents were read on the radio, explaining that since the mayor was suspected of committing a grave criminal offense (bribes), he had been temporarily—until the investigation was completed—removed from duty. The "temporary" nature of the act of deposing the mayor elected by the people was emphasized in the official comments many times. Each step in the seizure of the mayoralty was dressed in argumentation. Everything apparently exudes legitimacy and only legitimacy.

Nevertheless, it was all too thin. "Temporarily" put on the sidelines? Then why an equally rash destruction of the entire administrative structure created under Cherepkov? Such a

hasty dismissal of personnel? Have they also been identified wholesale as criminals, or at least suspects? Cherepkov had not been able for months to get rid of obvious saboteurs—his deputies and rayon heads—because of all sorts of procedural red tape. Here, however, several minutes were enough—exactly as long as it takes to read out the personnel "sentence."

And also, there is this disturbing bravura march, the coronation speech on the occasion of the new mayor assuming his duties. It was as if a magic tablecloth had been spread before the stunned city residents—transportation, dacha, merchandise, social and charitable goodies.... Which horn of abundance did it all come from? In what warehouses had it all been hidden from the city residents, exhausted by adversity? What billions and millions are behind it? If only this could all be true. Except that somehow one feels sad at this promised feast....

Procuracy Official on Vladivostok Events

944F0463C Vladivostok UTRO ROSSII in Russian
18 Mar 94 p 1

[Report by M. Petrova and N. Manzhurin: "And No Loose Ends"]

[Text] Our correspondent asked Senior Counselor of Justice V.N. Chichayev, a senior assistant to the Maritime Kray procurator, for comments on everything that took place in the mayoralty:

"On 15 March a decision was made to initiate criminal proceedings against City of Vladivostok Mayor V.I. Cherepkov. And since he is a candidate for a deputy to the kray дума, in keeping with the Temporary Statute on the Elections to the Maritime Kray Дума, he cannot be the subject of criminal proceedings or subjected to administrative punitive measures imposed by the court, without a concurrence of the kray procurator. A measure to secure the appearance of the accused and other criminal process measures may be applied to a candidate only by the ruling of the kray court; therefore, the kray procurator did grant his consent. There is also a kray court ruling."

This is the process basis. The requirements of the law formally have been observed in this case.

"But was it necessary to do it all so crudely, with the help of the OMON [Special Designation Militia Detachments]?"

"Having received the procuracy investigator's decision, the kray administration had all the grounds to carry it out. In what form to conduct this action is no longer the issue of a legal process, but a purely administrative one. If the law has been violated in the process of carrying out this decision, then the procuracy will look into it. Meanwhile, one side is standing there with posters, while the other guards the mayoralty; we do not have any problems with either. Problems will come up when unlawful actions are committed on one or the other side. So far we have not received such information.

"This is all I can say regarding the events around the mayoralty."

To the question whether it would be possible to review the kray procurator's decision—which, by the way, had been read over kray radio—Veniamin Chichayev replied that he does not have this document in his possession and does not even know its registration number.

Just as fruitless turned out the search for a copy of the decision by A.I. Vysotskiy, a deputy procurator and an investigator of the Frunzenskiy Rayon Procuracy. Like kray procurator V.V. Vasilenko, he also took sick and was not in the office. As to Aleksandr Ivanovich's colleagues, they said that they do not have any documents relevant to this case.

No documents in which we were interested were at the kray administration's press service. Neither were we able to meet with deputy head of the kray administration I.P. Lebedinets, who had signed the decree on I.V. Cherepkov's dismissal and directed the operation on the seizure of the "Gray House." We were told that he probably had gone on a trip to Ussuriysk.

An interesting kind of glasnost. For the chosen only.

We telephoned the kray court chairman, N.S. Vinogradova, and asked her to comment on the events that had taken place on the night from 16 to 17 March in Vladivostok.

"No comment; all questions should be directed to the kray procuracy," said Nina Sergeyevna. And confirmed at the same time that the court is aware of the happenings and has given its permission for such measures, based on some local-level documents....

Nina Sergeyevna refused to show the newspaper any official court document on the subject.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Partnership for Peace Criticized

944Q0250A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Mar 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Andranik Migranyan: "Why Join, if It Is Better Not To Join?: Joining NATO's 'Partnership for Peace' Program Will Intensify Russia's Isolation and Sharply Restrict Its Freedom of Maneuver in Foreign Policy"]

[Text] According to the statements of a number of officials and the position of the Russian leadership laid out in the presidential message to the Federal Assembly, Russia does not simply "support the 'Partnership for Peace' program as the path to common European partnership..." It will apparently officially join this program in the very near future. There is no unanimity of view among analysts on the question of whether or not Russia needs this program and what it can provide for it. A great deal has been discussed in official Ministry of Foreign Affairs circles and circles close to them about the possible advantages of membership in this program. I will discuss only those problems that, in my view, may have serious negative consequences on the strategic level as a result of Russia's joining this program.

First of all, it is no secret to anyone that the "Partnership for Peace" is an element of the strategy of the United States and the West with the aim of achieving a phased expansion of NATO.

The fact that they did not manage to expand NATO in the present stage by including a number of East European countries that yearn to get in, hoping to intensify their integration into the economic structure of the European Community through NATO membership, is viewed by certain of our analysts as a success of Russian diplomacy in the first round of the struggle against NATO expansion.

If we are to make a choice between the "Partnership for Peace" program and automatic NATO expansion, and movement of the entire military-political infrastructure of this organization to Russia's borders, then without a doubt the first alternative is preferable for Russia. Especially since this leaves the door formally open—with respect to both this program and NATO itself in the future—for all, including Russia. It is possible to view the situation differently, however. After all, the Cold War ended following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and collapse of the Soviet Union, and it would be entirely reasonable to expect that in the absence of ideological and military-political confrontation in Europe, and with the beginning of a partnership (certain documents and statements even make mention of an "allied") relationship between Russia and the United States, between Russia and the West, the necessity would disappear of preserving a military bloc created as a deterrence to international communism. In addition to this, it should be noted that in agreeing to the unification of Germany, repudiating the "Brezhnev Doctrine," and withdrawing from Eastern Europe, the USSR obtained assurances from the United States and its Western allies that they would not take advantage of this in filling up the vacuum created and alter the military-strategic balance in Europe to their benefit. I think former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev could discuss this more substantively and perhaps he will still do so.

It is entirely evident that there are no external reasons and no threat on the part of Russia either for preserving NATO or, even more so—in circumvention of agreements with the USSR, for expanding NATO directly or indirectly (through the program "Partnership for Peace") to Russia's borders. Most likely the United States and its allies are setting other objectives through NATO and the "Partnership for Peace" program, proceeding from their long-range interests. First of all, the Americans henceforth intend through NATO to maintain and consolidate their military-political leadership in Europe. Secondly, for a number of NATO member countries and for those East European countries that have become candidates for membership in this bloc, joining the "Partnership" program, the United States presence in NATO, and the alliance itself constitute a reliable way of keeping a unified Germany under effective control. Thirdly, the expansion of NATO—even initially through the "Partnership for Peace"—does in fact comprise real steps on the part of the NATO bloc to fill the "power vacuum" left by the USSR, with the aim of containing and disciplining what is now Russia.

A number of analysts believe that little depends upon Russia in the situation that has come about. Whether we like it or not, the process has already begun: More and

more signatures are appearing under the "Partnership" program. Therefore, it only remains for us to find our place in this process. There are those who believe that Russia should push others aside and stand first in line at NATO's doorstep. It is strange that such judgments are coming from quite serious people—far from naive—who claim to be strategists in matters of foreign policy.

But in the situation that has developed, where indeed very little depends on us, we are already unable to stand first in line at NATO's doorstep. This doorstep is surrounded by the Romanians, Estonians, Slovaks, and Czechs. Ukrainians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are also straining to enter. It will be amusing to see how Russia—still a superpower in the military sense—will look in such a crowd, where everyone is screaming about the threat from Russia and therefore desiring to lean on the powerful shoulder of NATO in a search for guarantees of territorial sovereignty and security. Whether or not these fears and hopes are real or invented is a separate question, but Russia is still capable all the same of securing its territorial integrity and its own security. It is hardly worth it for us to knock on NATO's door and join the "Partnership" for the sake of obtaining dubious support from NATO against the territorial claims of Estonia against Russia.

If Russia were to immediately enter NATO as a full-fledged member and this organization were to become a universal structure guaranteeing security in Europe, only a madman would fail to support such a development of events. But under conditions where NATO sets the terms, where the bloc itself determines the schedule for entry of "Partnership for Peace" program members, hardly anyone can harbor illusions as to how long the period of Russia's "candidacy" for NATO membership will be and under what conditions entry will be arranged.

Those analysts are entirely correct who say that in not joining the "Partnership for Peace" program, and subsequently NATO, we are dooming ourselves to strategic isolation. But it is also true that having agreed to participate in the "Partnership for Peace" program, with preservation of the NATO bloc which decides who, when, and how one may become a full-fledged member, we find ourselves in isolation here as well. Russia can hardly be the same kind of candidate as Estonia and Poland, for example, and Russia hardly has the same obligations and responsibilities for peace and security before the world community as do those countries that have today swarmed all around NATO's door. In the face of myriad problems in both the near and far abroad, Russia cannot be on a short leash held by NATO when its national interests may require one decision or another to be made in some part of the world which does not coincide with the view of the NATO bloc, the United States, or its colleagues in the "Partnership for Peace." Thus Russia's entry into the "Partnership for Peace" program could give the illusion of the breaching of possible isolation, but will become a far more serious factor, facilitating the weakening of its position and leading to real, not imaginary, isolation.

The attitude of the country's leadership with respect to the issue of Russia's entry into the "Partnership for Peace" program is ambiguous. At his January summit meeting with the U.S. President, Boris Yeltsin noted that Russia does not view the establishment of European security

through the "Partnership for Peace" program as a one and only opportunity, although it does not oppose it either. One would think the president's message to the Federal Assembly would contain great definitiveness on this key issue in the development of Russia's strategic course in the foreign policy sphere. However, internal foreign policy contradictions within the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs are unfortunately reflected in this document as well. On the one hand, the president's message mentions Russia's support for the "Partnership for Peace" program, although in the opinion of U.S. and NATO strategists the program should become a mechanism for gradually turning NATO into the single universal mechanism for guaranteeing security both inside and outside Europe. On the other hand, it is proposed to make the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) the main instrument of European construction in the military-political sphere. Added to this as one of the goals of Russia's foreign policy is the affording of cross guarantees to the countries of Central Europe on the part of Russia and its West European partners. Clearly, both ends do not meet here. Until quite recently Western strategists, advocating the automatic expansion of NATO by virtue of the East European countries, or at least achievement of the same objectives through the "Partnership for Peace" program, believed that adoption of the concept of cross guarantees for the countries of East Europe on the part of Russia and its West European partners would be a strategic victory for Russia. It must be said, however, that it is this very concept that supported the decisions according to which the USSR agreed to the unification of Germany and repudiated the "Brezhnev Doctrine." But while we have been talking about cross guarantees for the countries of Central Europe, the latter have already entered NATO's waiting room. The same is true of our aim to turn the NACC into the main instrument of support for peace and security in Europe. First of all, within the framework of the NACC too we are in fact joining as a single entity, without allies. Secondly, it is our former Warsaw Pact allies, now NACC members, that are longing to join NATO, and it does not depend on us as to how quickly and effectively the NACC can be turned into an instrument of European security.

Thus in joining the "Partnership for Peace" program, the Central European countries view themselves as candidates for NATO membership, and the question of cross guarantees loses its meaning for them to a significant degree. If Russia joins the "Partnership for Peace" program, we will in fact be giving the green light to turning NATO into the military-political instrument for construction of a new Europe.

In conclusion, I would like to sum up all the potential negative consequences for Russia should the "Partnership for Peace" program be implemented.

First. Historically, NATO emerged as a specific military-political bloc directed against the Soviet Union. The problem of its expansion lies in the danger that Russia will be strategically isolated. We must not ignore even the theoretical possibility of creation of a "cordon sanitaire" between Europe and Russia and the threat of excluding Russia from Europe.

Second. It would hardly be advisable to convert this regional organization, created to accomplish quite specific missions, to a universal instrument of security and conflict regulation throughout Eurasia.

Third. The proposed concept fails to stipulate any temporary framework for a transition period. A state such as Russia cannot be waiting in the entrance hall while extremely important decisions are made on matters key to its security.

Fourth. Whether the authors like it or not, this concept includes an objective attempt to block the process of military-political consolidation of the space of the former Soviet Union.

Fifth. Entry of the countries of Central Europe and former USSR republics into the "Partnership for Peace" program, with their subsequent passage into NATO, would push Russia out of the arms market with respect to these countries and thereby inflict a serious blow to our military-industrial complex.

Sixth. The inclusion of Russia within NATO (even in the long-range scenario) will in fact lead to conversion of our country into an outpost of this bloc organization along the border with the Islamic world and China. It is difficult to imagine American soldiers undertaking to defend this border the same way they once defended the border between the FRG and GDR. And so, Russia will find its hands tied, its room for maneuver restricted.

Skepticism that NATO can be an effective instrument for guaranteeing security and resolving conflicts is confirmed by the events in Bosnia. Clearly, Russia was hasty in agreeing to the change in NATO functions. Recent events have shown that in imprudently extending a mandate of broad authority to the UN secretary general so that he could entrust the conduct of peacemaking operations to the NATO Council, Russia, by the will of its gullible (the one defect Marx considered excusable) diplomats, denied itself the right of veto. So the NATO Council made decisions and presented ultimatums, without regard to the view and position of Russia. Without a full-fledged vote in the NATO Council, Russia will hardly be able to influence the decisions of this organization in the future on matters possibly far more important to it than Bosnia. It is a good thing that President Yeltsin exercised initiative at the last minute with respect to untangling the Bosnian crisis and rescued the Russian diplomats who had brought matters to the point where NATO was openly ignoring Russia's position and preparing to inflict strikes against the Serbs. Surely it would be advisable to perfect the mechanisms of the CSCE—specially created as a guarantor of peace and order throughout the European continent. But prior to that—the countries of East Europe should be given joint guarantees by Russia and the United States (or NATO).

Ivanov Views Russian Diplomacy in Mideast

944Q0252A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 10, 6-13 Mar 94 p 5A

[Article by Igor Ivanov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation: "What Russia Is Defending in the Near East"]

[Text] The present revitalization of Russia's diplomatic activity has been brought about primarily by the exacerbation of the situation in Bosnia and the Near East. But this does not mean that Russia was earlier a passive observer of the events occurring here. Our country was a participant in the Madrid Near East Peace Conference in 1991 and participated throughout the past two years, as cosponsor of this conference, in the negotiating process. Inasmuch as this process was quite smooth, diplomatic activity was not that noticeable to public opinion.

Russia's interests have traditionally been connected with the Near East. So our promotion of a peace settlement is far from fortuitous. The work initiated on the instructions of President Yeltsin is expressed both in contacts of the minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation with his colleagues from many states and in our active position in the UN Security Council. My trip to the region in the past week was made within the framework of these efforts. Its purpose was to meet directly with the leadership of the parties, to obtain information about the state of affairs first-hand, and to attempt to find compromise solutions that would make it possible to halt the violence and to resume the negotiating process. After all, as we all know, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon terminated the negotiations with Israel after the Hebron tragedy as a sign of solidarity with the PLO leadership.

A great deal of hard diplomatic work is now needed for finding a way out of the situation. There were meetings in the course of the trip with Yasir Arafat and the PLO Executive Committee in Tunis, with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and with Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres in Jerusalem.

A practical step toward a resumption of the negotiating process could be, in our view, an effective UN Security Council resolution condemning the terrorist act in Hebron and opening the way to the creation of the conditions for assurance of security for the Palestinian population. Second, it is necessary to decide the question of an international presence from the viewpoint of both its format and mandate in order to guarantee the realization of the accords that are achieved.

It seems to us that an international presence should be realized with the active role of the cosponsors of the Madrid Peace Conference, that is, Russia and the United States, which does not, of course, rule out the participation of other states. For it was Russia and the United States that assumed responsibility for the peace process, appending their signatures to the Declaration of Principles of Provisional Palestinian Self-Government adopted last fall in Washington. The practical aspects of the international presence, on the other hand, would be resolved by the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships: Without their consent there can be no question of the dispatch of observers at all.

I was asked frequently during my Near East trip: Are Russia and the United States not competing over what credit will be attributed to whom? But I replied: We are not at the Olympic Games, they are over, the medals have been handed out. Russian-American cosponsorship presupposes both the joint efforts of the two countries and the

independent diplomatic actions of each of them: This is what the United States is doing, this is what Russia is doing also.

The trip to the region helped in an explanation on the spot of our new initiative, which had originally been misinterpreted. We proposed, as we all know, stage two of the Near East Peace Conference. The reaction, on the part of the United States and Israel primarily, was cool: They were afraid that we wanted in this way to substitute for the negotiations that are already under way and, in fact, to cancel out all that has been achieved. But this is by no means part of our intentions. We are confident that the present Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are close to completion and that we need to be thinking today even about the future. Stage one has been negotiated, and certain experience—both negative and positive—has been accumulated. We now need to meet and think about how to further advance the peace process in all directions.

On 14 March Andrey Kozyrev will meet with Warren Christopher in Vladivostok, and a principal topic of the negotiations will be a Near East settlement. We will be discussing this topic with Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon also. We have traditionally had good relations with the Palestinian people and other Arab states. But we attach great significance to relations with Israel, proceeding from the fact that we could be an equal partner with all the parties, not an advocate for just one of them.

Attempts have been made in the Yugoslav conflict also, incidentally, to depict us as the defenders of the interests of just the Serbian side. But Russia has supported and continues to support equal contacts with the Serbs and with the Muslims and with the Croats. Shuttle diplomacy is in this respect helping us clear up the misunderstandings and find compromise solutions.

Yeltsin Envoy Posuvalyuk on Mideast Events

944Q0243A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 12 Mar 94 p 5

[Report on interview with Viktor Posuvalyuk, special representative of the president of Russia in the Near East and chief of the North Africa and Near East Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conducted by RIA correspondent Ivan Menshikov specially for SEGODNYA; in Tunis, date not given: "Moscow Is Active: And Gives Notice of Its Special Role in the Region"]

[Text] Russia's diplomatic assertiveness in the Near East reached its high point following the arrival yesterday in Tunis of Andrey Kozyrev, minister of foreign affairs of Russia, who was immediately received by Yasir Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee.

The details of the active shuttle diplomacy being conducted behind the scenes in Tunis are not being divulged as yet, but our correspondent managed to obtain a comprehensive interview, which sets forth Russia's general approaches to the situation in the region at this time, with Viktor Posuvalyuk, special representative of the president of Russia in the Near East and chief of the North Africa and Near East Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, who has already been here several days.

Responding to a question concerning the fundamental bases of the restoration of the peace process, the representative of the president of Russia emphasized that Russian policy proceeds from the need to preserve as the base of the negotiating process the "Gaza and Jericho first" agreement and the Declaration of Principles of Relations Between the PLO and Israel signed on 3 September 1993 in Washington. "All the direct participants in the peace negotiations, Russia included, are confronted by a single task—making it recoilless," Viktor Posuvalyuk continued. He observed here that after 13 September "many people succumbed to a certain euphoria, believing that the process had become irreversible," but after the tragic events of 25 February at the mosque in the city of Hebron, "it transpired that we had all been 'resting on our laurels' too soon."

"No compromise, as the phenomenon of a combination of two viewpoints, is ideal if seen merely from the standpoint of one party," V. Posuvalyuk observed. "But, by and large, the negotiations in Oslo and their 'crown'—the Declaration of Principles—are of 'an optimum diplomatic form.'" "Russian diplomacy not only knew of the secret meetings in Oslo but also actively assisted their successful completion. Despite the pressure being exerted from different sides, we always put the emphasis on the PLO and its present leadership as the sole credit-worthy partner of the government of Yitzhak Rabin, who came to power in Israel to slogans of peace."

Posuvalyuk rejected attempts to revise the said agreements inasmuch as it would play into the hands merely of extremist forces of all shades on both sides. "We must not farm out the development of events in the region to madmen, fanatics, and provocateurs," Viktor Posuvalyuk declared. While recognizing that fundamental questions of a settlement (the fate of the Israeli settlements on the West Bank of the River Jordan and in the Gaza Strip, the future form of the official status of the occupied territories, the affiliation of East Jerusalem, and so forth) remained outside of the framework of the said agreements, the Russian diplomat emphasized that, in his opinion, the boat could not be "overloaded" at the time they were being signed.

To conclude the interview Viktor Posuvalyuk observed that Russian diplomacy intended to continue to play an essential part both in the Near East and at other focal points of international tension and to step up its efforts in resolving conflict situations. "Russia occupies its ample niche in the Near East region, to which, by virtue of its distinctiveness, primarily historical and spiritual, no one else can lay claim," he emphasized.

Touching on the situation in connection with Iraq, the Russian diplomat observed that "Baghdad has already gone a considerable way toward compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 687." "This could at some stage, not too far off, what is more, put on a practical footing discussion of the question of the lifting of the international sanctions, the oil embargo in particular," he noted. Posuvalyuk emphasized in this connection that Russia "has a particular interest in this, considerable, what is more," alluding to Iraq's debt to Moscow. "This does

not, it is true, release Iraq from its obligation to unequivocally comply with all the other resolutions," he concluded, "particularly those connected with unambiguous recognition of the sovereignty and borders of Kuwait."

The representative of the president of Russia announced that during his stay in Tunis he had "useful talks with Ambassador al-Ubaydi, special representative of the Libyan leadership, during which the present situation in the 'Lockerbie case'" and also problems of bilateral Russian-Libyan relations with regard to Russia's serious economic interests in this country were discussed.

Churkin on Diplomatic Actions in Bosnia

944K0921A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 11, 16 Mar 94 p 14

[Interview with Vitaliy Churkin, deputy minister of foreign affairs of Russia, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA observer Denis Molchanov; place and date not given: "Was There a Breakthrough by Russian Diplomacy?"]

[Text]

[Molchanov] Vitaliy Ivanovich, whose idea was it to commit a Russian battalion to Bosnia?

[Churkin] I believe that this initiative was born somewhere between Yeltsin and Kozyrev on Saturday, 12 February. I was in Geneva and was about to leave for Moscow. I suddenly received a call from Sergey Lavrov (deputy minister of foreign affairs of Russia—D.M.), and, citing the president, he conveyed instructions that I fly to Belgrade to discuss the situation that had taken shape following the ultimatum with the Serbian president. I flew to Belgrade that same day and was speaking with Milosevic in the evening. Then came Skopje, Zagreb, and Sarajevo and meetings with Izetbegovic and Silajdzic. Following the news conference in Zagreb, I was approached by our ambassador in Croatia, who said that I had to fly to Belgrade—I would be told why on arrival.

In Belgrade I was connected with Kozyrev by HF from the embassy bunker, and he directed me for the first time: work this option through with the Serbs—at Russia's request they put their arms under UN control, and we commit our contingent to Sarajevo.

I said immediately that this was a brilliant idea. I took it to Milosevic, he summoned Karadzic, and the three of us talked together. The main task was to invest this initiative with the most precise form possible. The Serbs had to be convinced that our battalion would be in Sarajevo in timely fashion, and our aims had to be explained precisely to the world community.

I spoke by telephone with Grachev, Ryurikov, Lavrov, and Kolesnikov. With Pavel Sergeyevich (Grachev—D.M.) the conversation took just two minutes: He assured me immediately that tomorrow he would give the order for preparation for action.

But I still had to receive the text of Yeltsin's actual message to Milosevic. Incidentally, up to the decisive moment I had not told the latter that this would be a letter signed by Boris Nikolayevich. This was my final trump card. And when, on Thursday morning, I went to the president of Serbia

with a message signed by the president of Russia, Milosevic put a high value on this.

But this was not the end of the matter. It should be remembered that, granted all the authority of Milosevic and Karadzic, obtaining their "go-ahead" was only half the matter. The Bosnian Serbs are a law unto themselves, as they say, and would never do anything that was even to the least extent contrary to their interests (as was the case with the Vance-Owen plan, incidentally, when the Serbs said a firm "no"). So that even after the conversation with the president of Serbia, I was not wholly confident of success. This was why we went to Pale, where we met with the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, and only then did I understand that the mission could be considered accomplished.

[Molchanov] Yes, this truly was a breakthrough. But should things have reached the phase where this breakthrough was necessary?

[Churkin] It would have been better had they not, of course. We had been conducting the process so as to ensure that a crisis over Sarajevo not arise. Back at the end of January we had proposed a two-tier plan for a settlement of the conflict: convening a session of the UN Security Council at foreign minister level with an invitation to the representatives of the belligerents in order to seek a political solution. The second proposal amounted to a reinforcement of the conditions of the security zone—we had in mind Sarajevo primarily, of course. But these proposals were not accepted.

On 6 February, following the explosion in Sarajevo's market square, I called Milosevic and said: "Mr. President, the question of lifting the blockade of Sarajevo must be settled now. The parties will be meeting this week in Geneva, and this simply must not be 'one further successful round of negotiations,' the issue must be settled."

Milosevic agreed. We went to Geneva. Late in the evening I turned on the television in the hotel room and heard Clinton's statement and, immediately after this, the news conference given by Woerner (NATO secretary general—D.M.)—the ultimatum. It was immediately clear that continuing the negotiations was futile because the participants were looking more at the skies than at their partners.

Incidentally—the NATO people prefer to forget about this now—the decision on the transfer of heavy arms to UN control had been adopted by the Serbs and Muslims with the mediation of General Rose, commander of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, several hours before the announcement of the ultimatum. Thus NATO issued the ultimatum after the decision had already been made. And I, naturally, have the impression that the most important thing for NATO was not the lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo but striking a blow at the Serbs. Many people would like to change the political situation by means of such actions, but this would have very serious consequences.

[Molchanov] What is the explanation for the strange position of the UN secretary general, who farmed out the adoption of the decision on a bombing assault to the NATO command?

[Churkin] I would not want to criticize Butrus-Ghali but my personal opinion is that he was being subjected to colossal pressure on the part of a number of NATO countries, which very much wanted to bring matters to the point of an ultimatum.

Being subjected to pressure is the essence of the work of the secretary general, come to that. I would merely like the UN secretary general to cooperate more with the UN Security Council than the NATO Council.

We cannot agree with a situation where the right to interpret Security Council decisions is given over to another organization. And NATO, in interpreting these decisions, even attempted to dictate to the United Nations what should be done.

This is why those who maintain that Russia has seized the propaganda initiative and that everything would have been o.k. according to the NATO ultimatum in any case are wrong. No, our role was, in fact, pivotal. Take just the following fact: Despite the agreement between the Serbs and the Muslims, the intensive withdrawal of artillery only began following the commitment of the Russian soldiers. We asked the Serbs why. They replied: The public would not allow us! Women and children would gather and stand in the way of the equipment. But when we told them that a Russian battalion was coming, this was another matter....

To be honest, when I was working on this problem, the main thing that I tried to prevent was Russia's national humiliation. Not a further escalation in Bosnia—although I did not want this, of course, and my instructions here were clear—but humiliation of Russia. For if on this occasion also everything was handled without us, if we allowed ourselves to be brushed off this time also, the consequences, despite our present dispirited self-awareness, could have been more onerous for us than the Bosnians.

[Molchanov] Truly, for the first time in the entire post-Soviet period we permitted ourselves our own say in the world. What brought about this change?

[Churkin] There was a transition from quantity to quality. Earlier the line had been as follows: If we do not like something or other, we shall not say "no" immediately, but shall attempt to find a common language with our partners. But in time our reluctance to get into a confrontation came to be perceived by some people as spinelessness. And we said: Enough! All the "i's" need to be dotted. As Yeltsin did in conversation with Major: "We will not permit it without Russia!..."

[Molchanov] I was recently talking with Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee. He commented quite sharply on the American position in respect to Russia. "One quickly becomes accustomed to pleasant things," he said, "and America had very quickly become accustomed to us agreeing with Washington on just about everything." Today we have begun to speak with our own voice, and we have immediately been accused of neo-imperialism....

[Churkin] Well, first, I would say that these charges are not the official position of the United States, they are not Clinton and not Christopher. These statements belong more to the opposition. After all, the present president of

the United States has set serious store, the main store, perhaps, in his foreign policy by Russia. But there are symptoms of attempts being made to take us for simpletons (at some forum or another, say: What do you mean by opposing me, we are partners, accept my draft!). But we are increasingly seldom affording pretexts for people to talk to us in this way.

[Molchanov] That is, the transitional period is coming to an end?

[Churkin] Yes, unequivocally. We have drawn the line, I believe. And this line was drawn in Bosnia.

[Molchanov] We are restoring to ourselves great-power status, in other words?

[Churkin] Yes, we are moving along this path. Of course, this is impossible without a certain reinforcement—as in Sarajevo. Had we not had this battalion, what then? It is clear to everyone that there cannot be a great power without strong armed forces capable of accomplishing the mission entrusted to them at the modern level. And this work is under way. Our new military doctrine corresponds to these requirements in full.

[Molchanov] All this is well and good, but it seems to me that these goals are unattainable until the national self-awareness of the Russian people has been revived. But what is to happen when even such concepts as "patriotism" and "love for the motherland," have just about been given over to the opposition?

[Churkin] I believe that this was the democrats' biggest mistake when they began to use the word "patriot," albeit in quotation marks, in a disparaging sense. The word "patriot" is not enclosed in quotation marks, in the same way that the word "Motherland" is written with a capital letter. When people say "patriot," I consider that this is addressed to me, just as the democrats should have considered it addressed to them.

[Molchanov] The result is that the word "democrat" is now enclosed in quotation marks.

[Churkin] Yes, I believe that the losses on account of this have been very serious. We should have learned to equate the concepts "democracy" and "patriotism." Another, not mistake even, but tragedy, has been the fact that our democrats imagine the concept of "democracy" to be inseparable from the idea of the disintegration of the state. We are still dealing with the consequences of this delusion.

[Molchanov] Vitaliy Ivanovich, how, in your opinion, will events develop in the former Yugoslavia?

[Churkin] I have convinced myself repeatedly that to be an optimist in Yugoslav matters is to be a fool. One thing I can say: Our initiative prevented the intervention of the armed forces of NATO in the conflict, and this would have done no good. Aside from all else, in the event of our diplomatic failure, there would have been here, in Russia, a reassessment of our relations with the West, but no longer on the basis about which we have spoken—partnership with precise emphases—but closer to a position of strength.

As far as a forecast is concerned.... In any event, peace there is impossible without the consent of Russia,

America, and Europe. Perhaps we will succeed in arriving at some arrangements in the coming weeks. But the main thing, I believe, is that the worst is behind us.

Lukin Views Diplomacy, Parliament's Influence on Foreign Policy

944Q0245A Moscow OSHCHAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 10, 11-17 Mar 94 p 8

[Interview with Vladimir Lukin, chairman of RF State Duma's International Affairs Committee, by Irina Denisova, under "Credo" rubric: "A Period of Heightened Nervousness Lies Ahead. 'But It Isn't Mortal,' Assures RF State Duma's International Affairs Committee Chairman Vladimir Lukin"; time and place not given]

[Text] [Denisova] Vladimir Petrovich, you have been a journalist and an ambassador; you are a professor, doctor of historical science, and a well-known politician. What was most important for your professional career? And whom do you feel yourself to be?

[Lukin] It's hard to say. It all happened spontaneously. As they say, "Fate leads those who agree and drags those who disagree." In my case, it either led or dragged me, but I didn't resist.

As for whom I feel myself to be... Perhaps, first of all, "a citizen of the place where I live, but at the same time, a grain of sand of the Universe." One of my detractors said, aptly, "Vladimir Petrovich sees life as if he were looking out of the window of a speeding train." A desire to be inside life, "in a situation," and at the same time to look at it as it were from outside is, I think a good, useful quality.

[Denisova] In 1968, when you were working in Prague at the international magazine, PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, you spoke out against the introduction of soviet troops into Czechoslovakia, for which you were deported to the USSR. For more than 11 years you were under a travel ban.

[Lukin] There were several of us then who were "ceremoniously" dispatched to Moscow. In the same plane with us was Misha Polyakov, a nice guy, a specialist on America. There were also Kirill Khenkin and his wife Ira Kanevskaya—they are now working at Radio Liberty in Munich. There were others, as well.

[Denisova] The last two years you were the Russian ambassador in the United States. What were you able and not able to achieve during your ambassadorship?

[Lukin] An ambassador's is a bureaucratic job. Although I respect the ambassador's mission, I would say that in many ways it is a symbiosis of a postman and a waiter "with airs." A postman, because you get a communication from Moscow, with a list of whom to deliver it to, and what to say in the process. People in the host country are interested not in your personal opinion, which you are free to express unofficially: an ambassador is obligated to communicate the point of view of his country's official circles, the president or foreign minister. Well, and a waiter, because you continuously have to meet and treat high-ranking delegations.

[Denisova] And were you successful?

[Lukin] The first thing I managed was to master the ambassador's trade. I had specialized in international affairs and for a time worked on the central staff of the Foreign Ministry, but I had never been an ambassador. In Washington it took time for me to get to know the "thousand details" of the operation of a large embassy with a complex staff.

The second thing I managed was to create an image of an authentic representative of our country during the time I represented it. I was, after all, the first Russian ambassador since 1917. Besides, I represented it during a period of development of democratic structures in our country. I have at home a U.S. diplomat of the year award. The means the Americans felt my work was successful.

And third, I managed to establish good contacts with our compatriots. They saw me off literally with tears in their eyes. Yet until recently they would give a wide berth to our embassy.

During that time I got to know the work of the Foreign Ministry's central staff fairly well. Alas, it is in constant turmoil, with endless restructuring and reorganizations. Does this serve any useful purpose? In both the central and foreign staffs discipline and interest in diplomatic work have declined sharply. Personnel policy is in disarray, and some appointments are simply bewildering. In addition, there is a lack of coordination or sense of cohesion in the work of one of the country's most important ministries. And, incidentally, with one of the smallest, if not the smallest staffs: there are less than 3,000 diplomatic personnel. In other words, something which was always very important to me and without which it is difficult to achieve good results is lacking: a cohesive, smoothly functioning "team" at both the lower and upper levels of the ministry.

[Denisova] Your differences with Andrey Kozyrev are known, especially concerning views on the development of relations with the United States and the West as a whole.

[Lukin] What can I say... When I am asked if I have differences with Kozyrev I say, no, and none are possible. One's opinions may differ from those of a person who has opinions of his own. But what if he changes them every three months? What differences can there be in that case? Whoever is interested in this can compare what I said six months or a year ago with what I am saying now. And what Kozyrev has said during the same time. Everything will become clear. I have not changed my views and am not changing them now.

The situation developed in such a way that in his address to the Federal Assembly the president sharply criticized our diplomacy; he said what I have been saying over the last two or two and a half years. I am very pleased that our views coincide. Although I wouldn't like to look like the frog that says, "It was my idea! It was my idea!" I simply want our foreign policy to be independent, active, and show initiative. That it be given its due in the world and, most important, by our people. A good example, albeit an exception, that confirms the rule was our initiative in the Bosnian crisis.

I suggested something. That "something" was taken up by the president and, in words, by the foreign minister. It

would be alright if it had ended in a handshake with Kozyrev, as is customary in civilized society. But then a series of intrigues began... That, however, is not so important, the case isn't mortal.

[Denisova] As I recall, it was not without your help that Kozyrev became foreign minister.

[Lukin] Yes, I recommended him to Yeltsin. Actually, I recommended two people. Kozyrev was the second, but the first had declined.

[Denisova] You just visited the United States with a Russian parliamentary delegation, you met with congressmen, diplomats, military people. Did you gain the impression that the latest events would substantially harm Russian-American relations for a considerable time?

[Lukin] The problem is that our diplomacy made some very serious mistakes, moreover, of a conceptual nature. Currently they are being overcome on the conceptual level. But the Americans have already grown used to our smiling, passive, *a priori* agreement with them, and it is hard for them to readjust. That is why we are now doomed to a period (not very long, I think) of heightened nervousness and some controversy. I don't believe that there will be any marked deterioration of relations; there is no reason for that. But there will be a period of painful acceptance by the United States that Russia is a state which also has its national interests.

[Denisova] This is the second time you are heading a parliamentary foreign affairs committee. Is the committee capable, in the current situation, of influencing the formulation of the country's foreign policy and changing the situation in the Foreign Ministry?

[Lukin] The unhealthy situation in the Foreign Ministry has developed primarily because it is deteriorating as a highly professional collective; 500 active professional workers left it last year alone. The Foreign Ministry should work as a cohesive collective, not as a "group of comrades" consisting of 7-8 people who make foreign policy while flying constantly from one airport to another. There should be concern for people in both the material and every other sense, but for that it is necessary to be "in the business" at least sometimes. Otherwise the diplomatic service will collapse completely. If the best forces leave, in future we will have no high-quality diplomacy. So far I don't know how to help solve this problem at the present stage, because under the current constitution the committee has no oversight functions with respect to the Foreign Ministry. However, we will, of course, do all we can for its personnel.

As for our influence in the formulation of foreign policy per se, it will be realized in strict accordance with the constitution. During the election campaign I criticized some of its provisions, but once it has been adopted it must be obeyed.

Under the Constitution the president determines and conducts foreign policy with the help of the Foreign Ministry. In this sense there should be no competition or attempts to invade their authority on the part of the Duma. At the same time, the Duma ratifies foreign treaties. Ratification is a powerful lever for influencing foreign policy. If its formulation is approached constructively, in the spirit of cooperation of the branches of power—which

I would like very much—then we will be consulted before signing a treaty or agreement. Then we will be able to suggest what should or should not be done for the ratification of a document to proceed smoothly.

[Denisova] But so far they seem to get along without your advice?

[Lukin] Yes, if you have in mind the treaty with Georgia. They signed it first and only then realized that it would be very difficult to have it ratified. As a result, the president decided to temporarily postpone ratification. I hope they will eventually understand in the Foreign Ministry that it doesn't pay to bypass the parliament.

I would also like to note that the appointment and recalling of envoys is done by the president after consultations with the appropriate committees of the Federal Assembly. The consultation mechanism is currently being worked out and should soon be put into effect. For example, as soon as I returned to Moscow (that was before the president's decree to recall me from the United States) I gathered the committee to approve my being relieved of my duties. We then sent an appropriate document to the president's office, after which the decree was issued. We shall continue in future to work in accordance with regulations, and the Foreign Ministry and president's office will, perhaps, submit their comments and suggestions to us. I hope we establish mutual understanding and effective cooperation with them.

Proektor Ponders Post-Cold War Security System

944Q0241A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 12 Mar 94
p 10

[Article by Daniil Proektor: "Legacy of the Cold War and Security Policy"]

[Text] "*Renouncing cold war thinking means recognizing that 'big wars' are contraindicated for the 20th century. The postindustrial society has acquired not only the potential for self-annihilation but also immunity to it. The latter is being recognized far more slowly than the first.*"

We have, evidently, to reconcile ourselves to the thought that political forecasts have rarely been successful in the present century. No one foresaw the catastrophes of three world wars and their consequences. It was not anticipated that the second would uninterruptedly grow into a third, a 40-year war, which was, hardly correctly, called cold: No fewer people perished in it than in the two preceding ones.

Despite the atomic bombs, which were declared a superlative guarantee of peace.

The end of the cold war has confused the ideas of security. Bloc opposition is clear and simple: Here's the enemy, this is where we are, and here is the "border of the two worlds," on either side of which are troop armadas, which do not advance against one another. And suddenly everything has changed. Security has disintegrated into a mosaic of permanently changing blurred conflicts and wars arising suddenly just about everywhere. Within states and outside.

In order to determine a rational security policy in a changed world it would not be inappropriate to link our thoughts with a recognition of the lessons of the cold war just ended. For the present grows out of the recent past,

and, indeed, the "dead tugs at the living," however much we swear that this time everything will be in the new style.

The distortion of history over many decades has always taken its revenge on us, although this revenge has not always been recognized. It is distressing to think that in the present security policy also a repetition of the mistakes of the recent past is possible and that it is possible under the conditions of the present internal crises and upheavals arbitrarily or nonarbitrarily to slid into some version of relapses into the cold war—this barren historical failure.

The calamity of the cold war was the mythologization of the policy of security based on the ideology permeating it. The West and its institutions were held with us to be an absolute evil. Stalin's rejection of the Marshall Plan and reforms caused by a fear of limitation of his spheres of power and the penetration of "alien ideology" was the H hour at which the lag behind West Europe began. An emphatic start was made there on economic reforms, with us—just as emphatically—on a search for internal enemies and the struggle against "cosmopolitanism."

Ideology began to stifle economics, and with it, to undermine security. Together with the failure of the Berlin blockade this led to our isolation from the developed countries, which was made worse by another failure—the war that was unleashed in Korea.

These two losses of Stalin's in the cold war would hardly have been possible had our elite not believed its own myths of a decisive weakening of imperialism in the course of the "third stage of its general crisis" and had it renounced overreaching ambitions and the overestimation of the successes and victories of socialism.

When, subsequently, Khrushchev—a reformer and liberal at heart, but a hostage of the System—dragged the country simultaneously into most dangerous crises at different ends of the earth—the Caribbean, second Berlin, and Vietnamese—the reasons were, generally, the same. As were the results.

We may observe with disquiet how currently increasingly influential forces are once again attempting to insert ideologization and myths in the constructive policy of security of recent years. Responsible persons and leaders of parties are declaring the "harmfulness and danger of the orientation toward the West," which is hampering relations with the Arab world. As though the one excluded the other. The calls for once again counterposing "East" to "West" on the basis of some messianism are becoming ever louder and militant slogans from extremist circles similar to the rhetoric of the period 1910-1930's and the 1950's, which led to two world wars and an intensification of the cold war, are increasingly assured. An overestimation by some party leaders of the powers of their country and people and attempts to "embolden" them by prospects are noticeable once again.

I am sure that a principal postulate of our security policy should be a truth cast up by the cold war: Do not allow our country to become isolated from the civilized world. This means primarily treasuring the trust of others, who will in response value our trust also.

Stalin's policy in East Europe and Korea on the frontier of the 1940's-1950's and, later, the Berlin crises and the tanks

in East Berlin, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia undermined trust in us, which we are sensing even today in the East European countries' insuperable attraction to the West. The chauvinism and xenophobia periodically artificially stoked in the years of the cold war are now spreading like burning lava over increasingly wide expanses, threatening the breakup of a great country and a further loss of general trust in it.

The lesson of the cold war is the need to overcome the mentality of the cold war. This is, perhaps, more difficult in some respects than tearing down the Berlin Wall: People's memory of the past is far stronger. Suspicion and remembered insults remain for a long time in the subconscious of all too many people. Converting this into policy is very easy when the world is indistinct and unstable.

The mentality of the cold war was stimulated with us by the demands of the system: to blindfold the consciousness of a poor society from a sight of the West, which was rapidly pulling ahead and becoming richer. But the movement of the world itself relentlessly broke down the mentality of the totalitarian system—the more fully this world of the era of the information revolution converged, the more widely it opened up to all. Our tragedy of the era of the cold war was the discrepancy between evaluations of the surrounding world and its actual character. The merit of the new policy, on the other hand, in the sphere of security included, is the aspiration to reveal to the country and the people the world such as it is. And to build relations with it on such a basis, not on the previous one, whose architecture was erected over seven decades.

Is the fate of Russian history of the past two centuries: the constant replacement of liberal reformers by those who either slow down the pace or cancel out both the reforms and liberalism, so inexorable? Are we condemned now to converge with the West, now, having taken fright at this proximity, to enter into confrontation with it? As in the cold war?

There are two hopes. The first is that we will succeed in making the reforms irreversible, having determined, finally, their true path. The second is that the surrounding world will, perhaps, pull everyone into the information-technotronic revolution to such an extent that the main crisis of the 20th century—between rapid scientific and technological development and the vestiges of the old social thinking in vast areas of the world—will be overcome.

Then genuinely collective security will ensue. For its roots lie not in this declaration and document or the other but in people's mentality and consciousness, in general trust.

But can trust be stable if we have not determined the priorities of our security policy and, in some respects, policy in general? All had been determined, seemingly: to have good relations with everyone wherever possible, with a particular orientation toward the West, as all of Russian tradition has indicated since the times of Peter the Great.

But suddenly, under the influence of some domestic conservative pressures, the command: "left face-about face," is being heard, just about. And it turns out that this orientation is not the West in general but entirely the other way about—the Asia-Pacific region. Or the Arab world. Or

somewhere else. But a great power is not an infantry company, and grand national long-term strategy should not be called in question under the pressure of the opportunist ambitions of this party grouping or personality or the other.

Nor can there be uncertainty in respect to the Partnership for Peace slogan.

One has the feeling that under the shock impression of the results of the last elections a certain reconsideration of the estimates of external threats and of security policy in general is planned. It was acknowledged quite recently at the highest level that, broadly speaking, we have no enemies. The idea of general security "from Vancouver to Vladivostok" was recognized. There was talk of an alliance with NATO. We were at one with the majority at the United Nations and in the CSCE, we were thinking of joining the European Union, and we had established good relations with the United States.

And now, evidently, as a consequence of the events of 12 December, we are hearing increasingly sharp criticism of this effective policy of security on the part of authoritative people. It transpires that the establishment of relations with the United States is an "infantile disorder" or the legacy of Brezhnevite diplomacy. For the first time since the times of the height of the cold war we have heard threats to start World War III uttered by us! Sharply worded demands for the naming of a "specific enemy" since the "military doctrine of the Soviet Union considered the probable enemy the developed capitalist countries, primarily the United States," and this was good and useful, are being heard. And so forth.

But if there is no enemy? Should we invent one in order to "educate" the soldiers more easily?

But we have been over this hundreds of times already and have acknowledged on thousands of occasions that the world has changed and that the dangers and threats are not those of the cold war but entirely different ones. And the concerns for our security have shifted toward the southern Russian borders and the sphere of national, ethnic conflicts. But why, then, resuscitate nostalgia for the vanished monsters of the cold war? After all, wars arise not on account of the existence of weapons but as a result of policy. You can have many missiles and live in peace, and you can have a minimum number and begin to throw them.

The difficult subject of attitudes toward NATO is connected with this also. It is understandable that 40 years of hostility cultivated their stereotypes, which it is difficult for many people to abandon immediately. If we are expecting a deterioration in our relations with the West under the impact of our internal processes, certain steps are then understandable. Fears that NATO could draw closer to our borders in connection with the likely membership of the alliance of the former Warsaw Pact countries and our Western neighbors included.

But if we intend to progress further along the path of the creation of a general system of security in the spirit of the ideas of the end of the 1980's-start of the 1990's, what is there to fear? It is hard to find serious arguments against the Partnership for Peace and the subsequent convergence

of the security systems of East and West in some interacting structure, which could not happen any time soon, for that matter.

We do not need new Berlin walls at the borders. They would be disastrous for us. We need integration in the world. Inside and outside. And unified security systems could contribute to this. Inside, in the form of a common security space in the CIS, outside, in consistent movement toward what was long since called general European and, subsequently, a global system of security. Even if only in the next century.

A return, however, to bloc thinking would have deplorable consequences. After all, cold war blocs are a complex phenomenon. Defense against external attack is just one of their functions, not even, I would venture to say, the most important. The internal, "deterrent" functions are considerably more important. For the United States after the war this meant control and "reeducation" of German and Japanese extremism, the cementing of "Atlantic peace," and a strengthening of West Europe's relations with North America. For the elite of the USSR, control over the socialist camp and its unity and retention of East Europe in the orbit of the totalitarian structure and its protection against the impact of an alien system.

But the question of questions is the correlation between security and the internal condition of society. Involvement in the most dangerous crises of the cold war era was a consequence of internal factors to a greater extent, probably, than external factors.

In the West the fear of the ruling elites of appearing "weak" in the face of communism and losing the electorate and exaggerated fears in the face of the "world communist threat" stimulated the United States to war in Vietnam and an invasion of Cuba.

In the East fears of internal ferment in the Warsaw Pact countries, dissidence, and the undermining of the socialist camp prompted a series of crises—from Berlin to Hungary and Czechoslovakia and to fraternal assistance to 49 countries of the "anti-imperialist world" with the writing off of the debts of the majority of them at a time of the enormous crisis of its own economy. Here we have the roots of the present troubles.

What has been called the "logic of the cold war"—the incitement of hatred, furious distrust, and a mythical belief that the sole salvation lies in the stockpiling of weapons in the guise of a "balance of forces"—has taken shape as a result.

The main threat to the security of our people lies in the all-embracing crisis of society—the legacy of the policy of the cold war. If crime has become an internal war against the people, if corruption is demolishing morals and the system of government, if separatism is threatening to disarticulate a unified great country, if all this is the case, where are the keys to national security to be found? In a quarrel with the West and NATO, which are extending the hand of assistance and friendliness, or in the restoration of order within?

Our security is being totally undermined by internal processes, the sources of which lie not so much in this mistake or the other of the politicians of recent years (of which, as

we know, there have been enough) as in the entire preceding era after 1945. And if we once again look for enemies across the ocean and in Europe or Asia and not under our own nose, we will be making even more grievous mistakes than those with which the cold war was filled.

This by no means signifies, God forbid, a call for us to forget about possible external threats. The bloody wars along a wide arc from Yugoslavia to the Caucasus and Central Asia, like also unforeseen changes in the overall situation, require reliable defenses—who can fail to understand this?

But it is a question of a sober evaluation of realities, the correlation of forces, and dangers and possibilities.

To abandon the thinking of the cold war means to recognize that "big wars" are contraindicated for the 20th century. The postindustrial society has acquired not only the potential of self-annihilation but also immunity to it. The latter is recognized far more slowly than the first.

"The atom bomb is a paper tiger," Mao said. Doctrines of "nuclear deterrence" are still in vogue at this time. But there have been more than 300 wars in the atomic era, and the bomb has not deterred them. After the Caribbean crisis, many people realized that no one would use it. But certain countries' race for "nuclear status" is once again in fashion today. The hopes of certain leaders that the bomb could be a splendid means of policy and an attribute of respect, and of certain military figures, that this would be an excellent instrument of war and victory, are incurable, evidently, like the most virulent pathogenic bacteria, like relics of the cold war.

And the final point. Concerning the dimensions of a policy of security within the framework of Russia's relations with its neighbors. The concepts of "spheres of influence" and "national interests beyond one's borders" are highly contradictory. They disturb no one if democracy and accord constitute their foundation. They are unacceptable if totalitarianism and imperialism are mixed in here.

The difficulty of this problem for Russia reflects the consequences of the disintegration of the Union. The impossibility of severing economic ties overnight. Millions of Russians who have been left abroad. The tremendous number of troops, a legacy of the cold war, who need to be removed, but whither we do not know. The need for Russia's peacekeeping in the conflict zones and for soldiers to guard what are now foreign borders. The strategic positions of the Black Sea region. And, finally, the specters, summoned from the darkness by conservative forces, of the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which have not been forgotten in East Europe and which are once again pushing it as far away from Russia as possible.

It is clear that it will take great political skill in unentangling this knot of problems wound tight by the cold war not to overstep the fragile bounds separating that which is inevitable and necessary from imperial pretentiousness. The first would be understood. The second would to our and general shame be rejected.

In all this lies the problem of problems. The 20th century is an unbroken unprecedented general crisis, a global

transitional era on the way to some new future world, possibly. Only in this context is it possible to think about security.

It cannot be ruled out that if the new generation of politicians simply disregards the lessons of the past cold war, it could pull the world into the semblance of a new one. Its possible outlines are not clear as yet. Whether there would be a series of some small cold wars or, God forbid, a new, albeit brief, NATO-Russia or Russia-rest of the developed world split. Both would be an intensification of our tragedy.

Yet there is hope: Good sense and a recognition of the experience of the catastrophic 20th century will halt the flight to nowhere. The world will inevitably come together and unite, which will help overcome cold wars and make security more stable.

New Publications on Security, Arms Issues

SIPRI 1993 Yearbook Translated

94P50106A

[Editorial report] Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian publishes, as a "special supplement" to the journal, signed to press 21 December 1993, the 333-page 15,000-word "abridged translation from English" of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's [SIPRI] 1993 yearbook, "World Armaments and Disarmament."

New Academic Journal on Geopolitics

94P50106B

[Editorial report] Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian for 10 March 1994 publishes on page 8 a 200-word article by Andrey Vaganov entitled "New Publications: Security From the Point of View of Academicians," describing the first issue of a new journal, GEOPOLITIKA I BEZOPASNOST [Geopolitics and Security]. The journal is published by the Geopolitics and Security Section of the Military History Division of the Russian Federation Academy of Natural Sciences, and printed by the Voen-tekhizdat printing plant. Vaganov describes it as a "200-page, large format academic journal," printed on good paper with high-quality printing, with "something for the dilettante to read as well as something for the specialist to analyze." He quotes the journal's editors as describing it as an "experimental journal-almanac." Among the articles in the first issue are "Why Democracy Is Triumphant in Russia," by Cornell University Professor Richard Darlington, "Forecast of the State and Tendencies for Change in the Geopolitical Map of the World in Regions of the Far Abroad," "Ethnographic Factors of Military Security," "Military Security and Defense," and "Military Aspects of Ecological Security," as well as several articles on military history.

Vaganov writes that the first issue contains no information as to the size of the new journal's print run or its periodicity. He speculates that in view of its high-quality printing and paper, it will attract no more than 1,000 buyers.

Nixon Meetings, New U.S. Policy Viewed*944K0913A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 11, 16 Mar 94 p 1*

[Article by Andrey Novikov: "Intelligence by Scandal?: Nixon's Meeting With Zyuganov as Part of the New U.S. Policy"]

[Text] After Yeltsin's decision to broaden the social base of the reforms and to release the participants in the October rebellion, the West is beginning, it would seem, to "expand" the field of its political contacts in Russia. R. Nixon's recent meeting with leaders of the Russian opposition is a perfectly natural event, in my view. The sound-ing-out of post-Yeltsin Russia is beginning.

For the Western perception of the situation that has taken shape in Russia since the December elections there is no precise divide between those whom we at home have become accustomed to considering political antagonists. Yeltsin and Zyuganov, Chernomyrdin and Kozyrev, and, finally, Zhirinovskiy—they are all for the Western mind primarily "Russians," and only then "democrats," "communists," or "fascists." Such, if you will, is the Western aberration with our idee fixe of "national reconciliation"—such "reconciliation" emerged for the West, appar-ently, even before it did for ourselves. Is, in fact, the difference between Yeltsin and Zyuganov that great, for that matter, if the first is increasingly beginning to incline toward national-state ideas, wiring for sound what was just recently being proposed by the opposition?

The strong constitutional authority of the president has today neither an organizational nor conceptual pillar within the democratic camp. The government is beginning to play according to the rules of the opposition. This means that sooner or later the winner will be whoever produces political know-how, not the one who "consumes" it, stamping decisions in accordance with another's "license."

The main know-how today is the party. What in political science is called "organizational authority" affording an opportunity to initiate, introduce, and polish decisions adopted at government level.

Organizational authority is lacking, incidentally, not only with Yeltsin but also Zhirinovskiy. This brings them unusually close together, despite all their differences and noncomparability. The political style of both is "one-man theater" and the constant pedaling of the personality factor. But it is not the personality but the party-organizational factor that is becoming most important today. And the fact that all more or less important politi-cians have suddenly hurled themselves into the creation of their "own parties" is further confirmation of this.

Who disposes of real organizational authority in Russia today? Gennadiy Zyuganov's party. As of the present this is not only the largest but also the most structured party, having inherited from the CPSU a sizable personnel and financial base. It has a renewed national-communist ide-ology, one of the strongest factions in the Duma, and, according to certain information, good connections in the elite groups. In terms of type this is a **power party**, proposing the traditional techniques of a solution of the managerial crisis in the base sectors of the economy (and it is the crisis of management which is determining for the

so-called "economic crisis"). In an alliance with the agrar-ian-industrial lobby and also in a potential alliance with the center and democratic-patriotic forces Zyuganov's party has a chance of becoming a serious political factor in the country, despite all the unpopularity of its ideology.

Is the West ready for a serious dialogue with Russia's communists? Strictly speaking, for Western conservatives the communist establishment has always been an object of close attention primarily as a traditional component of the Russian political elite. More, since the clamorous Fuehrer-type escapades of Zhirinovskiy, who shocked Europe with the imaginary threat of "Russian fascism," G. Zyuganov's balanced position might appear the most acceptable ver-sion of Russian revanchism. The West is looking in Russia for "righteousness" as some standard of what is to be expected from Russia in the immediate future. Neither Yeltsin nor Zhirinovskiy nor anyone else manifestly cut it as yet as "righteous." Only national communism, directly or indirectly influencing all the other currents in Russian politics, may be the "new righteous" today.

Russia has approached in earnest the phase of "post-democratic stagnation," and one has the impression that the West has waived Russia's reforms goodbye. The main concern of Western politicians are not qualitative trans-formations within Russia but, rather, the geopolitical controllability of the new Russian revanchism.

Were not Brezhnev's stagnation of the mid-1970's and the suppression of the dissident movement not ultimately the result of a kind of "deal" between Russian and Western conservatives? It is worth remembering that the first phase of that "stagnation" pertained to the time of detente, and only after the USSR had invaded Afghanistan did the Western community return to the policy of the cold war. I see no grounds for believing that something similar might not be repeated today. The entire history of Russia's relations with the Western community indicates that its principal determining factor is Russia's geopolitical pre-dictability, not the fate of Russian reforms and not the human rights situation. At the present time Russia is too weak for expansionist activity outside of the former USSR.

An era of conciliation, a time of geopolitical deals are beginning. I have always been struck by Americans' punc-tiliousness with regard to the formal procedures of democ-racy. During his January visit to Moscow Bill Clinton observed that the results of the December elections and the democratically elected parliament were no less important to him than the popularly elected President Yeltsin.

Strictly speaking, he could have said something similar in 1933 in respect to the democratically elected Reichstag and the new German chancellor.

Continued Cooperation With U.S. Foreseen Despite Ames Affair*944Q0242A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
10 Mar 94 p 7*

[Article by DELOVOY MIR correspondent Gennadiy Shilin: "Let Us Be Realists"]

[Text] It seemed that just recently Russian newspapers were full of articles and commentaries on the developing cooper-ation in the area of combating terrorism and the drug mafia

between the FIS [Foreign Intelligence Service] and the CIA, and the intelligence services of other countries. It is well understood by everyone that this is a delicate issue and requires a special approach. But the most important point, which has been mentioned both here in Russia and over there in the West, is that this greatly needed interaction between the special services of different states requires a certain level of trust and, if you wish, sincerity, although it is hard to speak of the latter as applied to special service operations. Whatever—the interaction between Russian foreign intelligence and analogous structures in the West and the East over the past year has acquired real form. From searching for ways toward understanding we have progressed to exchanging information and developing promising problems that concern the entire world today. True, observers in the United States, Europe, and Russia could not help noticing that CIA Director James Woolsey has been increasingly often displaying greater activity in making public statements. And, what is especially remarkable, his statements have, as a rule, recently involved his agency's work in Russia, with whose foreign intelligence the CIA has begun to establish direct contacts and undertake interaction.

On the List of Priorities

Actually, the enlightened reader will say, what is so strange about the chief of American intelligence supporting the continuation of work in a country that only recently was the main target of its intelligence penetration?

What attracts one's attention is the peremptory tone of these statements.

Speaking at hearings in the U.S. Congress special Senate Intelligence Committee, the CIA director said at the beginning of February this year (even before the arrest of high-ranking CIA official Aldrich Ames, suspected of working for the KGB and later for the FIS), that the United States has "four extensive areas" in Russia where American intelligence is active.

First, the CIA "supplies the politicians (of the United States) with important, and sometimes unique... analytical materials containing warning of potential dangers Russia is encountering."

Second, U.S. intelligence "continues to track the deployment and status of about 27,000 of Russian nuclear warheads."

The third "Russian" line of its work remains "monitoring the state of Russian Federation general-purpose armed forces." And, finally, the fourth is "analysis of Russia's policy with respect to its neighbors."

"The future of Russia, Ukraine, and other states of the former USSR, as well as potential problems that may arise there, are on the list of priority tasks of American intelligence activities," he said at the end of February, speaking at hearings at the Intelligence Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. The changing political climate in Moscow, Russian policy with respect to the new independent states, and Russia's growing concern regarding the West's goals in East Europe and the CIS continue to be the subjects of the CIA's attention, Woolsey emphasized.

...That Is What Intelligence Is About

As we can see, the range of American intelligence interests is quite broad and its intent to conduct active operations with respect to Russia is beyond doubt, despite the developing cooperation between the two countries.

In this connection it would be proper to note that Moscow never hyped a situation in which an American intelligence officer was suddenly apprehended, or a Russian citizen actively working for American special services was caught red-handed. That is what intelligence is about, knowledgeable people say—learning other countries' secrets, analyzing them, and reporting observations to the government.

There are, however, some differences in the activities of the two special services: While Russian intelligence in the case of the Ames case, according to American sources, was interested in CIA operations in the Soviet Union (and later Russia), as Woolsey's statements demonstrate, American intelligence is interested in "high politics." The latter, as a sophisticated leader understands, is conducted in the Kremlin offices, and a limited number of people have access to it.

Is it worthwhile under such circumstances to raise such a clamor, as some American Congressmen and CIA top officials did, on the subject of detaining a CIA officer who shared secrets with foreign intelligence? If we approach this soberly, calmly, from the standpoint of developing partnership relations—hardly.

Double Bookkeeping

Perhaps we should have put a period at this point, had it not been for one piece of news, which came practically simultaneously from faraway Australia, where local newspapers, as though on command, raised the subject of Russian intelligence activities. The topic—several Russian diplomats who had left the country back in the middle and second part of last year. In response to the inquiry of a liberal party representative in parliament, Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Evans Gareth especially emphasized that the de facto expulsion had not been made public because Australia did not wish to aggravate relations with Russia.

Interestingly, the SYDNEY MORNING HERALD newspaper, quoting informed sources, reported that information on Russian intelligence officers working in Australia had been received by Australian special services at the end of 1992-beginning of 1993... from the American CIA. (Note: During this period the CIA and the FIS were moving toward searching for areas of interaction!) Also, the CIA, together with British intelligence (which, by the way, also began talking about partnership relations with the FIS at the time), insisted that the activities of aforementioned persons were energetic and dangerous to Australian security and that insufficiently decisive actions with respect to Russian representatives on the part of Australian special services allegedly compromised these organizations.

Today, after the arrest in the United States of CIA officer Aldrich Ames, American-British pressure apparently was brought to bear all the way up. Gentlemen's agreements, which had previously been lauded in England and the United States, were forgotten this time.

Learn To Be Peaceful Rivals

The campaign of unmasking Russian intelligence agents is gathering speed, and it is clear that its organizers have little concern for the development of interstate relations, which may to a certain extent be jeopardized, or the development of partnership ties, which are just beginning to produce the first results along lines important for many countries, including the United States.

Political salvos have already had a negative impact on the economic sphere of U.S.-Russian relations. The mass media have already reported numerous times on the blunt statements of some American Congressmen, who believe it necessary to immediately suspend appropriations of any money whatsoever to support the program of reforms in Russia. Now we are getting the first reactions from experts and direct capital holders. It should be noted that they reflect a much more realistic approach to the problem.

"The effect of the Ames affair should be short-lived," the REUTER agency quotes Aleksis Rodzyanko, managing director of the Chemical Bank—the largest in the United States. Neither do representatives of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and Johnson & Johnson foresee any problems for their companies. But this, it should be noted in parentheses, mainly goes for companies already actively doing business in Russia, who have invested serious capital in the country and have established themselves in the market.

The spy scandal per se will undoubtedly die down; however, the reverberations of the noise raised around it will long serve as an irritant, causing excessive caution among investors—especially those who are just contemplating investing their capital in Russia. Thus, they are in a way being pushed in the direction of thinking that with all the attractiveness of the Russian market, there exist numerous others—East European, Asian, or Latin American—where investment can bring no less profit to American companies, and without fear of being "accused of collaborationism."

At this point, as a counterbalance, I want to quote the remarks of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher at hearings on the federal budget for the 1995 fiscal year at the subcommittee for operations abroad of the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Committee. The United States "must be a realist" in conducting policy with respect to Russia, he said, expressing the administration's opinion.

As American-Russian relations develop, disagreements are inevitable, believes W. Christopher, and in this case the United States must act on the basis of its national interests. Recalling some Congressmen's calls for cutting or suspending aid to Russia entirely in connection with the Ames case, he said: "It is not in our interests to be mere spectators watching the course of reforms in Russia." The secretary of state reminded legislators of the words of President Clinton, who considers aid to Russian reform not charity but an investment in American security and prosperity. "Our dollars... will turn into credit guarantees for American exporters and investors," he emphasized. To change the current course toward Russia would mean to damage American interests first and foremost.

Realists understand perfectly well that in politics one should not mix two unrelated things. The cold war is a thing of the past, and it is not in our common interests to resurrect it. As the Paris newspaper L'ECHO writes, the "Ames case" will be good for both Russia and the United States if it helps them understand that the end of ideological confrontation between the two grandees does not mean the end of rivalry between them, which is natural for such major powers, and that now they have to learn to compete peacefully.

U.S. Quest for Influence in Southern Republics Viewed

Situation in Georgia

944Q0240A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Liana Minasyan under the heading: "American Diplomacy Steps Up Its Activity on Russia's Southern Borders: The Consequences of This Could Be Ambiguous, Including for the United States Itself"]

[Text]

In a short space of time a third CIS leader has gone to the United States: Clinton has received Kravchuk, he has received Nazarbayev, and now, Shevardnadze. All three countries have experienced quite strong pressure on the part of Moscow and could ultimately have been seeking an outside distraction, in any event, checking the extent to which the world is prepared to accept CIS countries outside of a Russian context.

Of the three countries, Georgia is the most susceptible to Russian influence—acknowledging Moscow's direct impact on the course of the Abkhaz conflict and the possibility of freezing it, its official representatives have thus far been expressing regret at the fact that international organizations have been in no hurry to respond to the joint requests of Moscow and Tbilisi concerning formalization of Russian peacekeeping in the zone of the conflict. The fact that Shevardnadze discussed in Washington the possibility of the dispatch of a UN peacekeeping contingent to Abkhazia and obtained support has for himself one attractive circumstance—Georgia's prospects are still linked with him personally, and, supporting him, Western leaders are supporting the present regime and have an interest in its stabilization. All other prospects are more doubtful.

Doubt number one—how long will it be necessary to wait for the prospects of a "firm political settlement," that is, for the parties to have reached a compromise which makes it possible to begin a peacekeeping operation without subjecting the soldiers to the unpredictable vicissitudes of the war. The appearance of "blue helmets" in a region stuffed with Russian arms in direct proximity to the troubled Russian borders is in itself a political problem. Russia is jealous not so much of the fact of the presence of UN soldiers as of the "outside" political influence on Georgia. The Abkhaz leadership could attempt to derive practical benefits for itself from the latent rivalry. Although it has no one from whom it can expect political recognition, enshrining the present status quo with the aid of its Moscow allies is possible.

But Georgia, split not only along the line of the front but also divided into spheres of influence, would be even

further from stability than now. Russia, even having signed the notorious cooperation treaty with it, played on its weakness. But Georgia will remain a weak country—with a financial system in a state of collapse and blocked lines of communication and cut off from energy supplies—until the internal problems are resolved and it becomes a self-sufficient state. Russia, despite all its ambitions, lacks the resources to “pay” for the corresponding political orientation—its “residual” influence has been sufficient thus far only for maintaining Georgia in a disorganized state. And Western investments would be spent on the war, as if on a glutton. Inasmuch as the main candidates for the role of peacemakers in the region—Russia and international organizations—have as of late been pushing disagreements more than seeking mutual understanding, the problems in their relations will be resolved at the expense of Georgia and Abkhazia. They can only be alleviated by a Georgian-Abkhaz compromise, but it, judging by the failure of the recent Geneva negotiations, is unattainable as yet.

Islamic Republic Risks

944Q0240B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Mar 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Aleksandr Ignatenko under the heading: “American Diplomacy Steps Up Its Activity on Russia’s Southern Borders: The Consequences of This Could Be Ambiguous, Including for the United States Itself”]

[Text]

The United States is increasing its penetration of the region of the post-Soviet South—the Caucasus and Central Asia. The local states here are being drawn into the NATO Partnership for Peace program. The news media are carrying reports each more sensational than the last: The Americans are studying the question of safeguarding Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea coast with the American Coastguard; NATO emissaries are proposing the formation in Kyrgyzstan of a mountain division; the American State Department (sic) is working out a plan for the commitment of UN “blue helmets” to the zone of the Georgia-Abkhaz conflict with the obligatory withdrawal of Russian troops beyond the River Psou, that is, beyond the Georgian-Russian border; the United States is offering to assist Georgia in the creation of a Georgian regular army.

These and other facts compel the assumption that the United States (directly in places, under the “roof” of NATO and the United Nations in others) has made an emphatic turn toward the post-Soviet South, methodically supplanting the Russians in this region. Not all the enumerated facts and assessments lend themselves to swift verification, and it could be that I am mistaken in some respects, but I do not want to be overtaken by events and would like, before it is too late, to address to those who make the decisions in Washington (may they believe me!) some well-meant thoughts.

Were I an American “hawk,” I also, most likely, would be drawn toward the post-Soviet South. Why?

The United States could peacefully or with the minimum use of military force score an unprecedented strategic win. Having penetrated the region of the post-Soviet South, it

would have moved into the rear of a whole number of states against which the United States has or could have complaints of various kinds (Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, China, Pakistan, India, and, of course, Russia).

Test ranges of the former Ministry of Defense of the USSR (nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological and missile and space research centers on the territory of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) are located in the region. It cannot be ruled out that there are some in the United States who are interpreting the slogan of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk anti-nuclear movement as an itinerary for the transfer of test ranges. But exclusion of the possibility of use of the Baykonur complex by the Russian military and space forces (and, possibly, its use by NATO and the United States) would be of the greatest importance to the United States in a military-strategic respect.

The United States could also control the raw material resources of the post-Soviet South. The detachment of Russia from the strategically important types of raw material of Central Asia which Russia either lacks, virtually, or of which it has insufficient quantities—uranium, copper-porphyrific, pyrite, and stratiform ores, manganese, chromites, strontium ores, germanium, and so forth—is possible. Naturally, use of these stocks by the United States itself and/or its allies cannot be ruled out either.

And what is most important, perhaps: OIL. This requires a separate paragraph. The priority interests of the United States include control of the Caspian hydrocarbon megafield, just about the most important in the world, whose oil and gas beds can be developed not only in Iran but also in the post-Soviet South—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

The United States also needs to ensure its control of the shipment of raw material and other resources both in the Central Asia-Caucasus-Europe direction and in the Central Asia-Indian Ocean direction.

And, finally, *stability*. The United States needs this to realize the listed and other of its interests. Naturally, the stability must correspond to American criteria. To this end the United States must do its utmost to establish in the region of the post-Soviet South pro-America regimes of a liberal-democratic persuasion.

It is possible that I have not mentioned everything. But even the considerations that have been noted are sufficient for recognizing the charted aims as being to the advantage of the United States.

I would like to call Americans’ attention to the problems that would threaten the United States in the event of their forced penetration of the post-Soviet South. The threats and dangers would grow in the proportion to the number and scale of America’s successes, what is more.

First, what is most obvious. Russia could not fail to respond to attempts to make it a passive observer of the processes, extremely dangerous for its very future, that are already under way on its southern borders. The specter of a new “cold war” already looms in Russian-American relations. It is obvious also that a development of events in the contemplated direction would signify a growth of the

anti-American mood in Russia, the corresponding evolution of the regime (if not its replacement), and an even greater exacerbation of Russian-American relations.

Second, the intrusion of a foreign element into the region and an aspiration to isolate and weaken Russia and the other regional powers with traditional interests here—all this could disrupt the stable geopolitical balance, which would inevitably lead to the unpredictable and dangerous fragmentation of the geopolitical space. In a search for military-political allies, Russia could turn to Iran, Iraq....

Third, in the Americans' place I would think long and hard before undertaking a concentrated military-political penetration of the region of the post-Soviet South. The region is characterized by an extremely high degree of conflict potential. A listing of the conflicts that have flared up and those that are ready to erupt (even more numerous and serious) could have taken up the whole of this article. The introduction into this zone of a foreign element and internationalization of the conflicts with regard to the United States would necessarily signify a growth of the conflict potential. And, naturally, destabilization—regional and, possibly, global.

Fourth, were I an American, I would beware of an outbreak of Islamic fundamentalism—not that which is attributed to Iran but that which would flourish independently, without outside influence even, as a luxuriant bloom in all Muslim states of the post-Soviet South to which the United States came. Imagine, in addition, a combination of different streams of Islamic fundamentalism here—Near East and Middle East, Central Asian and Caucasian.... Imagine also a combination of Islamic fundamentalism and Russian nationalism (there have been such theoretical and practical attempts)....

Fifth, no one has yet calculated what the corresponding expenditure would cost the American taxpayer. And how many American soldiers would, God forbid, lay down their lives in the mountains of the Caucasus and the deserts of Central Asia.

American penetration of the post-Soviet South would be dangerous primarily for the United States itself, not to mention the likelihood of regional and global destabilization. I see the Americans in this region in the role of torch-bearers who have blundered into the powder magazine. God bless America!

Commentary Finds Increasing Western Reluctance To Assist Russia

944Q0236A Moscow KOMMERSANT DAILY
in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 4

[Article by Natalya Kalashnikova: "They Waited Until the Russian Bear Awoke"]

[Text] "Since you are so smart, where is your money?" Kurt Vonnegut, *"Slaughterhouse Five, or The Children's Crusade"*

A cool front has blown in from the West. That is, it is not so much that there has been a bone-chilling draft, but the cold spell has dragged on for quite some time. Calls for a freezing of aid to Russia—for 60 days—such being, evidently, the initial auction price of the damage done to America's security by the Ames spies—have been heard in

the U.S. Congress from Republicans and Democrats alike. The White House is giving assurances as yet that it will resist in every possible way a winding down of assistance to Russia. But judging by the fact that the row in connection with this business is becoming louder by the hour—despite Moscow's more than limp response, Washington is working the bellows with enviable persistence—the bargaining will continue.

Not only the Americans, but other Western "auction attendees" would like to take part in it, most likely, also. And accord here is the sure way to success. Bill Clinton was recently paid a call by John Major, who attempted with might and main to reassure the president. He even spent a night at the White House (which, prior to him, had not been the case with any foreign visitor). The prime minister and the president agreed that the intelligence services of Britain and the United States would cooperate (as has not been the case since the times of World War II) to nullify the damage from the "Ames case." What its final price will be, Russia will soon find out—Moscow will resume negotiations with the West after the government reshuffle, which has finally been completed. New consultations with the European Union on a partnership agreement, casuistical procedures for Russia's affiliation to the GATT, and the completion of negotiations with the IMF and creditors are in the offing. Some visible outlines of the relations with the potential "auction attendees" will be manifested tomorrow, even—on the completion of the meeting of the finance ministers of the Seven. They will now be dealing with a somewhat different Russia, for that matter. The term "great power," which had been farmed out to historians, is being enshrined officially in the Russian political vocabulary, evidently—to judge by Boris Yeltsin's report to parliament, at least. And the West's delay in expressing some in any way definite response to it may be seen as a timeout for reflection. But some UN wits have already let fall: "The Russian bear has awoken." Not original, of course, but it is, in fact, impossible to sleep permanently.

Just some six months ago, relations between Russia and the West seemed all but idyllic. And pure, as in any idyll, that is, clouded by virtually no mercantilism. The partners were true to one another: They promised us assistance, we, them, a constant intensification of the reforms. And what promises these were! Moscow literally became muddled over these billions—now \$24 billion, now \$43.4 billion. The West, on the other hand, was exultant at the prospects of so-called "shock therapy," which, as has now transpired, has simply not occurred.

And all would have gone splendidly had it not been for Russia's Higher Destiny—the October crisis had once again shown the world "how not to live." According to the observations of certain Russian participants in the negotiations, embarrassment flickered in the eyes of their Western colleagues even then: How can this happen—firing from tanks at the parliament building. But the tension—at the level of the former promises, at least—was lifted: Moscow even managed to "squeeze through" preliminary arrangements with the European Union, which were greatly to its advantage. The situation was complicated somewhat by the subsequent mass foray of Russia's ministers among the ranks of members of parliament, which fairly set them at odds. This dirty Russian linen was

quite often washed before Western eyes, which did little to strengthen the positions of Moscow officialdom there. And as a result of the enervating process of formation of the new cabinet, which culminated in the departure from it of persons sympathetic to the West, a pregnant pause arose in the East-West dialogue. Russia's neighbors hastened to fill it—in the wake of the former Warsaw Pact allies, the Baltic countries and fraternal Ukraine got in line for NATO admittance, and no less fraternal Kazakhstan expressed a preference for the United States when it came to use of the Baykonur Cosmodrome—symbol of the sovereign pride of the USSR.

The change in the Western participants' attitude toward the negotiations with Russia could until recently have been judged only by individual nuances. The London Club of creditor-banks, which had consented at the end of last year to all of Moscow's conditions, for example, recently notified its Russian colleagues that it would insist on its former demands—renunciation of "sovereign immunity," which is disadvantageous to Russia. In the event of its violating the payments' format, this threatened pretrial investigations and the attachment of all assets of Russia and the Central Bank. The Paris Club, on the other hand, has confined itself thus far merely to a hint of a possible tightening of the rules of the game. Reefs show through in its offer to extend the agreement with Russia for 1993 a further four months: Moscow would have to pay for the restructuring of the debt not 40 percent, as earlier, but all 100 percent. The negotiations with the European Union are clearly being dragged out also—to flashing smiles and toasts to partnership. Although in the course of the November Russian-European summit Boris Yeltsin and Jacques Delors affirmed that all obstacles to the signing of a broad-based agreement on partnership had been removed and that it remained merely to work out purely technical trifles, pronounced progress in the working-out process is not in sight as yet—and the mutual hope of initialing an agreement "in the very near future" had been expressed at the summit. Nor are things any better with the GATT, the desire to join which Russia officially stated in July 1993, obtaining at that time the warmest assurances from the head thereof, Peter Sutherland, that all the procedures connected with this would be completed by the end of the year, just about. The same Mr. Sutherland, who recently no less warmly greeted Russian minister Oleg Davydov (see the material on page 3), is still promising a speed-up in the same fashion.

The essence of the change, which had only just become apparent, was summed up by FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In the process of preparation of the meeting of ministers of finance of the Seven, which opened today in Frankfurt, Herr Kohl observed while the debate on the subject of whether to invite representatives of Russia was still under way that it would be far better to draw a demarcation line between the political and economic spheres of cooperation with Russia. That is, as a political partner (as long as there is the infamous nuclear button), Moscow could perfectly well become the "eighth," but in the economic plane it would have to rest content with the role of "manservant."

Not forcing as yet the development of economic topics, it was on the political front that Moscow dealt the West a

powerful diplomatic blow—right in the "soft underbelly of Europe"—Bosnia—forcing the world to recall that it was the Balkan question that in the 19th century had raised Russia without any of your tedious economics to the level of Great Power. And judging by the fact that Boris Yeltsin's proposal concerning the convening of a summit on the Bosnia issue has yet to meet with a response in a single Western capital, the irritation with "upstart Russia" can no longer be concealed there. How are we not to surmise here that the United States timed the premiere of the drama of the Ames spy couple, which according to certain information had been rehearsed in Washington for several months (and Clinton knew about everything), to coincide with the moment when it was necessary to apply the "brakes" to Moscow in earnest. There have been many rows between the special services of Russia and the United States—they are commonplace—but they have assumed a political nature when the parties have categorically wanted to play a dirty trick on each other manifestly unrelated to the field of espionage. At this time, on the eve of a new round of negotiations on questions of assistance to the Russian reforms, the United States evidently deemed it convenient to "correct" the Russian image somewhat. And, as a matter of fact: The West is striving with might and main to render Moscow assistance, but it is paying spies and, yes, murderers (they have betrayed CIA agents, who in Russia are usually executed) and traitors. Quite an idea. It is put thus far at the \$2.5 billion promised Russia this year by the United States. Who else is there? What is striking at first glance is the dissonance of the speeches on both sides of the ocean. With us everyone, to a man, is saying that there is nothing so bad about this—we have spied, we are spying now, and we will continue to spy. But Clinton pouted, hinting that his grievance was sincere—there had been hints given to him of something or other in Moscow in January, but they had not kept their word.

The bear generally is, as we all know, a phlegmatic creature, albeit powerful. It does not react to trifling matters. Specifically, the CIA delegation that came to Moscow, although having attempted to discuss the subject of espionage at the highest level, has received no response as yet. This response may, evidently, be read between the lines of Boris Yeltsin's report to parliament. It is, meanwhile, being read.

U.S. Aid Benefits American Companies, Not Russia

944Q0247A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 10, 11-17 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Alexei Novikov: "American Aid for Americans, Leftovers for Russians"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[Text] Lately, the West's financial aid to Russia has been a favorite topic of both journalists and politicians in the majority of developed nations, with views on this question often extremely polarized. Some, in the heat of political romanticism, venture to prove that it is the West's sacred duty to help Russia, others see this as useless waste of resources, still others are convinced that this aid gives the West the right to lay claims to part of Russia's sovereignty and demand "obedience" from it.

These days the viewpoint of those advocating a reduction of American aid to Russia has unexpectedly been buttressed by the scandal which flared up in Washington over the arrest of the Ames couple who sold information to Russian intelligence. This has given an occasion for many American legislators to demand a freeze on the aid program on the grounds that while the United States has been heaping favors on the ungrateful Russia, the latter has brazenly continued spying against it and, moreover, paying for the traitors' services with that very same American money.

The ethical and logical character of such lamentations is a matter for special discussion. Now, however, let me discuss something different. Let us suppose that the USA has really frozen its contributions to our reforms. Who will this hurt—Russia? Hardly.

Highly indicative is the analysis made in early March by **The Wall Street Journal**, in an attempt to sort out how the money allotted by the US administration to Russia is being spent, whom it is spent by and for what purposes. According to the newspaper, when the United States promised to allot for the former USSR 5.8 billion dollars a large part of which was meant for Russia, "there was dancing in the streets from joy at this decision, but not in the streets of Russia. Who mainly celebrated this event? Whole hordes of American consultants who were about to seize a large part of the 'pie' of American aid."

Business in the field of "useful recommendations" amounts perhaps to one of the most lucrative in present-day Russia and, most importantly, does not carry the slightest element of risk—first, money is being pumped out of the US government and, second, the worse things are in Russia, the bigger the gain in the long term. It is not for nothing that at the US Agency for International Development (AID), which controls nearly the entire package of aid granted by the USA, as many as 1,200 consultants have submitted applications for participation in this program, which is a record high for the AID in its 33 years of existence.

As estimated by **The Wall Street Journal**, from 50 to 90 percent of the money granted Russia under any specific aid contract lines the pockets of consulting firms. All this is done so brazenly that it cannot deceive anyone, even in the USA. It is this that compelled Marshall Goldman, a well-known expert on Russia, to state recently to the US Congress that the aid granted Russia, at the hands of American consultants and "Beltway bandits," "brings minimal aid to Russians, and perhaps nothing useful comes from this at all."

Perhaps it is only at first glance that the passage about "beltway bandits" will seem too harsh, but only at first glance. It is enough to take a look at some figures to understand and forgive the unintellectuality of this thrust. The Sawyer/Miller Co. which organized what the Americans themselves saw as a useless act with TV ads on privatization received seven million dollars for its implementation. Its representative in Moscow, Marc Mellon Brown, demanded from AID a salary of 1,150 dollars daily for his titanic labors, though, it is true, his request was turned down. The point is that AID permits its consultants in Russia to be paid no more than 380 dollars per day which, considering pension benefits and overhead expenses, amounts to 800 dollars per day. And, naturally, from money designated as aid to Russia.

How many of our helpers' "problems" are being solved in practice can best of all be observed at Moscow's Radisson-Slavianskaya Hotel. A **Wall Street Journal** correspondent described this as follows: "On a recent evening a string quartette was playing in the foyer—a hall with a marble floor—when a large group of American businessmen, many of whom were aid consultants, were drinking and eating, not limiting themselves in anything. In the immediate proximity of them, on a frosty and dark street, about a hundred elderly men and women were wading through mud trying to sell their possessions—a bottle of vodka or maybe a pair of shoes—to passers-by."

It will be recalled that the famous Marshall Plan, which changed postwar Europe, deliberately minimized the role of American consultants. According to one of its architects, James Silberman, it was then found more effective and cheaper to bring to America 26,000 European economic managers and public figures who then returned to Europe with the restructuring methods they had received in the USA. As Silberman puts it, in those years indignation was evoked by the notion about American consultants not limiting themselves in expenses, well paid and "swimming in aid."

Russia-CIS Economic Relations Assessed

944Q0238A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 5 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Grigoriy Selyaninov: "The New Turns Out To Be the Old That Has Not Yet Been Forgotten"]

[Text] The priorities in Russia's relations with the CIS countries become obsolete faster than they are formulated. From the president's message to parliament one could draw the conclusion that the integrationists were gaining the upper hand in Russia, and the policies of the Burbulis-Gaydar cabinet were becoming a thing of the past. Then came the Gazprom [Gas Industry Concern] demarche (KOMMERSANT wrote about it on 3 March), which put both Ukraine and Belarus in an extraordinarily difficult economic position. Yesterday daily gas deliveries were already cut in half, and today, despite Kiev's statement of its willingness to begin payments as of 5 March, Gazprom is promising to shut the valve altogether. The duality of Russian positions is also reflected in the epic of the unification of the monetary systems of Russia and Belarus.

The Russian government's positions are dualistic in terms of both internal economic policy and the building of an economic union within the CIS framework. The only common feature appears to be the fact that one thing is stated while something entirely different happens in practice. Promises to repay debts to the budget-financed sector, the military-industrial complex and the agroindustrial complex are accompanied by a harsh criticism of the budget, while the Ministry of Finance's version of the budget is based on extremely strict criteria. Contacts with the former fraternal republics appear the same way: Viktor Chernomyrdin holds a semiconspiratorial meeting with his Belarusian colleague, but after it the pace of Belarus's joining the Russian monetary system does not speed up in the least. It turns out that use is being made of the principle: what I say is entirely different from what I do (what I think remains unknown).

Yet in relations with the CIS and in domestic policy a unified set of policies needs to be worked out. In light of recent events, one may assume that the gap between actual policy and official declarations will be, at the very least,

preserved. This is indirectly confirmed by the sharp increase in the degree of secrecy with which the Russian departments are concealing their plans with regard to relations with the CIS.

Russia's Economic Relations With the CIS in 1993

CIS countries	Trade in billions of rubles	Percentage of Russia's total trade	Allocation of state credits in billions of rubles
Azerbaijan	348	1.5	0
Armenia	86	0.45	11.7
Belarus	4,171	18.5	38.0
Kazakhstan	3,800	16.9	11.55
Kyrgyzstan	320	1.4	8.0
Moldova	514	2.28	14.5
Tajikistan	131	0.58	21.15 (noncash) + 60 (cash)
Turkmenistan	280	1.24	0
Uzbekistan	1,761	7.8	30.0 (including 20 billion cash)
Ukraine	11,012	49.0	69.5
Georgia	68	0.35	1.5

In 1992-1993 the Russian government reached a clear understanding of priorities with regard to Russia's interests in the CIS, an understanding which was subsequently called "isolationism." The contribution that 1994 makes to the situation may be the very same strategy in camouflaged political dressing. For all practical purposes, that is the approach that is defended by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry on Economic Cooperation With Member-States of the Commonwealth, and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. The industrial lobbies and, in part, the regional lobbies oppose it. After encountering nonpayments, they have been putting pressure not on their partners in the CIS, but primarily on the Russian government, through whose credits to the debtor countries financing is opened up for them, too. It is typical that at the beginning of the year Yuriy Shafranik stated at a meeting of his ministry's collegium that it was more profitable to export oil to the CIS than to Western Europe. The Central Bank is also in solidarity with the industrialists. Gazprom is so far the exception, and the

shut-off of deliveries to Ukraine and Belarus could, in theory, prompt the industrialists to toughen their positions vis-a-vis the consumers of their products from the former USSR.

Consequently, Russia will be officially defending the ideas of continuing economic integration with an emphasis on the development of supranational structures, while striving to assume key positions on those agencies. On the other hand, in bilateral relations—and they are what determine real relations—Russia will, at the least, hold to its positions of 1993: the preservation of customs duties on energy resources, a rigid arrangement for granting credits and the repayment of them (the indexation of credit amounts through the dollar, the determination of interest rates through the libor [London banks' short-term interest rate], and the requirement of an insurance deposit in hard currency), with the right to write off defaulted debts without requiring acceptance). Possible alternatives to present transportation routes for Russian export cargo that would bypass the Commonwealth countries are also being studied.

Per Capita National Income of Individual CIS Countries (As a Percentage of CIS Average)

CIS	100
Belarus	125
Russia	112.5
Ukraine	95.5
Kazakhstan	84.5
Moldova	77
Turkmenistan	69
Uzbekistan	64.5
Azerbaijan	62.5
Kyrgyzstan	59.5
Armenia	50
Tajikistan	30

Prospects for Increased Trade With Vietnam*944Q0238B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 5 Mar 94 p 4*

[Article by Svetlana Sukhova: "Moscow Changes Tactics in Relations With Hanoi"]

[Text] Yesterday in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations a protocol on commodity deliveries between Russia and Vietnam in 1994 was signed that will substantially increase both the types of products delivered and the number of facilities built by Russia in Vietnam (which created a small sensation). This week Moscow carried out an "offensive" across the entire line of the "Vietnamese front": on Thursday talks were also held between the chiefs of the two countries' general staffs. The discussion focused on questions related to the servicing of the Russian military base at Cam Ranh.

After the removal of the U.S. trade embargo on Vietnam, Russia, remembering the losses of many East European and Asian markets, decided to change its tactics for the protection of its interests in that country. And although, according to Mikhail Fradkov, first deputy ministry of foreign economic relations, Russia has not yet felt competition from the United States in the Vietnamese market, Moscow has already felt a slight chill in relations with the "Hanoi comrades." And in order to ensure against possible unpleasantness in the future, Russia has placed its stakes on not only preserving but expanding the spheres of cooperation.

As a KOMMERSANT correspondent learned, the greatest difficulty in the talks was caused by the problem of Vietnamese indebtedness (its the overall volume today comes to \$10 billion). And that is why Mr. Fradkov called the decision to reinvest at least part of it in setting up joint ventures in Vietnam (\$80 million worth) the "Russian delegation's greatest success." Two Russian-Vietnamese joint ventures for the production of latex and activated charcoal were chosen as targets of investment. It was possible to reach agreement for part of current indebtedness to be paid in the form of deliveries of goods (\$70 million worth).

On the other hand, in the opinion of [Le Suan Chin], the head of the administrative offices of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam government, the Vietnamese side's main victory was to get a considerable expansion of the list of mutual deliveries of goods in 1994, as well as the list of industrial facilities in Vietnam whose construction will be carried out with Russia's assistance. However, whereas such construction was financed with Soviet state credits during the existence of the USSR, today all projects are being financed jointly by Russian and Vietnamese firms. And since both sides' funds are limited, in the talks a decision was made for Russia to take part in an international bidding for Vietnamese facilities (international organizations will serve as the sponsor in them). The new projects will include the construction of the [Yali] Hydroelectric Power Station and several electric power networks and roads.

The question of debt was also addressed in the talks. Mikhail Kolesnikov, the chief of the general staff of Russia's Armed Forces, and his Vietnamese colleague

[Dao Dinh Luen], in which First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey Kokoshin also took part. The problem is that, according to an intergovernmental agreement, the Vietnamese side is supposed to cover all expenses for the maintenance of the Russian material and technical supply center (read Russian Navy base) at Cam Ranh and credit them toward repayment of its debt. So far use of the base has been free for Moscow, but it is not out of the question that as the debt gets repaid, Hanoi will more and more insistently press the question of rent for Cam Ranh (which it prefers to speak of so far in Aesopian language).

Some Figures on Cooperation Between Russia and Vietnam

In 1993 trade between Russia and Vietnam came to \$500 million (this year the plans are to raise it to \$1 billion).

Russia's principal spheres of activity in Vietnam are power station construction (two hydroelectric power stations—the [Chan] and the [Khuabin]—and the [Faley] Thermal Electric Power Station are already in operation, and the [Yali] Hydroelectric Power Station is under construction) and petroleum extraction.

Local Free Trade Zones Proposed for Nakhodka*944Q0238C Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 6 Mar 94 p 3*

[Article by Sergey Agapov and Marat Salimov: "Nakhodka Rejects the Status of Free Economic Zone"]

[Text] The administration of Maritime Kray has supported the idea of Nakhodka's industrial circles, which, having become major private owners as the result of privatization, intend to create local free economic zones at their enterprises. Yesterday letters from Maritime Kray Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko containing a request to support the idea of establishing free economic zones on the territories of individual Nakhodka industrial enterprises were delivered to the apparatus of the president and prime minister. Thus, for all practical purposes Nakhodka is rejecting the status of free economic zone previously granted to it as an administrative territory. Up until now, not a single one of the free economic zones has made such proposals.

The idea of establishing local free economic zones reflects the desire of the directors of major industrial enterprises who have become owners of them as the result of privatization to strengthen their positions by obtaining special status for the industrial zones they control. Their initiative is actively supported by the administration of Nakhodka and Maritime Kray. However, it is fairly unlikely that it will be approved by the federal authorities.

The prospect of establishing microzones was considered for the first time during a Maritime Kray visit by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, chairman of the Yabloko parliamentary faction, to Nakhodka, where he held a meeting with representatives of the city administration and industrial circles. At that meeting local industrialists made their concept of the development of the Nakhodka Free Economic Zones public for the first time.

Thus, Viktor Gnezdilov, head of the city administration, stated in a discussion with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy that, since the idea of developing the free economic zone as a unified

complex of industrial and agricultural territories had so far not found support in the structures of federal authority, the free economic zone's new administration considered the strategy of developing local zones around Nakhodka's major enterprises to be more effective.

According to that concept, in place of the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone, about eight enclave zones, including the Nakhodka Commercial Port Zone, the Vostochnyy Port Zone, the Nakhodka Tin Can Factory Zone, and the Reinforced Concrete Structures Plant Zone, should be established.

Despite the fact that the heads of the city administration and executives of local enterprises are putting forward the concept of local free economic zones, what evidently would be involved are duty zones, the conditions of operations in which fully meet the ambitions of Nakhodka enterprise executives.

KOMMERSANT: *In Russia the regulations for duty-free zones that have been legislatively approved provide for the possibility of placing and using imported goods in them without regard to customs duties and taxes. What is attractive about duty-free zones, for both Russian and foreign businessmen, is not just the fact that imported goods may be kept on their territories without customs inspection for as long as one likes, but also the fact that production operations may be carried out in them and, in such cases, export duties, the value-added tax and excise taxes will be based only on the components that were brought in from elsewhere in Russia.*

World experience indicates that, because of the half-way nature of the special breaks established by legislation, duty-free zones have not been an effective tool for attracting investments. In this connection, the idea of establishing microzones around major industrial facilities could not result in fundamental changes in the socioeconomic situation in Nakhodka. From every indication, those who have initiated the idea of establishing local zones are also guided, first and foremost, by their own

"local" interests, which square poorly not only with federal goals but with the objectives of regional development. Such a situation is a result of privatization, whereby the executives of the leading enterprises received large packages of stock in the new joint-stock companies and, for all practical purposes, became the owners of their enterprises. Following that, in December 1993, the representatives of the industrial lobby, in alliance with the city administration, took over the leading positions on the free economic zone's Administrative Committee.

As strange as it may seem, the idea of local zones was supported by the Maritime Kray administration and the kray governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko. The kray authorities' interest in establishing the microzones is understandable—such zones, only very nominally oriented toward federal structures, would be tightly linked to local authorities who controlled their power supply and utilities. Moreover, the establishment of a network of "growth points" on the basis of the kray's strategic enterprises could become a pretty good substitute for the separatist idea of singling Maritime Kray out as a separate enclave "growth zone."

Stages in the Development of Free Economic Zones in Russia

1991: The status of free economic zones is granted to nine territories on the scale of oblasts and republics within Russia.

1992: The status of free economic zones is granted to three more regions.

1993: All free economic zones with the exception of **Kaliningrad Oblast** are deprived of duty breaks and privileges. The first three **duty zones** are established: Sheremetyevo, the Moscow Free Port and the Free Port Terminal.

1994: The Nakhodka Free Economic Zone rejects the status of a free economic zone and submits a proposal to establish four local zones that resemble **duty zones** on its territory.

KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan Election Discussed

Delegation Head Outlines Election Flaws

944K0867A *Almaty PANORAMA in Russian No 10*,
12 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Nikolay Drozd: "The Head of the CSCE Delegation Maintains That the Kazakhstan Elections 'Did Not Conform to International Standards'"]

[Text] A news conference of the international experts who followed the progress of the parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan was held on 8 March.

Representatives of highly influential international organizations—the CSCE, which sent members of parliament from various countries, and also the International Election Systems Foundation—an organization tracking election systems worldwide—had come to the republic specially. Having expressed gratitude for the invitation to observe the elections, Jaan van Hauvelingen thereupon declared: "The elections far from conform to the international standards accepted in the CSCE. The purpose of elections in pluralist free societies, that of the people being afforded an opportunity to determine their future, was not achieved. Our delegation was made up of nine persons representing France, Sweden, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Germany, Turkey, Greece, and the Netherlands, and also the central machinery of the CSCE directly, and this is our unanimous opinion. In the course of the trip we have had an opportunity to meet both officials and leaders of public organizations, and to visit election precincts in Almaty, Kapchagay, Issyk, and several other places of the capital oblast. Six of our teams visited and had an opportunity to observe the election process at 50 polling stations."

Mr. Hauvelingen went on to dwell in detail on the actual reasons that made for the unsuccessful elections. He cited as the first of them the candidates' and, most important, the electorate's insufficient time for truly aware voting. "The system of registration of the candidates is very complex, and the district commissions excluded from the slates candidates, and the Ministry of Justice, political parties and grassroots movements, arbitrarily, frequently pursuing ends incompatible with fair elections," the CSCE representative observed. "The official slate constitutes 20 percent of the corps of deputies. So high a percentage of appointees, not elected persons, is a most flagrant breach of the principles on the basis of which the CSCE functions." He also emphasized that this runs counter to Kazakhstan's commitments, which the country assumed when it acceded to the Paris Charter and the Helsinki Act. The observers' particular criticism was evoked by the fact that one person would sometimes vote for several, not even presenting his papers, what is more. At some stations at which the foreign members of parliament were present, the number of such "dead souls" amounted to 35 percent. The existence of two electoral rolls (one at the station, the other in the district election committee) also left open the possibility of manipulation. Even the foreigners' fleeting acquaintance with our elections enabled them to uncover two instances of the portable ballot boxes being taken to the voters' homes, where they were forced to vote.

Nor was the campaign fair beyond reproach, in the words of the overseas experts. The dubious disqualification of many candidates was reflected in their assessments. The public was inadequately informed about the elections and the candidates and their programs. Election polls revealed the electorate's misunderstanding of the voting system. In the city of Kapchagay, which one team of observers visited, there were 13 open stations and three closed ones—at military facilities. Some 5,000 persons—20 percent of the electorate—voted at the closed ones, but there was not a single observer or representative of the candidate present there.

The system of distribution of ballots elicited the experts' particular objections. In many instances, there were more than were necessary, and there was no proper count and destruction of the surplus ballots. The ballot boxes were not guarded at some stations. The portable boxes were located in an unmonitored room, and the observers were unable, try as they might, to establish strict control here.

The leader of the CSCE delegation observed also: "In all likelihood, the press was unable to publish material or to criticize violations in the course of preparation of the elections. Intimidation of independent journalists by the local authorities occurred in some instances. This was manifested particularly obviously in Almaty and Karaganda." Summing up what he had said, Mr. Hauvelingen confirmed once again that all this prevents the elections in Kazakhstan being deemed sufficiently democratic. More than 10 points of the Election Charter were violated.

He distinguished as positive aspects the very aspiration of Kazakhstan to free elections and also the openness of officials in the leadership of the country and the Central Electoral Commission, who are capable of dialogue and of making revisions to the election system.

Representatives of the International Election Systems Foundation declared that they would not venture to defend the elections in court. The voice of the citizens of Kazakhstan simply was not, in their opinion, heard in full. Amat Radevegan and Linda Enborg subscribed fully to the assessments made by the CSCE parliamentary delegation. At the same time, they presented their own opinions also: They criticized the Election Code, which has obvious shortcomings, and also the practice of its application. All those whom the foundation's representatives met in the republic—political parties, observers, and officials—agreed with this, incidentally. The diktat of the local district commissions was observed in the course of the elections. The Central Electoral Commission was severely limited also in its opportunities for intervening in the process of registration of the candidates and monitoring the local commissions. Thus, 135 election standards, matching the number of electoral commissions, had taken shape in Kazakhstan. A necessary solution for the future, according to Madame Enborg, could be coordination vertically, with full responsibility being entrusted to the Central Electoral Commission.

Many violations were connected, as representatives of the foundation observed, with the fact that commissions, attempting to ensure the necessary 50 percent turnout, permitted one family member to vote for all. But there

were stations and commissions that performed their duty impeccably. The present elections were for all that, therefore, a step toward democracy.

Such harsh evaluations by the international observers could not have failed to have given rise to journalists' questions. The first was as follows: "....Do you not think that the president should cancel these elections?" Responding, Mr. Hauvelingen said that he hoped that Kazakhstan, as a member of the CSCE, would heed the delegation's opinion and take account of its observations, making the appropriate changes for the next elections.

Responding to a question as to who should be held responsible for the unfair elections, the leader of the delegation said that this was for the people of Kazakhstan and the new parliament, not the foreign observers' mission, to decide.

The foreigners' evasiveness as regards specific conclusions which might follow as a result of what had been said is perfectly understandable. But it is clear even now that Kazakhstan will once again get a parliament which it will be hard to call one that is legitimate and that truly expresses the will of the citizens of the republic.

Commission Head Disputes Observers' Claims

944K0867B Almaty PANORAMA in Russian No 10,
12 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Report by Nikolay Drozd: "The Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Refutes the Statement of CSCE Observers. He Acknowledges 'Merely Isolated Violations of the Election Code'"]

[Text] Not long before the elections, Karatay Turysov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, said at a news conference that he would not be afraid of the foreign observers, because they were "all proper people."

But postelection reality quickly forced him to alter his opinion. The news conference held in the Central Electoral Commission on 10 March was devoted practically entirely to a polemic against the conclusions of the CSCE parliamentary mission delegation, which evaluated the Kazakhstan elections as not entirely democratic or fair. Journalists' questions were answered by Tuleutay Suleymenov, minister of foreign affairs, Justice Minister Nagashbay Shaykenov, Press Minister Altynbek Sarsenbayev, and Procurator General Zharmakhan Tuyakbayev, together with the leadership of the Central Electoral Commission.

Mr. Turysov, who was the first to speak, said: "It is my pleasure to share with you the preliminary election results. Unconditionally democratic free elections were held in Kazakhstan. Despite skeptics' forecasts, the data at our disposal at this time indicates that no less than 75 percent of the electorate of the republic took part in the elections. Almost 7 million persons went to the polls. We may now say that the elections were held in all 135 head-to-head constituencies. In some oblasts the public displayed an enviable assertiveness: There was a turnout of more than 80 percent of eligible voters there. Only in Karaganda Oblast did this indicator constitute less than 60 percent." Having touched on the qualitative indicators of the future parliament, Mr. Turysov adduced certain figures. Thus, the new parliament will have 14.5 percent women, which is

not bad if compared with the analogous figures in the parliaments of other former Soviet republics, and 172 deputies—the vast majority—have higher education. Turysov highlighted particularly the presence among the future members of parliament of 18 "pure" lawyers and 15 "pure" economists, which, in the opinion of the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, points to the significant professional potential of the future Supreme Council of Kazakhstan.

Mr. Turysov dwelt on the political orientation of the future legislators. Seventy-five deputies representing public associations had been elected to parliament altogether, according to him. Thus, the seats are distributed among them as follows: the SNEK [Union of People's Unity of Kazakhstan], 30 seats; the Federation of Trade Unions, 11; the People's Congress of Kazakhstan, 9; the Socialist Party, 8; the Harmony Public Movement, 4; the Republican Party, 1; and the Democratic Committee for Human Rights, 1. Several seats were obtained by veterans and other less politically engaged public associations. The figures cited by Turysov did not take account of independents or the official slate. Altogether, the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission estimated, the SNEK could control in the future parliament approximately 45 seats. At the same time the future parliament, according to the information of the Central Electoral Commission, will have quite a sizable opposition stratum.

Speaking of the national composition of the future parliament, Karatay Turysov adduced the following figures: 58 percent of the future deputies will be Kazakhs, and the national representation of other nationalities is exceptionally broad: 49 members of parliament are Russians, and there are 10 Ukrainians, 3 Germans and Jews, and representatives of the Tatars, Ingush, and other nations of Kazakhstan.

Having done with the figures at his disposal, the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission turned to the polemic with the members of parliament of the CSCE. He said: "I would first of all like to thank all the international observers for their assistance and recommendations in the organization of the first free parliamentary elections in independent Kazakhstan. I would like to make particular mention of the work of the representatives of the International Democratic Institute of the United States, who spent the most strenuous pre-election time with us." He then dwelt directly on the work of the CSCE delegation. First of all, Mr. Turysov highlighted the statements, which came as a surprise to him personally, made by the European members of parliament. He emphasized: "We invited them. They were guests, and there are elementary ethics preventing guests from passing remarks without having forewarned the hosts." The chairman of the Central Electoral Commission went on to observe that there is the Foreign Observers Statute, which does not allow them to hold such news conferences.

Mr. Turysov also harshly criticized all 10 observations of the CSCE. Concerning the lack of time for democratic choice, he called attention to the fact that two months had been allotted for the elections in Russia compared with Kazakhstan's three and that "the CSCE did not deem this a violation," and the local election code was adopted by parliament entirely in accordance with the letter and spirit

of the law, of which there was not a trace in Russia, what is more. Mr. Turysov also rejected the charges of complexity and arbitrary action in the registration of candidates and parties.

Everything, according to him, was done fully in accordance with the election code, and the Ministry of Justice was not in the course of preparation for the elections required to register anyone. "It is hard to escape the feeling," Mr. Turysov said, "that the CSCE observers were guided not by knowledge, but by conjecture." "In addition, I see in the fact that more than 700 candidates were registered here elements of a strengthening of democracy and the formation of a genuine multiparty system. The assertion that an official slate is exclusively a Kazakhstan phenomenon is wrong also." This was employed, according to Mr. Turysov, both in Poland and in Romania (the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission forgot to mention, it is true, that there the electorate could reject such a list and cast its vote for the slate of parties or public organizations). In addition, as the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission believes, it was far harder for the candidates on the official slate than for the candidates from head-to-head constituencies—considerably more people had to vote for the former. Karatay Turysov rejected the charges that the press had not had an opportunity to engage in campaigning. He was supported here by Mr. Sarsenbayev, minister for the press, who noted that all the newspapers of political parties and independent newspapers continued to appear unimpeded, whereas the official press, as a consequence of printing difficulties, had switched to publication three times a week. He also rejected the allegations that the observers had not been accorded access to the closed stations. "They did not apply to us. We would have agreed," the head of the Central Electoral Commission declared.

Mr. Turysov emphatically rejected the assertions that 35 percent of the vote was obtained as a result of "family" voting, when one person voted for the whole household, saying that conclusions for the whole republic cannot extrapolated from several stations. The chairman of the Central Electoral Commission also called attention to the fact that the native voter is qualitatively different from the Western voter. "It is impossible to change the mentality in three months," he said. There was mention also of differences in the evaluation of the elections within the CSCE delegation itself. Thus, the Turkish representative has already stated his disagreement with the overall assessments of the parliamentary assembly. Nor was the representative of France in agreement with everything.

By the time of the meeting with the press, the Central Electoral Commission had received 57 complaints pointing to violations in the course of the elections, they

had all, according to Mr. Turysov, been most carefully studied, and an appropriate response to each will be forthcoming.

Concerning the technical deficiencies in the organization of the ballot, Mr. Turysov observed that everything had been done precisely in accordance with the law and that there had only been isolated violations. The 10 percent reserve of ballots which had been given the district commission over and above the electoral roll was, in Mr. Turysov's opinion, a pronounced step forward compared with the 40 percent given in the stagnation times.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Tuleutay Suleymenov attempted to tone down the sharpness of some of the opinions of the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, noting the usefulness of the institution of observers for the future of Kazakhstan democracy. If out of the 12 persons, five or six said that not everything was to their liking, this by no means signifies that contacts with the CSCE need to be abandoned. He insisted that the statement made by the European observers was the consequence of a well-meaning error, not of a biased attitude toward Kazakhstan.

7 March Election Results Tabulated

944K0896A *Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 17 Mar 94 p 1

["Report of the Central Electoral Commission on the Results of the Election of Deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan"]

[Text] The election of deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan was held on 7 March 1994.

Based on the results of voting in the election of deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate and the official reports of district electoral commissions on the results of the election of deputies of the Supreme Council by territorial electoral districts, the Central Electoral Commission reports that the election was valid in all 135 electoral districts and in all regions of the republic where candidates campaigned for deputy by state slate. Of 9,561,534 registered voters, 7,118,354 received election ballots and 7,030,050 took part in the voting (73.52 percent of the total registered voters).

The greatest voter turnout—over 80 percent—was observed in Almaty, Kokshetau, North Kazakhstan, Taldykorgan, and Turgay Oblasts. More than 70 percent voter turnout was observed in Akmola, Aktyubinsk, Atyrau, East Kazakhstan, Zhambyl, Zhezkazgan, West Kazakhstan, Kzyl-Orda, Kostanay, Pavlodar, Semipalatinsk, and South Kazakhstan Oblasts. More than 60 percent—in Karaganda and Mangistau Oblasts, and in the cities of Almaty and Leninsk.

In all, 176 deputies were elected to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Of these, 42 were nominated by state slate, 75—by public associations, and 59—through self-nomination.

Number of deputies by oblast:

City of Almaty.....	15
Akmola Oblast.....	9
Aktybinsk Oblast.....	8
Almaty Oblast.....	9
Atyrau Oblast.....	6
East Kazakhstan.....	10
Zhambyl Oblast.....	10
Zhezkazgan Oblast.....	6
West Kazakhstan.....	7
Karaganda Oblast.....	13
Kzyl-Orda Oblast.....	6
Kokshetau Oblast.....	7
Kostanay Oblast.....	11
Mangistau Oblast.....	4
Pavlodar Oblast.....	8
North Kazakhstan Oblast.....	7
Semipalatinsk Oblast.....	9
Taldykorgan Oblast.....	8
Turgay Oblast.....	5
South Kazakhstan Oblast.....	15
City of Leninsk.....	3

The elected deputies include 154 men and 22 women.

Nationalities of the 176 deputies: 105—Kazakh, 49—Russian, 10—Ukrainian, 3—German, 3—Jewish, and 1 each—Uzbek, Tatar, Ingush, Korean, Polish, and Uygur.

By education:

Those with higher education.....	171
Incomplete higher education.....	2
Secondary specialized education.....	2
Secondary general education.....	1

By area of specialization:

Specialists in industry.....	40
Construction specialists.....	13
Transportation specialists.....	1
Agricultural specialists.....	21
Economists.....	20
Teachers.....	27
Journalists.....	13
Lawyers.....	16
Doctors.....	14
Military.....	3
Workers in the arts.....	1

Political scientists.....	1
Philosophers.....	1
Other areas.....	5

By position held:

Organs of state government.....	39
Enterprise managers.....	19
Directors of sovkhozes, chairmen of kolkhoz boards.....	4
Directors and functionaries of other organizations and institutions.....	27
Managers of enterprises in the nonstate sector of the economy.....	23
Instructors.....	12
Heads of law enforcement organs.....	5
Deputies of the Supreme Council, XII Convocation (working on a released basis).....	18
National authors.....	4
Directors and functionaries of public associations.....	12
Editors in chief, deputy editors in chief, and journalists.....	8
Pensioners.....	2
Temporarily unemployed.....	3

Elected candidates nominated by public associations:

The union People's Unity of Kazakhstan.....	33
Federation of Trade Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan.....	11
The party People's Congress of Kazakhstan.....	9
The Socialist Party of Kazakhstan.....	8
Peasant Union of the Republic of Kazakhstan.....	4
The republic social movement Lad.....	4
Organization of Veterans of the Republic of Kazakhstan.....	1
Youth League of Kazakhstan.....	1
Democratic Committee on Human Rights.....	1
Association of Lawyers of Kazakhstan.....	1
International public committee Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan.....	1
Congress of Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan.....	1
Deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation.....	40

Based on Article 66 of the Code on Elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Central Electoral Commission has registered the deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan who were elected by state slate and from territorial electoral districts (lists attached).

Results of the election for Irtyshskiy Electoral District No. 101 of Pavlodar Oblast will be published separately.

7 March Election Results by Region

944K0896B Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 17 Mar 94 pp 1-2

["Report of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Results of the Election of Deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by State Slate"]

[Text] Based on the official reports of district electoral commissions on the voting results in the election of deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan reports:

Sixty-four candidates elected by state slate presented by the president of the republic were registered and ran for the office of deputy, competing for 42 seats in the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan. None of the candidates for deputy withdrew his candidacy prior to election day.

The names of 9,561,534 individuals were entered on voter lists on the whole throughout the republic. Election ballots

were obtained by 7,118,354 voters, and 7,030,050 voters, or 73.52 percent, took part in the voting.

Three candidates campaigned for two seats in each of 18 oblasts and in the cities of Almaty and Leninsk, while four candidates campaigned in South Kazakhstan Oblast for two seats in the parliament.

The election of deputies nominated by state slate was valid in all oblasts and in the cities of Almaty and Leninsk, and yielded the following results:

City of Almaty

Total number of registered voters 746,446
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots..... 469,793
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting..... 468,609
Percentage..... 62.78 percent
Number of ballots declared invalid 412

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Isabayev, E.T.	154,961/33.07	313,236/66.84
Sabdenov, O.	188,851/40.30	279,346/59.61
Shchegolikhin, I.P.	310,148/66.18	158,049/33.73

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for the city of Almaty:

Sabdenov, Orazaly, born 1947, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan. XII Convocation, city of Almaty;

Shchegolikhin, Ivan Pavlovich, born 1927, national author, city of Almaty.

Akmola Oblast

Total number of registered voters 510,738
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots..... 385,807
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting..... 385,340
Percentage..... 75.45
Number of ballots declared invalid 816

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Geroyev, S.S.	184,236/47.81	200,288/51.98
Zhusupov, B.G.	168,429/43.71	216,095/56.08
Ilyashenko, Yu.M.	213,952/55.52	170,572/44.27

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Akmola Oblast:

Geroyev, Salman Saydarovich, born 1938, head of the industrial production administration Agrostroykomplekt, city of Almaty;

Ilyashenko, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, born 1938, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan. XII Convocation, city of Almaty.

Aktyubinsk Oblast

Total number of registered voters 425,209
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots..... 302,990
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting..... 302,511
Percentage..... 71.14
Number of ballots declared invalid 386

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Ospanov, M.T.	190,958/63.12	111,167/36.75
Rozenberg, B.M.	109,833/36.31	192,292/63.57
Shukhovtsov, A.I.	119,915/39.64	182,210/60.23

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Aktyubinsk Oblast:

Ospanov, Marat Turdybekovich, born 1949, chief of the Main Tax Inspectorate and First Deputy Minister of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty;

Shukhovtsov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1944, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty.

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Baymuratov, O.B.	262,629/58.68	184,563/41.24
Lysenko, A.V.	155,416/34.72	291,776/65.19
Fedotova, Z.L.	284,192/63.49	163,000/36.42

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for the city of Almaty:

Baymuratov, Orazgeldy Baymuratovich, born 1935, chairman of the Council for the Study of Production Forces of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty;

Fedotova, Zinaida Leontyevna, born 1938, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, member of the Socialist Party, city of Almaty.

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Yermekov, K.	91,782/50.45	89,893/49.41
Zimanov, S.Z.	100,656/55.32	81,019/44.53
Sarsekenov, T.B.	76,080/41.82	105,595/58.04

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Atyrau Oblast:

Yermekov, Kuramys, born 1936, chairman of the philosophy department of Atyrau Teachers Institute, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Atyrau;

Zimanov, Salyk Zimanovich, born 1921, chief research associate at the Institute of the State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty.

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Kazhibayev, A.	217,260/48.18	233,414/51.76
Sadykov, B.M.	156,399/34.68	294,275/65.25
Sytov, Yu.N.	259,535/57.55	191,139/42.38

Almaty Oblast

Total number of registered voters	541,457
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....	448,226
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....	447,586
Percentage.....	82.66
Number of ballots declared invalid.....	394

Atyrau Oblast

Total number of registered voters	236,327
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....	182,115
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....	181,936
Percentage.....	76.98
Number of ballots declared invalid.....	261

East Kazakhstan Oblast

Total number of registered voters	621,015
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....	451,628
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....	450,970
Percentage.....	72.62
Number of ballots declared invalid.....	296

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for East Kazakhstan Oblast:

Kazhibayev, Amangeldy, born 1943, deputy head of the East Kazakhstan Oblast Administration, city of Ust-Kamenogorsk;

Sytov, Yuriy Nikolayevich, born 1947, chief of the Main Geological Administration of the Ministry of Geology and Protection of Mineral Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty.

Zhambyl Oblast

Total number of registered voters551,935

Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....415,264

Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....414,467

Percentage.....75.09

Number of ballots declared invalid1,729

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Boroda, V.I.	158,254/38.18	254,484/61.40
Kalizhanov, U.	227,714/54.94	185,024/44.64
Mursaliyev, T.B.	261,970/63.21	150,768/36.38

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Zhambyl Oblast:

Kalizhanov, Ualikhan, born 1948, editor in chief of the republic newspaper ZHAS ALASH, city of Almaty;

Mursaliyev, Tursynkhan Beysebayevich, born 1936, deputy head of the Zhambyl Oblast Administration, city of Zhambyl.

Zhezkazgan Oblast

Total number of registered voters263,469

Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....185,040

Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....184,923

Percentage.....70.19

Number of ballots declared invalid266

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Akhmetov, K.K.	108,154/58.49	76,503/41.37
Abishev, Kh.A.	112,865/61.03	71,792/38.82
Vasilyuk, T.N.	73,671/39.84	110,986/60.02

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Zhezkazgan Oblast:

Abishev, Khabylsayaz Azimbayevich, born 1957, doctoral candidate at the Institute of the State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Karaganda;

Akhmetov, Kasymkhan Kaskenovich, born 1951, deputy head of the Zhezkazgan Oblast Administration, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Zhezkazgan.

West Kazakhstan Oblast

Total number of registered voters396,934

Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....307,129

Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....306,606

Percentage.....77.24

Number of ballots declared invalid212

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Gabbasov, E.G.	193,323/63.05	113,071/36.88
Kiyanskiy, V.V.	154,076/50.25	152,318/49.68
Payev, M.K.	153,895/50.19	152,499/49.74

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for West Kazakhstan Oblast:

Gabbasov, Engels Gabbasovich, born 1937, writer, city of Uralsk;

Kiyanskiy, Viktor Vladimirovich, born 1947, head of the Department of Chemistry and Ecology, West Kazakhstan Agricultural Institute, city of Uralsk.

Karaganda Oblast

Total number of registered voters742,284
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....446,142
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....445,472
Percentage.....60.01
Number of ballots declared invalid1,272

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Mukashev, R.Zh.	217,875/48.91	226,325/50.81
Nurtazin, M.M.	199,545/44.79	244,655/54.92
Khristenko, A.F.	286,106/64.23	158,094/35.49

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Karaganda Oblast:

Mukashev, Rakhmet Zheldybayevich, born 1956, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty;

Khristenko, Aleksandr Fedorovich, born 1936, general director of the Karaganda Scientific Research Sovkhoz/Institute, Telmanskiy Rayon.

Kzyl-Orda Oblast

Total number of registered voters304,543
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....241,788
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....241,548
Percentage.....79.31
Number of ballots declared invalid561

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Kalybayev, A.	134,408/55.64	106,579/44.12
Nakipov, B.	91,726/37.97	149,261/61.79
Khodzhanazarov, U.T.	118,068/48.88	122,919/50.89

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Kzyl-Orda Oblast:

Kalybayev, Abdirzhan, born 1935, head of administration of the city of Kzyl-Orda, city of Kzyl-Orda;

Khodzhanazarov, Usen Turlibekovich, born 1955, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty.

Kokshetau Oblast

Total number of registered voters402,770
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....330,021
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....329,077
Percentage.....81.70
Number of ballots declared invalid60

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Iskakova, B.S.	170,445/51.79	158,572/48.19
Rudnitskiy, I.F.	178,033/54.10	150,984/45.88
Sapargaliyev, G.	131,059/39.83	197,958/60.16

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Kokshetau Oblast:

Inkakova, Bayan Seilkhanovna, born 1957, deputy chief physician at the railways Hospital, city of Kokshetau;

Rudnitskiy, Ivan Fabiyonovich, born 1948, chairman of the board of 14th Year of October Kolkhoz, city of Dashko-Nikolayevka, Chkalovskiy Rayon.

Kostanay Oblast

Total number of registered voters671,213
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....496,253
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....493,422
Percentage.....73.51
Number of ballots declared invalid396

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Aldamzharov, Z.A.	235,961/47.82	257,065/52.10
Garkavets, A.N.	305,636/61.94	187,390/37.98
Irtayeva, B.	228,326/46.27	264,700/53.65

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Kostanay Oblast:

Aldamzharov, Zulkharnay Aldamzharovich, born 1937, rector of Kostanay State University, city of Kostanay;

Garkavets, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1947, deputy general director of Kaznatskultfond, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty.

City of Leninsk

Total number of registered voters16,921
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....11,853
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....11,775
Percentage.....69.59
Number of ballots declared invalid44

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Ilyasov, A.I.	7,164/60.84	4,567/38.79
Ozhgikhin, P.S.	3,883/32.98	7,848/66.65
Sarabekova, T.S.	8,926/75.80	2,805/23.82

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for the city of Leninsk:

Ilyasov, Avay Izgeyevich, born 1960, chairman of the Leninsk City Court, city of Leninsk;

Sarabekova, Tarbiye Serbatovna, born 1947, chairman of the territorial Committee for State Property Management, city of Leninsk.

Mangistau Oblast

Total number of registered voters166,598
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....106,763
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....106,411
Percentage.....63.87
Number of ballots declared invalid301

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Bayev, N.I.	46,832/44.01	59,278/55.71
Zhursimbayev, S.K.	67,711/63.63	38,399/36.09
Savchenko, N.A.	36,622/34.42	69,488/65.30

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Mangistau Oblast:

Bayev, Nikolay Ivanovich, born 1945, head of the city administration, city of Aktau;

Zhursimbayev, Sagindyk Kemalovich, born 1940, deputy procurator general of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty.

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Belger, G.K.	244,221/61.53	151,767/38.23
Vildanov, V.G.	214,353/54.00	181,635/45.76
Zhakina, A.K.	191,977/48.36	204,011/51.40

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Pavlodar Oblast:

Belger, G. old Karlovich, born 1934, author, translator, city of Pavlodar;

Vladimir Gimranovich, born 1944, deputy chief engineer of the concern Pavlodartraktor, city of Pavlodar.

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Kozlov, A.N.	203,879/65.68	104,086/33.53
Omirlin, A.N.	93,441/30.10	214,524/69.11
Orazov, K.	134,000/43.17	173,965/56.05

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for North Kazakhstan Oblast:

Kozlov, Aleksandr Fedorovich, born 1953, newspaper correspondent of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA for North Kazakhstan Oblast, city of Petropavlovsk;

Orazov, Kairbek, born 1946, director of the Petropavlovsk branch of Karaganda Polytechnical Institute, city of Petropavlovsk.

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
BoyarSKIY, I.G.	125,880/33.54	249,027/66.35
Ryabtsev, A.D.	162,636/43.33	212,271/56.56
Suleymenov, O.O.	281,493/75.00	93,414/24.89

Pavlodar Oblast

Total number of registered voters360,592
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....397,188
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....396,934
Percentage.....70.81
Number of ballots declared invalid946

North Kazakhstan Oblast

Total number of registered voters386,645
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....310,690
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....310,402
Percentage.....80.28
Number of ballots declared invalid2,437

Semipalatinsk Oblast

Total number of registered voters477,724
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....375,737
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....375,324
Percentage.....78.57
Number of ballots declared invalid417

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Semipalatinsk Oblast:

Ryabtsev, Anatoliy Dmitriyevich, born 1952, chairman of the oblast Committee for Water Resources, city of Semipalatinsk;

Suleymenov, Olzhas Omarovich, born 1936, poet, member of the People's Congress Party, city of Almaty.

Taldykorgan Oblast

Total number of registered voters399,217
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....336,456
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....335,975
Percentage.....84.16
Number of ballots declared invalid.....357

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Azamatov, Yu.A.	160,419/47.75	175,199/52.15
Kim, Yu.A.	160,745/47.84	174,873/52.05
Tastandiyev, S.M.	228,603/68.04	107,015/31.85

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Taldykorgan Oblast:

Kim, Yuriy Alekseyevich, born 1940, first deputy minister of justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty;

Tastandiyev, Salamgazy Mukhametkaliyevich, born 1948, senior assistant to the Taldykorgan oblast procurator, city of Taldykorgan.

Turgay Oblast

Total number of registered voters163,380
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....135,408
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....135,232
Percentage.....82.77
Number of ballots declared invalid.....169

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Mukhamedzhanov, U.B.	81,723/60.43	53,340/39.44
Nikanov, O.Yu.	71,554/52.91	63,509/46.96
Shaykamalov, S.	70,129/51.86	64,934/48.02

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for Turgay Oblast:

Mukhamedzhanov, Ural Baygunovich, born 1948, head of the Amangeldinskiy Rayon Administration, village of Amangeldy, Amangeldinskiy Rayon;

Nikanov, Oleg Yuryevich, born 1955, editor in chief of the newspaper EKSPRESS K, city of Almaty.

South Kazakhstan Oblast

Total number of registered voters976,117
Number of registered voters receiving election ballots.....782,063
Number of registered voters taking part in the voting.....779,871
Percentage.....79.90
Number of ballots declared invalid.....1,453

Full name of candidate for deputy	Number of votes for/percent	Number of votes against/percent
Akuyev, N.I.	388,231/49.78	390,187/50.03
Dzholdasbekov, U.	491,701/63.05	286,717/36.76
Dodonov, G.A.	198,606/25.47	579,812/74.35
Maslov, A.D.	285,124/36.36	493,294/63.25

The following are elected deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan by state slate for South Kazakhstan Oblast:

Akuyev, Nikolay Ilich, born 1941, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty;

Dzholdasbekov, Umirbek Arislanovich, born 1931, president of the Engineering Academy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty.

Newly Elected Deputies Listed

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["Listing of Deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan"]

[Text] ADILBEKOV, Dauren Zekenovich, born 1956, first deputy head of the Sovetskiy Rayon Administration, city of Almaty. From Abylaykhanovskiy Electoral District No. 12, city of Almaty.

ABDYKARIMOV, Bolat, born 1939, deputy minister of education of the Republic of Kazakhstan. From Zhanaar-kinskiy Electoral District No. 57, Zhezkazgan Oblast.

AKYLBAYEV, Kobes Akylbayevich, born 1945, president of the Akniyet joint-stock construction company, city of Taldykorgan. From Taldykorgan Rural Electoral District No. 118, Taldykorgan Oblast.

ASKAROV, Kanat, born 1947, deputy editor in chief of the Taldykorgan Oblast newspaper ZHERUYK, city of Taldykorgan. From Uygentasskiy Electoral District No. 119, Taldykorgan Oblast.

ABDILDIN, Zhabaykhan, born 1933, vice president of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Aksuskiy Electoral District No. 99, Pavlodar Oblast.

AYTUGANOV, Nurmakhambet Sarsenbekovich, born 1947, first deputy head of the Otrarskiy Rayon Administration, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, Otrarskiy Rayon. From Arysskiy Electoral District No. 126, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

AUBAKIROV, Kenes Amanovich, born 1934, first deputy head of the Zhambyl Oblast Administration, city of Zhambyl. From Auliyeatinskiy Electoral District No. 46, Zhambyl Oblast.

AKHMETOV, Ashimzhan Suleymenovich, born 1950, general director of the Inko joint enterprise, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Zhambyl. From Zavodskiy Electoral District No. 47, Zhambyl Oblast.

ABDRAKHMANOV, Serik, born 1951, president of the Yelimay international ecology foundation, city of Almaty. From Kegenskiy Electoral District No. 33, Almaty Oblast.

ALPYSBEKOV, Kuanysh Makhmutovich, born 1944, director of the representation of the Sozhkred joint-stock company for Kazakhstan and Central Asia, city of Almaty. From Yermentaustkiy Electoral District No. 20, Akmola Oblast.

ABASHOVA, Raisa Dauletovna, born 1951, deputy director of the Aktyubinsk Oblast Finance Administration and chief of the State Budget and Social Development Division, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Aktyubinsk. From Zheleznodorozhnyy Electoral District No. 22, Aktyubinsk Oblast.

ALDAMZHAROV, Gaziz Kamashevich, born 1947, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Isatayskiy Electoral District No. 37, Atyrau Oblast.

AUBAKIROV, Toktar Ongarbayevich, born 1946, general director of the National Aerospace Agency, city of Almaty. From Karkaralinskiy Electoral District No. 72, Karaganda Oblast.

ARZYMBETOV, Zhaksylyk, born 1947, chairman of the Zhaksylyk peasant bank, city of Shymkent. From Tolebiyskiy Electoral District No. 133, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

ALEYNIKOV, Sergey Afanasyevich, born 1957, deputy general director for economic matters of the Kustanaybest joint-stock company, city of Dzhetysay. From Zhetysayinskiy Electoral District No. 86, Kustanay Oblast.

ABYULKANOV, Tulekul, born 1937, director for capital construction of the Balkhashmed production association, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Balkhash. From Balkhashskiy Electoral District No. 55, Zhezkazgan Oblast.

AKUYEV, Nikolay Ilich, born 1941, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty. From South Kazakhstan Oblast.

AKHMETOV, Kasymkhan Kaskenovich, born 1951, deputy head of the Zhezkazgan Oblast Administration and chairman of the territorial Committee for State Property Management, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Zhezkazgan. From Zhezkazgan Oblast.

ALDAMZHAROV, Zulkharnay Aldamzharovich, born 1937, rector of Kustanay State University, city of Kustanay. From Kustanay Oblast.

ABISHEV, Khabylsayaz Azimbayevich, born 1957, doctoral candidate at the Institute of the State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Karaganda. From Zhezkazgan Oblast.

BIZHANOV, Akhan Kusainovich, born 1949, first deputy head of the Almaty City Administration, city of Almaty. From Auezovskiy Electoral District No. 4, city of Almaty.

BALIYEVA, Zagila Yakhyanovna, born 1958, chief of the legal division of the apparatus of the head of the Almaty City Administration, city of Almaty. From Aeroportovskiy Electoral District No. 11, city of Almaty.

BAYZHUMANOV, Askar, born 1939, chief surgeon of the Turgay Oblast Public Health Department, city of Arkalyk. From Arkalykskiy Electoral District No. 120, Turgay Oblast.

BAYMAKHANOV, Kozhakhmet, born 1953, director of the Sovkhoz imeni Bukharbay the Brave, Dzhalagashskiy Rayon. From Terenozekskiy Electoral District No. 76, Kzyl-Orda Oblast.

BARANOV, Mikhail Ivanovich, born 1937, pensioner, retired major general, city of Petropavlovsk. From Bulayevskiy Electoral District No. 105, North Kazakhstan Oblast.

BUKHARBAYEV, Tursynbek Madaliyevich, born 1963, deputy head of the Kelesskiy Rayon Administration, village of Abay. From Kelesskiy Electoral District No. 128, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

BEKEYEV, Adletbek Tolendiyevich, born 1953, senior foreman at the Kentau Earth Mover Plant, city of Kentau. From Ordabasynskiy Electoral District No. 130, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

BAYSERKEYEV, Leskhan Amirbekovich, born 1942, head of the department of sociopolitical disciplines of the Zhambyl Hydromelioration Institute, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Zhambyl. From Stroitelnyy Electoral District No. 48, Zhambyl Oblast.

BEKBOSYNOV, Argyrbay, born 1937, editor of the Zhambyl Oblast newspaper AK ZHOL, city of Zhambyl. From Zhambyl Electoral District No. 49, Zhambyl Oblast.

BAYMENOV, Alikhan Mukhamedyevich, born 1959, deputy head of the Zhezkazgan Oblast Administration, city of Zhezkazgan. From Zhezkazganskiy Electoral District No. 54, Zhezkazgan Oblast.

BANOVSKA, Olga Viktorovna, born 1941, director of the joint enterprise producing paints and consumer products of the Karbid production association, city of Temirtau. From Temirtauskiy Electoral District No. 69, Karaganda Oblast.

BERKENOVA, Asiya Aynpovna, born 1950, teacher at Ulendy High School of Naurzumskiy Rayon, settlement of Ulendy, Naurzumskiy Rayon. From Semiozernyy Electoral District No. 89, Kustanay Oblast.

BAYMURATOV, Orazgeldy Baymuratovich, born 1935, chairman of the Council for the Study of Production Forces of the National Academy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Almaty Oblast.

BAYEV, Nikolay Ivanovich, born 1945, head of the Aktau City Administration, city of Aktau. From Mangistau Oblast.

BELGER, Gerold Karlovich, born 1934, writer, translator, city of Almaty. From Pavlodar Oblast.

BISHNEVETSKIY, Boris Andreyevich, born 1952, director of the small private enterprise, Nadezhda, city of Yesil. From Yesilskiy Electoral District No. 121, Turgay Oblast.

VODOLAZOV, Viktor Borisovich, born 1948, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Uralsk. From Zhaikskiy Electoral District No. 58, West Kazakhstan Oblast.

VASILYEVA, Stella Georgiyevna, born 1931, pensioner, city of Ust-Kamenogorsk. From Zashchitinskiy Electoral District No. 40, East Kazakhstan Oblast.

VILDANOV, Vladimir Gimranovich, born 1944, deputy chief engineer of the Pavlodartraktor concern, city of Pavlodar. From Pavlodar Oblast.

GULYAYEV, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1948, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Petropavlovsk. From Kyzylzharskiy Electoral District No. 102, North Kazakhstan Oblast.

GORELNIKOV, Yakov Viniaminovich, born 1947, director of the Semipalatinsk Oblast Drama Theater imeni F.M. Dostoyevskiy, city of Semipalatinsk. From Zatonskiy Electoral District No. 108, Semipalatinsk Oblast.

GALENKO, Valeriy Pavlovich, born 1949, chairman of the board of the Slavic cultural association, Slaviya, city of Pavlodar. From Satpayevskiy Electoral District No. 97, Pavlodar Oblast.

GRANKIN, Anatoliy Yefimovich, born 1938, lawyer of the Altaysvinetsstroy joint-stock company, city of Ust-Kamenogorsk. From Vostochnyy Electoral District No. 38, East Kazakhstan Oblast.

GOLOVKOV, Mikhail Nikolayevich, born 1936, head of the electrical engineering department of Ust-Kamenogorsk Highway Engineering Institute, city of Ust-Kamenogorsk. From Zaulbinskiy Electoral District No. 39, East Kazakhstan Oblast.

GABRIYEL, David Ignatyevich, born 1937, chairman of the Akmola Council of the Federation of Trade Unions, city of Akmola. From Alekseyevskiy Electoral District No. 17, Akmola Oblast.

GULER, Ibragim, born 1942, president of the Ogu-Tay bank and firm, city of Almaty. From Vuzovskiy Electoral District No. 7, city of Almaty.

GEROYEV, Salman Saydarovich, born 1938, director of the Agrostroykomplekt industrial production administration, city of Akmola. From Akmola Oblast.

GABBASOV, Engels Gabbasovich, born 1937, writer, city of Uralsk. From West Kazakhstan Oblast.

GARKAVETS, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1947, deputy general director for science and culture of Kaznatskultfond, city of Almaty. From Kustanay Oblast.

DZHUMADILDAYEV, Askar Serkulovich, born 1956, laboratory director at the Mathematics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Pridarinskiy Electoral District No. 74, Kzyl-Orda Oblast.

DZHAGANOVA, Altynshah Kairzhanovna, born 1945, editor in chief of the magazine KAZAKHSTAN EYYELDERI, city of Almaty. From Zaysanskiy Electoral District No. 45, East Kazakhstan Oblast.

DZHANASAYEV, Bulat Bakhitzhanovich, born 1952, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty. From Kordayskiy Electoral District No. 51, Zhambyl Oblast.

DARIMBETOV, Baydaly Nurtayevich, born 1960, chairman of the Bereke joint-stock company, city of Satpayev. From Satpayevskiy Electoral District No. 56, Zhezkazgan Oblast.

DZHUNUSBEKOV, Yedigen Isatovich, born 1940, first deputy head of the Almaty Oblast Administration, city of Almaty. From Zhambylskiy Electoral District No. 27, Almaty Oblast.

DYRDIN, Oleg Vasilyevich, born 1938, first deputy head of the Kaskelenskiy Rayon Administration, city of Almaty. From Kaskelenskiy Electoral District No. 29, Almaty Oblast.

DZHUNDYBAYEV, Tasbulat Bekutbayevich, born 1939, deputy head of the Almaty Oblast Administration, city of Almaty. From Talgarskiy Electoral District No. 30, Almaty Oblast.

DZHUBANDYKOV, Berik Sagidullayevich, born 1954, president of the Taldykorgan Oblast Center for International Business Cooperation Joint-Stock Company, city of Taldykorgan. From Taldykorganskiy Electoral District No. 114, Taldykorgan Oblast.

DZHOLDASBEKOV, Umirbek Arislanovich, born 1931, president of the Engineering Academy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty. From South Kazakhstan Oblast.

YESENGALIYEV, Abat Kadimovich, born 1948, first deputy head of the West Kazakhstan Oblast Administration, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Uralsk. From Zhalpaktalskiy Electoral District No. 61, West Kazakhstan Oblast.

YELISEYEV, Vilen Mikhaylovich, born 1939, head of the Ilimevskiy Rayon Administration, city of Pavlodar. From Beregovoy Electoral District No. 95, Pavlodar Oblast.

YERMEKOV, Kuramys, born 1936, department head at the Atyrau Teachers Institute, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Atyrau. From Atyrau Oblast.

YERMAGAMBETOVA, Aglen Kurmangaliyevna, born 1948, director of the collective enterprise Orkash, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, Mugodzharskiy Rayon. From Mugodzharskiy Electoral District No. 25, Aktyubinsk Oblast.

ZHULANOVA, Lyudmila Arkadyevna, born 1946, deputy chairman of the Administrative Council of the Lisakovsk Free Economic Zone, city of Lisakovsk. From Lisakovskiy Electoral District No. 88, Kustanay Oblast.

ZHAKUPOV, Serikkhan, born 1950, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty. From Ayaguzskiy Electoral District No. 110, Semipalatinsk Oblast.

ZHEKSEMBINOV, Zhomartkali Bayasilovich, born 1943, director of the Taldykorgan Zoological and Veterinary Technical School, city of Taldykorgan. From Koksuskiy Electoral District No. 117, Taldykorgan Oblast.

ZHUNUSOV, Amanzhol Asetovich, born 1940, chief physician of the Samarskiy Rayon Hospital, Samarskiy Rayon. From Ulanskiy Electoral District No. 43, East Kazakhstan Oblast.

ZHURSIMBAYEV, Sagindyk Kemalovich, born 1940, deputy prosecutor general of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Mangistau Oblast.

ZAIIKA, Anna Anatolyevna, born 1951, chief physician of the Akmola City Children's Hospital, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Akmola. From Akmolinskiy Electoral District No. 15, Akmola Oblast.

ZIMANOV, Salyk Zimanovich, born 1921, chief research associate at the Institute of the State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Atyrau Oblast.

IBRAYEV, Rashid Turarovich, born 1948, temporarily unemployed, city of Shymkent. From Turkestanskiy Electoral District No. 135, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

ISAYEV, Musabek, born 1947, chief of the Atyrau Directorate for Boring Operations of the Embanef Scientific Production Association, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Atyrau. From Atyrauskiy Electoral District No. 34, Atyrau Oblast.

ISERGEPOV, Iskakh Naushinovich, born 1936, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty. From Uritskiy Electoral District No. 90, Kustanay Oblast.

ITEGULOV, Maral Sergaziyevech, born 1953, director of the Aktyubinsk Division of the Fund for Support to Entrepreneurial Activity and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Aktyubinsk. From Aktyubinskiy Electoral District No. 21, Aktyubinsk Oblast.

ILYASHENKO, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, born 1938, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty. From Akmola Oblast.

ISKAKOVA, Bayan Seilkhanovna, born 1957, deputy chief physician of the polyclinic section of the railroad depot, city of Kokshetau, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Kokshetau. From Kokshetau Oblast.

ILYASOV, Avay Izgeevich, born 1960, chairman of the Leninsk City Court, city of Leninsk. From the city of Leninsk.

KOYSHYBEKOV, Nurbakit, born 1949, general director of the concern Construction Industry and Technology, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Aynabulakskiy Electoral District No. 10, city of Almaty.

KULBATCHAYEVA, Kalima Davletyarovna, born 1941, president of the South Kazakhstan Oblast Association of Businesswomen, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Shymkent. From Abayskiy Electoral District No. 123, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

KOCHKIN, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, born 1951, docent at the Department of Electrical Engineering of Karaganda Polytechnical Institute, city of Karaganda. From Stepnoy Electoral District No. 66, Karaganda Oblast.

KLIMENKO, Vera Dmitriyevna, born 1952, chief of the Therapeutics Division of the Molodezhnyy Rayon Hospital, settlement of Molodezhnyy. From Osakarovskiy Electoral District No. 73, Karaganda Oblast.

KARAMANOV, Uzakbay, born 1937, executive director of the International Foundation To Save the Aral, city of Almaty. From Kazalinskiy Electoral District No. 75, Kzyl-Orda Oblast.

KUZYARINA, Alevtina Sergeyevna, born 1942, head of the Department for Legal Protection of Workers of the North Kazakhstan Oblast Council of Trade Unions, city of Petropavlovsk. From Bishkulskiy Electoral District No. 104, North Kazakhstan Oblast.

KALMATAYEV, Murat Dyusembinovich, born 1936, chief of the Semipalatinsk Oblast Directorate of Internal Affairs, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Semipalatinsk. From Zharminskiy Electoral District No. 112, Semipalatinsk Oblast.

KEKILBAYEV, Abish, born 1939, state counsellor of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Mangistau Electoral District No. 94, Mangistau Oblast.

KEMELOV, Myrzageldy, born 1949, chairman of the Utirtobe collective enterprise, Kirovskiy Rayon, settlement of Kirovskiy. From Zhetysayskiy Electoral District No. 127, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

KOPBERGENOV, Abdimanap Bapanovich, born 1946, temporarily unemployed, Sarysuskii Rayon. From Karatau Electoral District No. 50, Zhambyl Oblast.

KOBENOV, Zymgali Abdrakhmanovich, born 1956, chief physician of the railroad hospital of the village of Shubarkuduk, West Kazakhstan Railroad, village of Shubarkuduk. From Khobdinskiy Electoral District No. 24, Aktyubinsk Oblast.

KUANYSHALIN, Zhasaral Minazhadinovich, born 1949, director of the laboratory for sociomedical demographic research of Kazakhstan Women Teachers Institute, city of Almaty. From Aytekebiskiy Electoral District No. 26, Aktyubinsk Oblast.

KOZLOVSKIY, Miloslav Kuzmich, born 1942, foreman of the central chemical laboratory of the Leninogorsk Polymetallic Combine association, city of Leninogorsk. From Gornyskiy Electoral District No. 42, East Kazakhstan Oblast.

KIRILYUK, Andrey Mikhaylovich, born 1938, chairman of the trade union committee of the Zarechnoye experimentation and demonstration facility, settlement of Zarechnoye. From Kustanayskiy Rural Electoral District No. 87, Kustanay Oblast.

KUBEYEV, Abdumutalil, born 1960, deputy head of the Kazygurtkiy Rayon Administration, settlement of Kazygurt. From Tyulkubasskiy Electoral District No. 134, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

KALUGIN, Vitaliy Nikolayevich, born 1956, teacher at High School No. 23, city of Uralsk. From Zapadnyy Electoral District No. 59, West Kazakhstan Oblast.

KAZHIBAYEV, Amangeldy, born 1943, deputy head of the East Kazakhstan Oblast Administration, city of Ust-Kamenogorsk. From East Kazakhstan Oblast.

KIYANSKIY, Viktor Vladimirovich, born 1947, head of the department of chemistry and ecology at West Kazakhstan Agricultural Institute, city of Uralsk. From West Kazakhstan Oblast.

KALYBAYEV, Abdirzhan, born 1935, head of the Kzyl-Orda City Administration, city of Kzyl-Orda. From Kzyl-Orda Oblast.

KALIZHANOV, Ualikhan, born 1948, editor in chief of the republic newspaper ZHAS ALASH, city of Almaty. From Zhambyl Oblast.

KOZLOV, Aleksandr Fedorovich, born 1953, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent for North Kazakhstan Oblast, city of Petropavlovsk. From North Kazakhstan Oblast.

KIM, Yuriy Alekseyevich, born 1940, first deputy minister of justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Taldykorgan Oblast.

LEONOV, Yuriy Sergeyevich, born 1949, deputy chief engineer of the Kasmetallurgstroy joint-stock trust, city of Temirtau. From Metallurgicheskii Electoral District No. 68, Karaganda Oblast.

LUTSENKO, Natalya Grigoryevna, born 1960, department chief in the Economics Directorate of the Kuybyshevskiy Rayon Administration, city-type settlement of Kuybyshevskiy. From Arykbalykskiy Electoral District No. 79, Kokshetau Oblast.

LEBEDEV, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1951, electrical fitter at the Mining Railroad Transportation Directorate of the Sokolovsko-Sarbaykiy Mining Production Association, city of Rudnyy. From Rudnenskiy Electoral District No. 85, Kustanay Oblast.

LUKYANENKO, Mikhail Vasilyevich, born 1949, docent in the department of jurisprudence of Kazakh State National University imeni Al-Farabi, city of Almaty. From Al-Farabinskiy Electoral District No. 6, city of Almaty.

MAKALKIN, Valentin Ivanovich, born 1937, chief specialist of the Council of the Federation of Trade Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Dzhandosovskiy Electoral District No. 3, city of Almaty.

MURZAGULOV, Zhangel'dy Kabetovich, born 1949, chief engineer of Geological Exploration Expedition 92, Atyrauskiy Rayon. From Kokteshauskiy [as published] Rural Electoral District No. 80, Kokshetau Oblast.

MELNIK, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, born 1952, YaK-40 flight engineer, city of Kokshetau. From Chkalovskiy Electoral District No. 81, Kokshetau Oblast.

MURTAZA, Sherkhan, born 1932, chairman of the state radio and television company Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Merkenskiy Electoral District No. 52, Zhambyl Oblast.

MAMASHEV, Talgat Asylovich, born 1948, deputy head of the Almaty Oblast Administration, city of Almaty. From Yenbekshikazakhskiy Electoral District No. 31, Almaty Oblast.

MUNBAYEV, Kabit Nurgaliyevich, born 1948, chief of the Atyrau Oblast directorate Alembank Kazakhstan, city of Atyrau. From Balykshinskiy Electoral District No. 35, Atyrau Oblast.

MIKHAYLOV, Viktor Petrovich, born 1941, chairman of the Akmola republic social Slavic movement Lad, city of Akmola. From Stepnogorskiy Electoral District No. 16, Akmola Oblast.

MONETOV, Valeriy Konstantinovich, born 1939, general director of the East Kazakhstan Poultry-Raising Association, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan. From Glubokovskiy Electoral District No. 41, East Kazakhstan Oblast.

MARINUSHKIN, Boris Mikhaylovich, born 1949, chairman of the board of the Karagandaintervind scientific production consortium, city of Karaganda. From Novomaykudukskiy Electoral District No. 64, Karaganda Oblast.

MUKASHEV, Rakhmet Zheldybayevich, born 1956, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Karaganda Oblast.

MUSRALIYEV, Tursynkhan Beysebayevich, born 1949, deputy head of the Zhambyl Oblast Administration, city of Zhambyl. From Zhambyl Oblast.

MUKHAMEDZHANOV, Ural Baygunovich, born 1948, head of the Amangeldinskiy Rayon Administration, village of Amangeldy. From Turgay Oblast.

NURGAZIYEV, Bolat Nurgazyevich, born 1943, deputy head of the Almaty City Administration, city of Almaty. From Medeuskiy Electoral District No. 13, city of Almaty.

NAGMANOV, Kazhmurat, born 1948, vice president of the KATEP national joint-stock company, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Semipalatinsk Electoral District No. 109, Semipalatinsk Oblast.

NURAKHMETOV, Dosmukhamet Nurakhmetovich, born 1956, president of the Fund for Support of Young Gifted Persons imeni Al-Farabi, city of Almaty. From Aksuskiy Electoral District No. 116, Taldykorgan Oblast.

NASYROV, Imin Mumunovich, born 1937, director of the Assinskiy sovkhos, village of Gayrat. From Bugutinskiy Electoral District No. 32, Almaty Oblast.

NIKANOV, Oleg Yuryevich, born 1955, editor in chief of the republic newspaper EKSPRESS K, city of Almaty. From Turgay Oblast.

OZGAMBAYEV, Omirzak, born 1941, chief of the oblast Directorate of Public Education, city of Aktau. From Aktauskiy Electoral District No. 93, Mangistau Oblast.

ORALBAYEV, Utegen Oralbayevich, born 1952, deputy editor in chief of the republic newspaper AUYL, city of Almaty. From Makatskiy Electoral District No. 36, Atyrau Oblast.

OSPANOV, Marat Turdybekovich, born 1949, chief of the Main Tax Inspectorate and first deputy minister of finance

of the Republic of Kazakhstan, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Aktyubinsk Oblast.

ORAZOV, Kairbek, born 1946, director of the Petropavlovsk branch of Karaganda Polytechnical Institute, city of Petropavlovsk. From North Kazakhstan Oblast.

PILAT, Tatyana Lvovna, born 1958, president of the firm Eykos, city of Almaty. From Aksayskiy Electoral District No. 1, city of Almaty.

PRIGODIN, Viktor Ivanovich, born 1946, deputy head of the Karaganda City Administration, city of Karaganda. From Tsentralnyy Electoral District No. 67, Karaganda Oblast.

PEREGRIN, Aleksandr Gennadyevich, born 1959, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, settlement of Geofizik. From Altynsarsinskiy Electoral District No. 83, Kustanay Oblast.

ROGALEV, Viktor Pavlovich, born 1957, head of the department of political science and sociology of Karaganda State University, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Karaganda. From Transportnyy Electoral District No. 65, Karaganda Oblast.

ROZE, Vitaliy Yegorovich, born 1957, president of the Abay Algas joint-stock firm, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Abay. From Abayskiy Electoral District No. 71, Karaganda Oblast.

RUDAS, Valentina Ilinichna, born 1948, chief of the culture and information section of the oblast newspaper IRTYSH, city of Semipalatinsk. From Abayskiy Electoral District No. 107, Semipalatinsk Oblast.

RUDNITSKIY, Ivan Fabiyonovich, born 1948, chairman of the board of 14th Year of October Kolkhoz, Chkalovskiy Rayon, village of Dashko-Nikolayevka. From Kokshetau Oblast.

RYABTSEV, Anatoliy Dmitriyevich, born 1952, chairman of the oblast committee for water resources, city of Semipalatinsk. From Semipalatinsk Oblast.

SULEYMENOV, Nurlan Ilyasovich, born 1946, deputy head of the Almaty City Administration, city of Almaty. From Tastakskiy Electoral District No. 5, city of Almaty.

SUBBOTIN, Sergey Anatolyevich, born 1963, reserve officer in the Border Troops Command of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Amangeldinskiy Electoral District No. 9, city of Almaty.

SARTAYEV, Sultan Sartayevich, born 1927, rector of the Kazakh Institute of Jurisprudence and International Relations, city of Almaty. From Shiyeliskiy Electoral District No. 77, Kzyl-Orda Oblast.

SMAGULOV, Shaymurat Smagulovich, born 1936, head of the Zhambul Rayon Administration, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, village of Blagoveshchenka. From Sergeyevskiy Electoral District No. 106, North Kazakhstan Oblast.

SUYERBAYEV, Rakhmetulla Khamitovich, born 1938, vice president of the state holding company Kazakhgaz, city of Uralsk. From Burlinskiy Electoral District No. 60, West Kazakhstan Oblast.

SAPAROV, Tabylgali Satkaliyevich, born 1954, head of the Taskalinskiy Rayon Administration, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, Taskalinskiy Rayon. From Taskalinskiy Electoral District No. 62, West Kazakhstan Oblast.

SULTANOV, Kuanysh Sultanovich, born 1945, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Zharkentskiy Electoral District No. 115, Taldykorgan Oblast.

SOLOVYEV, Anatoliy Vladimirovich, born 1936, chairman of the oblast committee of the communications trade union, city of Pavlodar. From Pavlodarskiy Electoral District No. 96, Pavlodar Oblast.

SULTANOV, Yerik Khamzinovich, born 1956, first deputy head of the Ekibastuz City Administration, city of Ekibastuz. From Ekibastuzskiy Electoral District No. 98, Pavlodar Oblast.

SIVRYUKOVA, Valentina Andreyevna, born 1948, president of the Birlesu republic trade union, city of Almaty. From Enbekshinskiy Electoral District No. 125, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

SADYKOV, Bakhtiyar, born 1948, former chairman of the Saryagashskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Saryagash. From Saryagashskiy Electoral District No. 132, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

SEYDALIYEV, Murat, born 1944, deputy head of the Moyynkumskiy Rayon Administration, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, Moyynkumskiy Rayon. From Shuskiy Electoral District No. 53, Zhambyl Oblast.

SKORIKOV, Aleksey Ivanovich, born 1942, chief of the locomotive depot of Tselinograd Station, city of Akmola. From Ishimskiy Electoral District No. 14, Akmola Oblast.

SILKINA, Tatyana Yegorovna, born 1949, deputy chairman of the International Committee for Rights of Military Servicemen and Their Family Members, city of Akmola. From Atbasarskiy Electoral District No. 18, Akmola Oblast.

SULEYMENOV, Mekhlis Kasymovich, born 1939, director of the Kazakh Scientific Research Institute for Grain Farming imeni Barayev, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, village of Shortandy. From Tselinogradskiy Electoral District No. 19, Akmola Oblast.

SMIRNOV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, born 1957, workers' settlement Fedorovka. From Fedorovskiy Electoral District No. 91, Kustanay Oblast.

SADYKOV, Aytzhan Aytmukhanovich, born 1951, deputy head of the Lebyazhinskiy Rayon Administration, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, village of Lebyazhye. From Shcherbaktinskiy Electoral District No. 100, Pavlodar Oblast.

SABDENOV, Orazaly, born 1947, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty. From the city of Almaty.

SYTOV, Yuriy Nikolayevich, born 1947, chief of the Main Geology Directorate of the Ministry of Geology and Protection of Mineral Resources, city of Almaty. From East Kazakhstan Oblast.

SULEYMENOV, Olzhas Omarovich, born 1936, chairman of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Semipalatinsk Oblast.

SARABEKOVA, Tarbiye Serbatovna, born 1947, deputy head of the Leninsk City Administration and chairman of the territorial Committee for State Property Management, city of Leninsk. From the city of Leninsk.

TINIKEYEV, Mukhtar Bakirovich, born 1963, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty. From Kuzembayevskiy Electoral District No. 63, Karaganda Oblast.

TOKHTAROV, Tanirbergen Tokhtarovich, born 1952, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty. From Zhanasemeyskiy Electoral District No. 111, Semipalatinsk Oblast.

TURLYKHANOV, Daulet Bulatovich, born 1963, head coach of the National Greco-Roman Wrestling Team of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Urdzharskiy Electoral District No. 113, Semipalatinsk Oblast.

TSHANOV, Amalbek Kozybakovich, born 1942, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Shymkent. From Al-Farabinskiy Electoral District No. 124, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

TREGUB, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1940, head of the Iliyskiy Rayon Administration, Kaskelenskiy Rayon. From Iliyskiy Electoral District No. 28, Almaty Oblast.

TASTANDIYEV, Sapamgazy Mukhamedkali-uly, born 1948, senior assistant to the Taldykorgan Oblast prosecutor, city of Taldykorgan. From Taldykorgan Oblast.

UMERBAYEV, Adilkhan Abdrakhmanovich, born 1962, deputy head of the Leninsk City Administration, city of Leninsk. From Baykonurskiy Electoral District No. 92, city of Leninsk.

FEDOTOV, Viktor Danilovich, born 1956, chief of the Yenbekshilderskiy Rayon Department of Internal Affairs, city of Stepnyak. From Shchuchinskiy Electoral District No. 82, Kokshetau Oblast.

FEDOSEYEV, Sergey Gennadyevich, born 1962, instructor in the military department of Kazakh Polytechnical University, city of Almaty. From Alatauyskiy Electoral District No. 2, city of Almaty.

FOMICHI, Nikolay Aleksandrovich, born 1951, instructor at the Kokshetau School of Music, city of Kokshetau. From Kokshetauskiy Electoral District No. 78, Kokshetau Oblast.

FEDOTOVA, Zinaida Leontyevna, born 1938, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII

Convocation, member of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Almaty Oblast.

KHRISTENKO, Aleksandr Fedorovich, born 1936, general director of the Karaganda Scientific Research Sovkhoz/Institute, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, Telmanskiy Rayon. From Karaganda Oblast.

KHODZHANAZAROV, Usen Turlibekovich, born 1955, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty. From Kzyl-Orda Oblast.

CHERNYSHEV, Vladimir Vasilyevich, born 1938, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Kustanay. From Kustanayskiy Electoral District No. 84, Kustanay Oblast.

CHIZHIK, Assa Iudovna, born 1940, chief physician of the North Kazakhstan Oblast Stomatology Clinic, city of Petropavlovsk. From Severnyy Electoral District No. 103, North Kazakhstan Oblast.

CHASNIKOV, Ivan Yakovlevich, born 1933, laboratory director at the High-Energy Physics Institute, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Alatau. From Bolshenarymskiy Electoral District No. 44, East Kazakhstan Oblast.

SHELIPANOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1950, head of the Leninskiy Rayon Administration, city of Almaty. From Zheltoksanskiy Electoral District No. 8, city of Almaty.

SHAYAKHMETOV, Shaysultan, born 1939, adviser to the prime minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Amangeldinskiy Electoral District No. 122, Turgay Oblast.

SHINGISOV, Aytkozha Mukhamedzhanovich, born 1956, student at the Kazakh Institute for Management, Economics, and Prognoses, settlement of Shakhan. From Shakhtinskiy Electoral District No. 70, Karaganda Oblast.

SHEKEYEV, Zhaksylyk, born 1948, deputy head of the Suzakskiy Rayon Administration, Suzakskiy Rayon. From Algabasskiy Electoral District No. 129, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

SHIRYAYEV, Fedor Petrovich, born 1937, chief of the Main Administration for Mechanization and Electrification of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Aktyubinskiy Rural Electoral District No. 23, Aktyubinsk Oblast.

SHUKHOVTSOV, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1944, deputy of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, XII Convocation, city of Almaty. From Aktyubinsk Oblast.

SHCHEGOLIKHIN, Ivan Pavlovich, born 1927, national author of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From the city of Almaty.

YUSUPALIYEV, Sabirzhan Tokhtamishevich, born 1940, editor of the South Kazakhstan Oblast newspaper

DUSTLIK BAYROGI, village of Belyye Vody. From Sayramskiy Electoral District No. 131, South Kazakhstan Oblast.

Corrections to Newly Elected Deputies List

944K0896D Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 19 Mar 94 p 1

[Corrections to "Listing of Deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan": "Central Electoral Committee Publishes Corrections"]

[Text] L. Artamonova, secretary of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan, yesterday communicated with our editorial office. It is clear from the information she provided that errors have crept into the listing of elected deputies presented by the Central Electoral Committee for publication. Today we publish additional information from the Central Electoral Committee correcting these errors.

The section of the report entitled "Elected Candidates Nominated by Public Associations," published 17 March 1994 by the Central Electoral Committee in the newspaper KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, should read: the union People's Unity of Kazakhstan—30; Republic Council of Women's Organizations—3.

The listing of deputies of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan elected 7 March 1994 should read:

ABYLKANOV, Tulekul, born 1937, director for capital construction of the Balkhashmed production association, city of Balkhash. From Balkhashskiy Electoral District No. 55, Zhezkazgan Oblast.

ABISHEV, Khabylsayaz Azimbayevich, born 1957, doctoral candidate at the Institute of the State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Karaganda. From Zhezkazgan Oblast.

GARKAVETS, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1947, deputy general director for science and culture of Kaznatskultfond, member of the party People's Congress of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Kustanay Oblast.

YERMAGAMBETOVA, Aglen Kurmangaliyevna, born 1948, director of the collective enterprise Orkash, Mugodzharskiy Rayon. From Mugodzharskiy Electoral District No. 25, Aktyubinsk Oblast.

ZAIIKA, Anna Anatolyevna, born 1951, chief physician of the Akmola City Children's Hospital, city of Akmola. From Akmolinskiy Electoral District No. 15, Akmola Oblast.

ISAYEV, Musabek, born 1947, chief of the Atyrau Directorate for Boring Operations of the Embanefit Scientific Production Association, city of Atyrau. From Atyrauskiy Electoral District No. 34, Atyrau Oblast.

ISKAKOVA, Bayan Seilkhanovna, born 1957, deputy chief physician of the polyclinic section of the railroad depot, city of Kokshetau. From Kokshetau Oblast.

KOBENOV, Zmgali Abdrakhmanovich, born 1956, chief physician of the railroad hospital of the village of Shubarkuduk, West Kazakhstan Railroad, village of Shubarkuduk. From Khobdinskiy Electoral District No. 24, Aktyubinsk Oblast.

MURZAGULOV, Zhaneldy Kabetovich, born 1949, chief engineer of Geological Exploration Expedition 92, Ayyrtauskiy Rayon. From Kokshetauskiy Rural Electoral District No. 80, Kokshetau Oblast.

MUSRALIYEV, Tursynkhan Beysebayevich, born 1936, deputy head of the Zhambyl Oblast Administration, city of Zhambyl. From Zhambyl Oblast.

SHIRYAYEV, Fedor Petrovich, born 1937, chief of the Main Administration for Mechanization and Electrification of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan, city of Almaty. From Aktyubinskiy Rural Electoral District No. 23, Aktyubinsk Oblast.

Western Criticism of Elections Pondered

944K0914A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 11, 16 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Aleksandr Samoylenko: "Everyone Is Happy With the Elections in Kazakhstan. Except for Certain Skeptics From the CSCE?"]

[Text] Alma-Ata [Almaty]—The elections for the new parliament in Kazakhstan were not the most routine news of recent days. On 8 March such press agencies as ASSOCIATED PRESS, REUTERS, and ITAR-TASS greatly distressed women of the world community with the news that "the elections in Kazakhstan did not correspond to international standards of democracy."

Men were also distressed. Particularly on the Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan. They were so upset that they lost the power of speech for the three women's days, and this whole time "enemy radio voices" (the enemies are all those who do not flatter!) tarred unimpeded the facade of young Kazakhstan democracy.

It is impossible to take what happened seriously. It was foolish to expect in the parliamentary births the daughter of Democracy, not having conceived her in good time (surely the nomenklatura fathers of Kazakhstan understand this?!), and it was just as foolish (on the part of the CSCE observers) heart-rendingly wailing to the world that in Kazakhstan (ah, in Kazakhstan itself!!!), apparently, there is a tight situation when it comes to freedom and fairness.

I personally am amazed by something else—the fantastic haste with which Jan Van Hauvelingen's delegation at the news conference on 8 March accused Kazakhstan of "the aims of free and fair elections not being met."

The trouble with these Dutch and Americans and the miscellaneous world community is that, despite the imagination of the ladies and gentlemen, they are not given to understand the entire "distinctiveness," "youthfulness," and "individuality" of our democracy. Whence it transpires that what for them is nomenklatura willfulness is for us "the indisputable"—in N. Nazarbayev's expression—"success of young Kazakhstan democracy." What for them

is staggering confusion is for us "difficult weather conditions." Earlier spring did not indulge the farmers, now (who could have thought it!) the climate is hampering democratic transformations also.

In other words, the misfortunes of some are the blessings of others. The CSCE observers were extremely upset by the fact that Kazakhstan had not in its organization of the elections abided all that much by the Paris Charter. And a polling station of an Alma-Ata district could not even remember this charter when, prior to the counting of the vote, "extra" ballot boxes full of ballots miraculously appeared. In the opinion of the CSCE experts, the Kazakhstan elections were not in the best harmony with the Helsinki Final Act either. And at other polling stations the ballots were printed either only in Kazakh or only in Russian.

But if there is a desire to be at one with the world community (which was why observers were summoned to the elections), there had to be some response to the critical passages of the CSCE broadcast to the world. And a response was forthcoming. The Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan called its own news conference and... tore to shreds the conclusion of the observers of the CSCE, and this was done with such assured self-satisfaction, what is more, as though Kazakhstan had accumulated a wealth of experience of life in the channel of international charters and acts.

This was an odd news conference. The Central Election Commission pressed invitations on the ambassadors of Iran and Turkey (why not Britain and the United States?), and for some reason or other the presidium contained representatives of the General Procuracy and the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan, the ministers of the press and foreign affairs, and the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers in charge of the press! Why had I, a journalist, to work in the presence of ambassadors of foreign states and, simultaneously, people from the General Procuracy?! Dissatisfaction with the elections was expressed by "individual" representatives of the CSCE. Why were the opinions of the ambassadors of France and Romania distributed in the cloakroom of the news conference? What, did they not agree with the CSCE in its evaluation of the elections in Kazakhstan?

In short, the Kazakhstan Central Election Commission smeared findings of the group of observers of the CSCE on the wall, going so far as to say that they did not have the right to stage their news conference and "should have notified us."

What can we say.... The ways of the former party functionaries of assessing themselves as the inspiration behind and organizers of all our victories remain exactly what they used to be. They never allowed and do not now allow anyone, the CSCE included, to cast doubt on their "successes." Yesterday they were foaming at the mouth, defending the sanctity of the CPSU and pushing into parliament milkers, plasterers, and slaughtermen. Today these same people are proud that in the "new" parliament there are one worker and three Jews—and all have higher education.

The most distressing thing is that Kazakhstan's first contact with the CSCE ended, through the fault of local

functionaries, in a row. A shame. It is time to break ourselves of the habit of pouting and bawling out dissenters. It is time to learn to listen closely to people, from a long way off included, and to thank them for their assistance, even if these people have in some respects artlessly erred.

TAJIKISTAN

Latifi Outlines Opposition Concerns, Goals

944K036A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 11, 18 Mar 94 p 2

[Interview with Otakhon Latifi, chairman of the board of the coordinating center of Tajikistan's democratic forces in the CIS countries, by OBSHCAYA GAZETA correspondent Aleksandr Karpov; place and date not given: "Opposition Is for National Accord"]

[Text] The Tajik problem may only be solved by political methods—this is the main result of negotiations between the delegation of forces in opposition to the current official Dushanbe with the Russian MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] leadership, which were held under UN sponsorship in Teheran. Our correspondent Aleksandr Karpov interviews a member of the Tajik delegation at this meeting—Otakhon Latifi, chairman of the board of the coordinating center of Tajikistan's democratic forces in the CIS.

[Karpov] Why did the negotiations process on the Tajik problem begin with, of all things, the opposition meeting with the Russian political leadership?

[Latifi] It is our deep conviction that negotiations with current Tajik authorities are impossible without first discussing the Russian factor. Russia, which alternately supported either one or the other side in the confrontation, found itself, willy-nilly, directly involved in this conflict. Today the official regime in Tajikistan is holding up only because of the presence of the Russian army, which in its actions transcends the boundaries of peacekeeping tasks and constantly interferes in the internal affairs of a sovereign independent state. This has been acknowledged by international experts, Russian analysts, and the Russian press. One of the important results of the meeting in Teheran is the general understanding that peacekeeping forces in our republic may even be represented by Russia's 201st motorized rifle division but on the condition that it will be authorized by the United Nations.

[Karpov] Opposition leaders' statements at various times often mentioned Russia's special geopolitical interests in Tajikistan. What specifically do they have in mind?

[Latifi] The economy—it is the uranium industry in Leninabad Oblast. Do not forget that the first Soviet atomic bomb was built using uranium ore mined around the city of Chkalovsk. Many among our enterprises also have direct ties with plants and factories in the Russian Federation. In the political sphere, Tajikistan has always been and remains a gate to the East for Russia; Russian positions in Iran, Afghanistan, and India depend to a considerable extent on relations with Tajikistan. Anyway, how can one discard ties that go back more than 200 years?

[Karpov] For a long time, Tajikistan's official authorities kept saying that they could not sit down at the negotiating

table with the opposition, whose "hands are in blood up to the elbows." The opposition, in turn, maintained that they have nothing to discuss with a puppet government...

[Latifi] Most such mutual accusations are a thing of the past. During his latest trip to Tashkent, Emomali Rakhmonov said that he is willing to sit down at the negotiating table with any official representative of the opposition forces regardless of his political views. As to blood on the opposition's hands, I want to remind that opposition in Tajikistan had never been in power. Right now, however, the important point is that there is an opportunity to reach a sensible solution, in which there should be no place for ambitions.

[Karpov] Criminal proceedings, which are investigated by the republic procuracy, have been initiated against many opposition leaders in Tajikistan...

[Latifi] One of the terms of truce is that all these proceedings will be terminated.

[Karpov] Probably the first round of negotiations between the opposition and the representatives of Tajikistan's official authorities will take place soon. What proposals will the opposition forces leaders bring to this meeting?

[Latifi] Tajikistan's authorities more or less control the situation in Dushanbe, but certainly not in the republic as a whole. Therefore, a period of transition to stabilization must be defined. During this time, in our opinion, a state council of national accord should be set up, which will be comprised of new, absolutely neutral people. Over the period of two or three years they will have to make a tremendous effort to return all refugees to the Motherland (about a million people); conduct a population census; disarm all—both opposition and government—illegal armed formations. And only then draft and adopt a new national constitution and conduct elections to the supreme bodies of authority. The opposition does not thirst for power. All we want is national accord.

UZBEKISTAN

Karimov Proffers Opinions on Democratic Reform, Russian Relations

944K0884A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Mar 94 p 8

[Report by Yelena Dikun: "Islam Karimov—Uncomfortable in a 'Member-Carrier'"]

[Text] As reported in the press, Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov made an official visit to Moscow last week. Prior to his return to Tashkent, Mr. Karimov met with representatives of business circles and the Moscow intelligentsia at the Uzbek Embassy. The confidential discussion broadened the understanding of meeting participants of the current situation in Uzbekistan and of its leader. In particular, President Karimov stated...

On Democracy and Democrats

The Moscow newspapers are writing a great deal about Karimov allegedly using the bugaboo of fundamentalism to protect his authoritarianism and policies, about him being a reactionary. While at the same time they make no mention of the fact that in all of Central Asia it is only in

Uzbekistan, in 1991, that presidential elections were held with alternative candidates in the running. I received 86 percent of the votes at that time, while Akayev and Nazarbayev got 98.5 percent. They are referred to as democrats, and I—as a postcommunist.

When Akayev meets with Americans, he states that Kyrgyzstan is the bastion of democracy in Central Asia. Incidentally, had Karimov not gone to Kyrgyzstan on the eve of its referendum and supported Mr. Akayev, the latter would not have received 96 percent of the votes. Or consider what is going on in Turkmenistan. You see 15-meter statues of the leader with every step you take—the likes of which even Stalin did not permit himself. We have adopted a Constitution that underwent the most exacting expert review in many Western countries. Incidentally, the states of West Europe and America follow very closely what is going on in Uzbekistan. We have adopted laws on human rights, on citizenship, and on elections, that correspond to the norms of the democratic states. And we will attain the kind of democracy others only dream about. The fact that we are only able to do this some time after you have done it is a different matter. But I am a practical individual, a realist and pragmatic. I therefore often ask myself the question: Why inflict harm needlessly?

Purely Personal

I will admit that when they received me with full honors just now in Moscow and then transported me around the city in this grand "member-carrier," I did not feel good about it. Why so? After all, I have spent 40 years in Moscow and, like any visitor who walks, I know it perhaps even better than you. Before, when I was an economist and later minister of finance, I used to come here at least twice a month on official business with the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] and the Ministry of Finance. I would run all around the capital then with my briefcase, and each time would drop in without fail at Children's World. Usually I tried to arrive when the store opened, when there were fewer people, and would spend an hour or two here. I was familiar with all five floors of the store and knew what was sold in each department. After all, I have two little girls and I used to bring them everything from here...

On Independence

After the Soviet Union collapsed and we became sovereign, there was a period of giddiness with us, of euphoria. All of a sudden we all felt quite independent. In certain cases this independence turned into a fetish and people began to fashion grand plans around it. But life is cruel and it quickly demonstrated to us that simply declaring independence was not sufficient to achieve it. What is the point of sovereignty if our children will not live normal lives under it?

Recently at an international forum in Davos, I sat next to Mrs. Bhutto, Mr. Demirel, Nazarbayev, and my friend the Turkmen leader—I forgot his name. Mrs. Bhutto, a strong personality, of course, compared to us, brilliantly rattles off English (I feel insecure in that I do not know foreign languages, though I did study English, German, and French in my time). So she began talking about the fact that since there is no Iron Curtain now and the Central Asian republics are open, we finally have the opportunity

to make contacts with one another, integrate, etc. When I was in Islamabad I learned that many people there are starting to think that Pakistan will now be the leader in the region. It is very important, therefore, for us to feel that we have something behind us that will impart to us power and might. For Uzbekistan this pillar is Russia. He who believes that Russia can be written off is mistaken. We in Uzbekistan realize that Russia is a great power in every sense of the word.

On Reforms

I am an advocate of the reforms Russia is carrying out, and I fully support them. But we have different methods of attaining these objectives. Under our conditions, radical reforms are unworkable. Tell me, do we have the right, when 50 percent of the population of Uzbekistan are children, who cannot feed themselves, to tear everything down to its foundation and then, as the revolutionary song goes—"We will build a new world, our own world"? If we followed this course in Central Asia, you would see an explosion worse than what has occurred in Karabakh. You in Russia have gotten too carried away by these reforms and, as a result of their forced implementation, you have discredited the most noble intentions. But we have found the only proper way out—we have operated without "shock therapy" and have not been too quick to repudiate the legacy of the past. We have achieved a great deal. Whereas the decline of production as compared with 1989 is somewhere around 46 percent on the average for the countries of the former USSR, in Uzbekistan it is 12 percent. The drop in national income on the average throughout the republics is 34 percent, while in Uzbekistan it is just 6 percent. In short, our situation is much better than that in other regions.

On Barriers

We ourselves are inventing a great many barriers today that separate us from one another. For example, the expressions "near abroad" and "far abroad" have recently come into everyday use. These concepts appeared with you in Russia, not with us. Then too, it is not entirely clear as to just what criteria are used to categorize certain countries with the "near abroad" and others with the "far abroad." For example, why is America, with whom you have developed fairly warm relations, considered the far abroad?

In the same manner, I do not really perceive the concept "Russian-speaking population." Whom does this term include—just Slavic peoples? But then, where do you place me, a person who has completed Russian schooling and who speaks Russian? The Russian language has always united us—now we seem to be turning it into a watershed.

Nazarbayev and I resisted right up to the end the departure of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan from the ruble zone. I said that the most terrible consequence of this step would be the fact that millions of people would feel alienated from Russia. And this is in fact what happened. Today Belorussia [Belarus] and Russia want to create a unified monetary system. I think this is proper, but it should not be confined to a union between Belorussia and Russia. This garment should be thrown out to all the countries of the former USSR.

Edict on Formation of State Committee for Administration of State Property, Support of Entrepreneurship

944K0907A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
10 Feb 94 p 1

[Edict: "Edict of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning the Formation of the Republic of Uzbekistan State Committee for Administration of State Property and the Support of Entrepreneurship"]

[Text] For purposes of the further deepening of the economic reforms and the processes of destatization and privatization, as well as guaranteeing the development of entrepreneurship in the republic, [it is decreed]:

1. To form the Republic of Uzbekistan State Committee for Administration of State Property and the Support of Entrepreneurship (Goskomimushchestvo) on the base of the Republic of Uzbekistan Committee for Administration of State Property and Privatization and the State Property Fund under Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry of Finance [Uzgosfond].

To transfer Uzgosfond from Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry of Finance to the makeup of the Republic of Uzbekistan State Committee for Administration of State Property and the Support of Entrepreneurship.

2. To define as the basic tasks in the areas of activity of the Republic of Uzbekistan State Committee for Administration of State Property and the Support of Entrepreneurship:

- the conducting of a single policy in forming a diverse economy and in supporting entrepreneurship; the development of programs and the definition of priorities in destatization and privatization, and in promoting the development of private business in the republic;

- the organizational and methodological guidance of the process of destatization and privatization and the support of entrepreneurship; the coordination of the activities carried out by the appropriate structures;

- the protection of the property rights of the republic's population in the process of destatization; the mobilizing of funds from the transformation of objects of state property into other forms of property in order to resolve tasks of structural reforms in the economy;

- the definition of the basic trends and forms of attracting, as well as using, foreign investments during the destatization and privatization of objects of state property;

- the creation of investment funds, consulting and auditor services, holdings, fund exchanges and real-estate exchanges, other funds, and other market structures.

3. To establish that the decisions of the Republic of Uzbekistan State Committee for Administration of State Property and the Support of Entrepreneurship that have been made within the confines of its powers are mandatory for execution by ministries, departments, concerns, associations, enterprises (unions), institutions and organizations, and local agencies of authority and administration.

4. The Republic of Uzbekistan Cabinet of Ministers, within the period of one week, is to enact a decree concerning the organizing of the activities of the Republic of Uzbekistan State Committee for Administration of State Property and the Support of Entrepreneurship, and to approve the structure of the committee and the statute governing it.

5. To recognize as no longer in effect the edicts of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, dated 7 September 1992, entitled "Formation of the State Property Fund Under Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry of Finance ('Uzgosfond') and dated 10 February 1992, entitled "The Formation of the Republic of Uzbekistan Committee for Administration of State Property and Privatization (Goskomimushchestvo)."

[Signed] I. Karimov, president of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Tashkent

7 February 1994

Decree on Organization of Work of Committee for Administration of State Property, Support of Entrepreneurship

944K0907B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
15 Feb 94 pp 1-2

[Decree: "Decree of the Republic of Uzbekistan Cabinet of Ministers Concerning the Organization of the Work of the Republic of Uzbekistan State Committee for Administration of State Property and the Support of Entrepreneurship"]

[Text] In conformity with Edict of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, dated 7 February 1994, entitled "The Formation of the Republic of Uzbekistan State Committee for Administration of State Property and the Support of Entrepreneurship" the Cabinet of Ministers decrees:

1. To approve the structure of the central apparatus of the Republic of Uzbekistan State Committee for Administration of State Property and the Support of Entrepreneurship [Goskomimushchestvo].

2. To define the maximum number of workers in the Goskomimushchestvo system, including its territorial subdivisions, in the amount of 904 billets.

To establish that the financing of the central apparatus of Goskomimushchestvo and its territorial administrations is carried out at the expense of the republic budget, and the financing of the rayon and city subdivisions at the expense of funds from the appropriate local budgets.

To establish, effective 1 February 1994, the salary rates for the managerial workers and specialists of Goskomimushchestvo in accordance with decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers, dated 26 December 1992, No. 589 (Appendix No. 2) and No. 590.

3. To approve the standard structure of the territorial administration of Goskomimushchestvo.

To establish that the territorial agencies for the administration of state property and the support of entrepreneurship are directly subordinate to Republic of Uzbekistan Goskomimushchestvo and in their practical work interact closely with the appropriate *khokimiyats*.

4. Goskomimushchestvo is to create in the first quarter of 1994 a scientific-research center for problems of forming a diverse economy, with a computer center, within the confines of the appropriations stipulated for science in the republic.

The *khokimiyat* of the city of Tashkent, within a period of two weeks, is to resolve the question of assigning accommodations for the center.

5. In conformity with the tasks that have been imposed, Goskomimushchestvo is to be granted the right:

- to carry out the powers of the owner of property belonging to the state;
- to approve in the established procedure the normative and methodological documents, and to carry out publishing activity;
- to create and liquidate investment funds, consulting and auditor services, holdings, and fund exchanges and real-estate exchanges, and to participate in the creation of property and other funds and other market structures;
- to transfer on a contractual basis to joint-stock companies, for their development and the resolution of social problems, part of the dividends on shares belonging to the state;
- to purchase shares (stock) in joint-stock companies and other economic societies and corporations;
- to delegate the right of administration with regard to the shares (stock) belonging to the state, to other agencies of state administration, associations, corporations, unions, holding companies, investment funds, and other managing subjects;
- to carry out operations involving the sale of shares belonging to the state, as well as involving the exchange of them for shares of special funds of destatization and privatization, and holding companies.

6. To define that the funds accruing from the destatization and privatization of objects of state property, the payment for rental of state enterprises and organizations, and the income from the sale of shares in joint-stock companies newly approved by the state accumulate in accounts that are specially opened by Goskomimushchestvo and are channeled into:

- the paying off of the domestic and foreign debts of the Republic of Uzbekistan;
- the making of investments in structural reforms in the economy;
- the socioeconomic development of the territories;
- the implementation of programs of destatization, privatization, and the development of private business.

7. The State Committee for Administration of State Property and the Support of Entrepreneurship, within the period of 20 days, is:

- to develop a standard statute governing the territorial administration of Goskomimushchestvo;
- to submit to the Cabinet of Ministers drafts of the statute governing the State Committee, with a consideration of its new functions and its areas of activity, the republic exchange for trade in real estate, the republic fund exchange, and bankruptcy (provisional [statute]), and its recommendations concerning the use of investment checks in the process of destatization and privatization.

8. To grant the right to the chairman of the Republic of Uzbekistan Goskomimushchestvo to make changes in the approved structure of the committee's central apparatus within the confines of the established number of personnel and the fund for payment of labor.

9. The Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry of Finance is:

- to allocate to Goskomimushchestvo, for the purpose of equipping the central apparatus and the structural subdivisions, 520 *sum*-coupons;
- to transfer in the established procedure to Goskomimushchestvo the number of workers (301 billets), material-technical resources, stock, equipment, and means of transportation of Uzgosfond and its territorial administrations, with the corresponding [financial] limits;
- to carry out the financing of the work of the center in accordance with the research program that has been approved by the State Committee For Science and Technology.

10. To preserve the buildings, official accommodations, and communications lines that were previously occupied by Goskomimushchestvo and Uzgosfond and their territorial administrations, for use by Goskomimushchestvo and its territorial subdivisions.

11. To consider Republic of Uzbekistan State Committee for Administration of State Property and the Support of Entrepreneurship to be the legal successor of the transformed Republic of Uzbekistan Committee for the Administration of State Property and the State Property Fund under Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry of Finance.

12. To recognize as no longer in effect decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, dated 10 February 1992, No. 57; dated 3 August 1993, No. 362; and dated 10 November 1992, No. 518.

13. The monitoring of the execution of this decree is to be entrusted to Comrade A. M. Mutalov.

[Signed] I. Karimov, chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers

Uzbek Economic Environment Said To Facilitate Business Development

944K0871A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 3 Mar 94 p 13

[Article by Mikhail Stakhov: "They Promise That Businessmen Will Not Be Shot in Uzbekistan, and That They Will Even Make a Good Living"]

[Text] Half a year ago the president of a Western company, who made almost weekly visits to Moscow and had even opened an office here, decided to stop doing business in Russia. "Working here is inconvenient, difficult, and dangerous," he explained his decision tersely, although he had been making great plans just two years ago and had even managed to act on some of them. His euphoria soon passed, however, after it had been throttled by Russian irresponsibility.

Now he sees Moscow as only a transfer point—going from Sheremetyevo-2 to Sheremetyevo-1, and from there to Almaty, and then back home by the same route in reverse. In Kazakhstan he found what he could not find in Russia: a reliable and secure foundation for normal business activity. I would not exclude the possibility that he and his Western colleagues will now begin buying tickets to Tashkent as well. The harsh political climate in Uzbekistan unexpectedly turned out to be a favorable atmosphere for business. Unprecedented measures are being taken in Tashkent to carry out economic reforms, protect private property, develop business, and attract foreign investments on a broad scale.

President I. Karimov did what Moscow had tried and failed to do in the reverse order: He began by strengthening his political base and then opened the door to the market economy while keeping his finger "on the pulse." When Yu. Abdullayev, Uzbekistan's ambassador in Moscow, was asked what had made this possible, his reply was brief and to the point: "The time was right."

Judging by the edict the president of Uzbekistan issued on this matter, the mechanism of the process itself, which should be fine-tuned by various agencies in the next month (a special interdepartmental council was established to coordinate their work), should assign priority to the legal protection of non-governmental property, to administrative penalties and criminal liability for violations of the property rights of citizens, and to privileges, credits, and state guarantees for private owners within the limits specified by the Constitution of Uzbekistan. This means that the state will be responsible for securing a civilized business climate for those who are occasionally shot in Russia with the complete connivance or impotence of government officials (to which end the criminal and civil codes and other legal instruments in Uzbekistan will be supplemented and revised).

Apparently, guarantees of this kind are essential before a person can start doing business within the territory of the former Union and even start taking an interest in economic conditions. Tashkent is letting the market faucet run at almost full blast. Joint-stock companies of the closed type, for example, are to be "opened up." Republic commercial exchanges will sell state property slated for privatization and sell stock in enterprises undergoing this process. Facilities in the trade and service sector and

parcels of land may be acquired as private property in competitive bidding sessions. Furthermore, the bidder will not even be required to declare the source of the funds used for the acquisition of property.

Existing bureaucratic obstacles in the licensing procedure will be eliminated to stimulate business activity. Permits for various types of business activity will be issued by seven different agencies, including the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Public Education. There will be no restrictions on the amount of foreign currency brought into the country or taken out of the country by citizens of Uzbekistan and by foreigners—unless, obviously, some aspect of the transfer is against republic law.

The formation of joint ventures for the production of consumer goods will also be convenient in Uzbekistan. If the foreign share of the capital stock of these joint ventures exceeds 50 percent, they will be exempt from the payment of taxes on foreign currency receipts and from the obligatory sale of part of the foreign currency to the republic Central Bank for the first five years.

Officials in Tashkent, in contrast to those in Moscow, felt it would be counterproductive to "shelter" local producers with high import duties and thereby strip the domestic consumer market bare. For this reason, customs duties on all but a few types of goods will not be charged until 1 July 1995. In addition, there are some export quotas, especially on foodstuffs. Customs duties on exports will range from 5 percent of the contract cost (for cotton fiber or raw silk, for example) to 50 percent (mixed feeds, table salt, and matches) and 100 percent (antiques of cultural value).

These rates are temporary, of course, and are certain to be reviewed after the improvement of conditions in the food supply and several other spheres.

One more item on the list of measures connected with economic reform is extremely important in the establishment of a free market. It concerns the host of bureaucrats who are smothering the businessmen in Russia. This is why the edict specifically stipulates (and we can only hope that this is not a mere declaration) that any kind of interference in the finances and management of enterprises, establishments, and organizations, irrespective of their property status, by the heads of administrations and superior administrative bodies will not be tolerated, and neither will the creation of various types of extra-budgetary funds in rayons and cities with deductions from the income of enterprises, establishments, and so forth.

The innovations in Tashkent did not escape the notice of the West or the East. They are certain to influence economic processes in other Central Asian republics, where Tashkent would like to consolidate its influence, with the energetic encouragement of some rich Muslim countries, primarily Saudi Arabia. Karimov's recent trip to Turkey was no coincidence. We can assume that the first investments will begin flowing into Uzbekistan from Turkey. Karimov got his start in politics, but now he wants to win economic victories as well.

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